Proceeding contribution from Lord Owen (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 24 January 2007. It occurred during Debate on Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent.
Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent
My Lords, my noble friend has made a very dignified and serious speech, which deserves close attention. The issue before us is summed up in the words of the White Paper: "““The investment required to maintain””" our deterrent, "““will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities that our armed forces need””." Were that to be true, I would find it much easier to be enthusiastic in support of the White Paper, but all experience shows that that is not true. I remember that in 1968, when I had a small responsibility for the Royal Navy, it was genuinely believed by the admirals that the Polaris programme was outwith the rest of the defence budget and that the naval budget and capabilities would be judged quite separately. That was wrong then and it has been wrong ever since. Let us be clear: that statement is historically incorrect and it is very unlikely to be true in future. I then looked at what is the Royal Navy at present. In 1968, we had our first Polaris boat going out on patrol. We could claim, broadly, 200 naval ships; we had a substantial Navy. In 1980, Royal Navy personnel numbered 75,000. There were 8,000 to 10,000 Marines and a hundred capital ships. What is it today? There are roughly 33,000 Royal Naval personnel, 6,000 Royal Marines and 35 major ships. The Royal Navy is very close to lacking all-round capability and capacity. We have to face that. If we are really to make this decision as early as it is being asked for, it must coincide with the public expenditure review for 2007, not come before it. It needs to be taken into account in what we are going to do about, for example, the two carriers that have been consistently promised. It needs to be taken into account against the other service budgets. The Navy cannot be considered in isolation. Many naval personnel are involved in Afghanistan at the moment, if we consider the Royal Marines and others. All of us are in a way responsible for the fact that we have not kept the covenant with the Armed Forces. I must say that I object to the business of using naval ships as a background for political speeches. We have not done that in this country before; we have always kept that sort of thing to when we are actually operational abroad. It appears that the Prime Minister, after 10 years, accepts that he has not lived up to that covenant. If so, that is a very welcome change, but let actions speak louder than words and let us now look at the budget. Do we really accept in this House that we do not have enough Chinooks in Afghanistan and that, as a consequence, some of our soldiers die? Do we really accept the story about armaments, body armour, and so on? We can all argue about the aim—there is no question that anyone intended the situation—but it worked out so that many people believe that we were not putting basic resources into that fairly minor item of expenditure. We also need to look at many other aspects. I start with the belief that the defence budget at the moment is seriously inadequate. I am therefore being asked to take on a new commitment. I make absolutely no secret of my belief, and never have, that a ballistic weapons system is the best form of deterrent, provided that the warheads are sophisticated enough to be able to penetrate ABM defences. At least I have a track record on this. I argued in 1977, 1978 and 1979 that we had to be very careful before we committed ourselves to a belief that a deterrent was credible only if it could penetrate ABM defences, because I genuinely believed then, and events have subsequently borne this out in spades, that we in this country did not have the capability to keep ahead of the complicated and sophisticated changes in ABM defences. Just look what happened to the Chevaline programme, which started in effect under Harold Wilson’s Labour Government in 1967-68 as the Antelope programme. It became the Super Antelope programme, and then became the Chevaline programme. In 1972, which was probably the first time you could reasonably estimate its costs, it was going to cost £175 million. It ended up costing more than £1 billion—the cost escalated year by year; I could read the figures to the House—which is also a staggering increase in real terms. The House of Commons Select Committee report of 2006-07 on the provisions for nuclear submarines quite sensibly looked at all aspects, including asking whether there was sufficient capacity to build and maintain them and whether Rolls Royce had the nuclear capacity. It was an extremely good report. I came across this little statement on the Select Committee’s visit to Aldermaston and seeing the A91 building—the integrated radioactive liquid effluent treatment plant—which was completed but the plant was never used—a loss of expenditure of £147 million. I simply thought to myself that that was another sign that the programme, which is now a different Chevaline programme or whatever equivalent, demonstrates yet again our incapacity to contain our costs. On the basis of the argument as we currently see it, I reluctantly understand why the Government have taken the decision that they have. Certainly, the decision to participate in the Trident D5 life-extension programme, at a cost of some £250 million, is prudent, and keeps the options open. However, the section on dual use in the White Paper is extremely depressing. I