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Fraud (Trials without a Jury) Bill

That point has also been made by other hon. Members. Nevertheless, it has been part of the Solicitor-General’s argument that cases such as the Jubilee line and Blue Arrow have caused many problems. In Her Majesty’s chief inspector’s suggestions on what to do about those burdens, he was talking not only about the Jubilee line case but about the problem that some trials are of substantial length. He said that such cases did not need to be taken away from a jury; rather, they needed a proper structure and support, and they needed to be planned effectively to minimise the disruption for jurors and to provide authoritative assistance. That needs to happen, and I would be interested to find out what progress has been made in that regard, and also what steps have been taken that have not worked, that justify taking this extra step of sacrificing the principle of trial by jury. I should be happy to give way to the Solicitor-General if he can tell me what steps have been taken as a result of those suggestions to avoid the situation that we find ourselves in now. If we are to make this sacrifice, it is important to recognise that there would be a limited number of cases involved. Of the 40,000 or so cases going to the Crown court, we are talking about 20 or so cases, and about six this year. Indeed, in four years, only 26 cases have lasted more than six months. That puts this matter in perspective, if the Government are using those cases as a justification for going down this route. Case management is highly relevant to this issue. The criminal procedure rules were introduced at the end of March for quite proper reasons, in order to streamline cases, to make interviews more succinct and to ensure that the length of trials could be reduced wherever possible. But where is the evidence that any of the six cases this year has not been properly streamlined and reduced in length? Must we still go a large step further and seek to undermine the principle of trial by jury? The Government’s next justification for sacrificing that principle is that of complexity. By implication, that justification casts aspersions on the members of the jury—my fellow jurors, if I were asked to serve on a jury in a fraud trial. I should have to see whether I could get that length of time off to do so, but no doubt that would be the case. Would we, the jury, be able to cope with the complexity? That is the essential question for jurors. It is plainly patronising to question a jury’s ability to cope, and there is little evidence that they could not do so. It is a matter of conjecture, and I am worried that that argument is being used to justify taking such a serious step. The Government advance an argument about the prosecution being able to establish full criminality. The Solicitor-General has made the point about paring down charges and wanting to prove them. However, the fundamental issue is that justice must be seen to be done. The public are explicitly involved in that process by being members of a jury. A trial is not there just for the lawyers, for the defendants, for the victims or for the judge. It is not there for the state. It is there for the public, and for this country. It is there to provide an understanding of the conviction and the sentence, which is guaranteed by having a jury. We will not all go into the courtroom to listen to what is reported there, but the presence of the jury ensures that the public participate in the important judgment that is made. Why is fraud getting such special treatment? Why cannot the Government give careful consideration to how to deal with the burdens of full criminality? Why do they not consider the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004—the protocols of which are being implemented, as I was informed in a note only today—which allows the judge alone to consider similar charges after the defendant has been convicted on a sample count? Why do the Government not consider the effect of that, rather than rushing, as they seem to be doing, to throw away the jury? That leads many of us to suspect that they are not willing to consider the case management rules from last year, or the effects of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act, but are seeking to abolish jury trial as a point of principle. Others have drawn attention to a concern that Blackstone put much more authoritatively and succinctly than I could:"““these inroads on the sacred bulwark of the nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of our constitution; and that, though begun in trifles, the precedent may gradually increase and spread, to the utter disuse of juries in questions of the most momentous concern.””" I invite the Solicitor-General to consider that point. Let us deal in isolation with the Solicitor-General’s case on full criminality. Why cannot we apply the same principle of wanting to establish full criminality to other cases, such as health and safety cases? The Solicitor-General said that the RCPO might want to deal with financial implications of drugs cases as an adjunct. Where will that lead? Perhaps drugs cases, in which prosecutors must decide which of several defendants and counts to go for, will have that principle applied to them. Why should not we sacrifice the principle of the jury system in relation to terrorist cases, in which it might not be possible to expose full criminality without a complex, lengthy trial? Sadly, if the argument were applied consistently, that would be the case, and it is feared that that will happen. The Under-Secretary, the hon. Member for Enfield, North (Joan Ryan), justified the steps to be taken by saying that a double standard in relation to easy-to-prosecute petty frauds and unprosecutable major frauds was unacceptable. Are not double standards, with two different trial systems for criminal cases, exactly what the Bill suggests? A distinction is being made between white collar crime and other crimes. Are not double standards inherent in the Bill? Rather than referring to unprosecutable cases, should not we be dealing with prosecutions? To go a stage further, slightly away from the Bill but still on the subject of fraud, is it not the case that many minor frauds are not even investigated? Is not the double standard that one cannot get insurance companies or the police to investigate credit card frauds costing individuals millions? In terms of wanting to deal effectively with fraud, that is where the double standard is, not in the major frauds. The problem of trying to secure a successful prosecution is not dealt with by removing the jury. Instead, we should try to improve prosecutions. The Solicitor-General cited magistrates courts as a defence for judge-only decision making, but the core of the magistrates court, as I know it from being there year in, year out, is the lay magistracy. It is the beacon of magistrates. The Government have sought to diminish and limit its role, but it is part and parcel of the magistrates court and of the public participation that is itself part and parcel of the criminal justice system. The hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) is right. The Government do indeed have form—considerable form—in relation to removing the opportunity to opt for a jury trial. Form exists in the attempt to remove that opportunity in minor cases, but also in the attempt to prevent defendants themselves from opting for jury trial. That is of great concern to us all. As Members in all parts to the House have recognised, burdens are involved in dealing with serious and complicated fraud, but surely that is a price worth paying. Blackstone and others have referred to the price worth paying for justice. Surely we as a Parliament, given our dependence on the jury as a little parliament, should recognise and respect its fundamental importance to Parliament and to the country. Tonight, as on other occasions, we must be a jury deciding on the Solicitor-General’s case. Has the case been made for doing away with jury trial in limited circumstances? It is certainly not clear, and I would say there is no case to answer. We shall have an opportunity to vote, but given the case made by the Solicitor-General, I think it should be thrown out.