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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, in the context of today's debate many of us have been here before and carry some luggage, and, yes, scars. It is nearly 50 years since I attended the meeting at Central Hall, Westminster, on 17 February 1958, that effectively launched the campaign for nuclear disarmament. The distinguished platform included Bertrand Russell, J. B. Priestly and A. J. P. Taylor and Alan Taylor, my former history tutor, who was in coruscating rhetorical form. The audience was ecstatic, but I moved from agnosticism to the reluctant acceptance of nuclear weapons, upset by the militant unilateral campaigners and, more important, the clear threat from the Soviet Union to Britain’s security and freedom. I never accepted the aphorism that it was ““Better red than dead””. Almost a whole generation later, in July 1980, I replied in the House of Commons as shadow Secretary of State for Defence to the Conservative Government’s Statement that they intended to replace the existing Polaris nuclear deterrent with Trident. In a cautious response, I said that the Government's case had not been made but that I did not object to the principle. Many angry Labour Back-Benchers were not pleased, saying that they were in ““utter despair”” and that it was a ““disgrace””. Shortly afterwards I was removed from my role in a Labour Party’s television programme and replaced by Robin Cook, the then acceptable voice of unilateral disarmament; in due course I was sacked from defence by the Labour Leader. How times have changed. To complete the picture and to avoid misleading, I should point out that in the 1980s there were shifting opinions within my Social Democratic Party and between the SDP and the Liberals. We should not be surprised that bitter arguments over awesome nuclear weapons have continued for so long. Decisions involve acute ethical, financial, social and technological issues and changing international circumstances and threats. In high politics, taking risks over matters of life and death raises very difficult questions of judgment. But, in reflecting over half a century, I welcome the White Paper as it sets out plainly enough the areas of choice. In my view, if we are to have another generation of nuclear deterrents, the best prospect is a modestly updated Trident D5 missile system resting on a new class of submarines. As Britain is a small island, a nuclear deterrent is less exposed and vulnerable under water than on land or in the air. It is also better to build from the experience of Trident and draw on the United States’ facilities than to choose cruise missiles, although submarine-launched weapons may have been a serious alternative once upon a time. We cannot safely forecast the cost of the new boats, given our mixed financial record in dealing with complex weapons systems, but the procurement of Polaris and Trident was broadly within budget. Thus cost should be manageable despite the opportunity cost, including new claims within the budget, Britain having chosen to maintain its extended international frontiers. I hope that there will be only three boats rather than four, and fewer warheads, but I am not competent to weigh those arguments. The central question, prior to the merits of alternative nuclear systems, is whether Britain should retain a nuclear deterrent at all when the Vanguard-class submarines begin to leave service in the 2020s or possibly beyond. We cannot say with confidence whether Britain would have moved from wartime research to the procurement of its own nuclear weapons had there been no Cold War, but from the 1950s until the Berlin Wall came down, Britain’s case for nuclear weapons rested on the dangers from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It follows that, from the early 1990s, it seemed that there might be no need for a new generation of weapons. The paradox is that we have moved from a bipolar balance of nuclear power—and, I agree, of terror—that was carefully calculated and relatively stable after the Cuban missile crisis, despite those new tensions over the deploying of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe in the 1980s, to a twilight zone in which so much more is unpredictable. The White Paper refers to the ambitions of North Korea and Iran, but not to the long-term future of China or the flexible muscles of Russia, with Putin and his successors. Today’s terrorism, with which we are preoccupied, can be consolidated into maverick or rogue states with nuclear weapons as more than status symbols. I share the White Paper’s view that no one, hand on heart, can wholly discount the possibility of a major threat to Britain through our grandchildren’s lives. Despite recent foreboding, we may some time find ourselves living through the sunny uplands of unprecedented peace. But, taking the most optimistic view, the ultimate risk—and the danger to Britain—would remain. I recognise and respect all those who have long been opposed to nuclear weapons on ethical grounds, at every time and in every place. Yet I am not persuaded that, if nuclear weapons were, reluctantly, acceptable in the Cold War, they cannot be morally acceptable, sadly and reluctantly, in the years ahead. There is a serious argument—to adapt the memorable phrase of the noble Lord, Lord Hurd—that it is now time for Britain to punch below its weight. A post-Iraq parallel would be the ending of Britain’s imperial role following the Suez debacle, but even if Britain were to choose to shrink its international frontiers there would still be the need to protect the homeland from external threats. I share the view that there is no need for the Government to make a final decision on Trident now or for several years. There is time not only for a full and extended debate but, given the operational gap before the existing submarines are phased out, to wait for a decision after the next election. However, I assume that the Prime Minister and his putative successor would like to tidy up the loose ends before he moves on, whether we like that or not. Given the publication of the White Paper and a debate in both Houses, the momentum of opinion towards an early decision will gather. On such vital, critical security matters, the public may soon want to know exactly where policy-makers stand. I would like to believe that, in the gap, an unexpected successful international initiative on arms control and multilateral disarmament will justify having second thoughts on the thrust of the White Paper, but we should not deceive ourselves about the likelihood of that.