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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, I too am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Drayson, for introducing this debate. As the noble Lord, Lord Howell, said, the decision regarding the future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent is a very serious matter. It requires the widest possible consultation, which is why we on the Bench of Bishops welcome the White Paper. I think that it is the first time that a British Government have initiated a public debate of this kind. Since the Attlee Government committed themselves to a nuclear programme, decisions about nuclear weapons have been taken by the Prime Minister, as the Minister indicated this afternoon, with perhaps some key Cabinet colleagues but probably not the full Cabinet. That and much else in the White Paper is welcome. It is right to confine its arguments for the retention of a nuclear capability solely to the case for deterring nuclear threats and to resist the temptation to broaden its use to counter threats such as chemical and biological weapons. Also welcome are the proposed reductions in the stockpile of the United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal. These, and a readiness to reduce the number of submarines necessary to maintain this deterrent capability, underline the United Kingdom’s track record in progressively reducing its capability in line with its international obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. I also agree that the question of what constitutes a reasonable insurance policy in a dangerous and uncertain world is important and difficult. It is right that Governments should err on the side of caution. No one would disagree that it is a fundamental responsibility of any Government to provide for the security of the United Kingdom and its citizens, now and for the future, against both real and potential threats, including nuclear aggression and blackmail. Security is the good that makes possible other goods, and the defence of the United Kingdom remains the first duty of the Government. Yet as other noble Lords have noted, since nuclear weapons belong by virtue of their terrifying power in a different category to any other weapon system, it is important to ask what kind of security they offer us, and in what circumstances, if any, their use or threat of use can be ethically justified. It is that concern that I feel is insufficiently addressed by the White Paper. In paragraph 3.4, to which the Minister made oblique reference, the White Paper reasons: "““We deliberately maintain ambiguity about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate use of our nuclear deterrent. We will not simplify the calculations of a potential aggressor by defining more precisely the circumstances in which we might consider the use of our nuclear capabilities. Hence, we will not rule in or out the first use of nuclear weapons””." Of course, there is merit in keeping potential enemies guessing. Nevertheless, given the grave ethical issues involved with any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, it is legitimate to ask in what sorts of circumstances their use might be justified and proportionate in terms of the just war doctrine. The White Paper gives inadequate treatment of that legitimate question, which I believe must be asked if the public debate is to be meaningful. Fear that making this information publicly available would somehow reduce the credibility of the United Kingdom’s deterrent is, in my view and that of others on the Bench of Bishops, overstated. Such reticence might have been excusable and understandable at the height of the Cold War, but I question its acceptability in today’s circumstances. The position of the Government is not necessarily shared by other comparably sized nuclear powers. President Chirac, for example, seems ready to discuss these issues more openly. The modernisation and adaptation of the French nuclear arsenal to strike at a potential aggressor’s political, economic and military power centres in a comparatively discriminate way marks a significant departure from the anti-cities strategy of the Cold War days. It is disappointing that a similar shift in strategy, and a move towards greater public transparency, is not reflected in this White Paper. Central to the concern that I and other right reverend Prelates have is whether we can be assured that the war plan for Trident and any successor will be based only and wholly on an explicit counter-combatant targeting strategy, holding at risk military and related assets and keeping non-combatant casualties to a proportionate minimum. For us, that is a crucial question in the context of the ethical arguments against nuclear weapons, which are strikingly omitted from the interesting box 3.1, which sets out the Government’s response to various counter-arguments. Since that is probably the most widely held objection to nuclear deterrents, I find the omission very curious. Addressing this ethical concern would not require the Government to disclose details of targeting plans or precise details of the envisaged circumstances of use. All it would require is for the Government to indicate their overall strategy, including the parameters for the weapons’ use and the limits within which any targeting policy would be set. That would enable the Government to explain how their use would be consistent with the United Kingdom’s obligations in international law, as well as with ethical principles, particularly the just war requirements that any use of weapons should be proportionate to the objective to be achieved, and discriminate in order to minimise non-combatant casualties. The Government’s reluctance to engage in such discussions leaves it vulnerable to the charge—from those opposed to a nuclear deterrent—that the use, or very possession, of nuclear weapons is immoral and somehow coarsens the moral fabric of the nation. If the Government are unwilling to say anything further about the terms under which they might use their deterrent, how are Parliament and the wider public meant to evaluate the efficacy and utility of such an instrument, even assuming that they are prepared to accept the principle of nuclear deterrence? As I have already said, the Government are to be congratulated on publishing this White Paper. For any debate to be meaningful, the Government need to provide additional information regarding their war plans for Trident. It is important to remember that the credibility of the national deterrence strategy depends to a significant extent on public backing, since an assessment of that will play into the calculations of potential aggressors. We on this Bench want to avoid being drawn into some of the party-political issues touched upon by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for example. We are aware of the complexity of the profound issues underlying this debate. Our concern is that amid the proper arguments already shaping the contributions of noble Lords, the hugely important ethical concerns continue to be explored rigorously in this House.