believe that, in our economic situation, we must consider dual use for almost everything. The section on cruise missiles is one paragraph, with an absurd statement that, "““Any programme to develop and manufacture a new cruise missile would cost far more than retaining the Trident D5 missile””." What does that mean? Does it mean that Britain will develop a cruise missile by itself? We have never yet done so; we have very sensibly bought from the Americans. Are we then saying that the Americans will not make any changes to their cruise missiles? Why are they spending as much money as they are on hypersonic technology? It is perfectly possible that we may see a cruise missile of greater sophistication and perhaps particularly of greater speed. I happened to be in Belgrade a few years ago. I drove down the street and saw the Ministry of Defence, in which, for my sins, I had to spend some time in 1992-93 talking to the then Serbian military. The whole place had been completely destroyed. The buildings on either side were completely intact. I went further down the same street and saw the same thing with the Ministry of the Interior. I remember our Ministry of Defence telling me in 1978 that cruise missiles were inaccurate and unproven technology, and that was why the MoD could not make any commitment to it. Let us at least admit when we have made a mistake. The arguments have not been truthfully used under successive Governments, in part because of far too much secrecy. The present Government deserve some credit for coming up with an early proposal and giving us the potential—after all, we are only taking note of this White Paper—to explore it much more fully. As I understand it, the Government looked at dual use of Trident—whether one could put a battery of cruise missiles on those large boats, which one has to have if one is going to use Trident missiles, so one could have a cruise missile battery and also the possibility of being able to deploy Royal Marines in it—and they came out against it. I can understand that, with a dedicated programme and the possibility of only three submarines, but I am told by people who should know that at no stage has there been a serious look at dual use of cruise missiles and at no stage has there been a serious look at where new cruise missile technology could take us. That is not good enough. It means that we are not looking at all the options. The only justification for that would be if one had decided that any nuclear deterrent has to penetrate ABM defences. First, let us remember the Polaris situation. The Polaris was not able to penetrate Soviet ABM defences in the view of the then-chief of defence staff from November 1975 as relayed to Ministers and as revealed in documents that are in the public domain until Chevaline was deployed for the first time in the summer of 1982. There was a seven-year period during which time, first, the Ministry of Defence tried—in fact I believe that it succeeded—to stop the then Chancellor of the Exchequer knowing that there was this gap; and secondly, there was no overt debate about the question. Of course we had to keep it private. One was not in those days able to let the Soviet Union know that one had doubts about one’s own deterrent capacity, so there are limits, but now it is a completely different situation. Some of the language is as though the Cold War is still continuing. What was needed to penetrate Soviet ABM defences and the argument about the Moscow criterion was the linchpin of the debates in 1978-79, yet they had to be kept private. Now we can openly discuss the question and it is not yet apparent for me whether that is the Prime Minister’s criterion: that he wants a missile to be able to land on any country anywhere from any naval space. If we had all the money of the United States of course we would sign up to it tomorrow: that is a reasonable deterrent force. The Government can claim—they deserve some credit for it—that they have substantially reduced all the so-called tactical strategic nuclear weapons; taken them right out. They are wise and sensible for doing so. This is the start, not the end of a debate. This is the start of a discussion. If we replace the present Vanguard class I hope very much that the type of submarine is different from the one that we are currently imagining. It is not an appropriate response to mirror the situation of the government decision, which I broadly supported, to replace Trident in the early 1980s. We would be much wiser to start to think afresh on all those different questions. I do not mind taking a decision in principle that at the moment that looks the best option, which are much the same words as the previous speaker used, but I would not want to close down a cheaper option, particularly if I find out, as is highly likely, that we have insufficient money for the defence budget and for the maintenance of a credible Royal Navy.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
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- 688 c1127-30
- Session
- 2006-07
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- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Costs Arms control International cooperation Nuclear weapons Nuclear fuels Procurement Proliferation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Terrorism USA Trident submarines Iran Nuclear submarines North Korea Guided weapons Trident Cruise missiles
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- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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