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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, let me make it clear that I support the retention and ultimately the replacement of the Trident system. I notice that quite a few speakers have talked about abandoning the substrategic concept. I am not sure that that is necessarily such a good idea. I suspect that it is being covered by the present Government’s position by stretching the concept of what constitutes a strategic deterrent rather than the complete abandonment of the other. In the world of changing threats it is perhaps overly restrictive to rule out substrategic as opposed to tactical use of nuclear weapons. I pay tribute to the many valuable people working for us at Aldermaston and Burghfield. I was lucky enough to be responsible for them for a few years when I was in the MoD. We have talked about our relationship with the US in the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent. It is important to stress that this is not a one-way street. Our work is of value to the US just as its work is of value to us. It is therefore salutary that we have spent a considerable amount of money over the past few years on improving the facilities at these sites to ensure that we can continue to verify that our nuclear deterrent works properly in the absence of the ability to test it. In addition, we have invested in the skills which, as the nuclear industry in Britain runs down, are increasingly difficult to retain in this country. It is vital for us to retain these skills or we will lose the ability to manage and maintain our deterrent. We have been told that the long-term thinking needed for the replacement of Trident requires an early decision. It is perhaps more accurate to say that over the lifetime of any long-term weapon system, decisions are constantly being made on the relative merits of retention, refurbishment and replacement of that system. I am not absolutely convinced yet that the relative merits of refurbishment and replacement have been fully explored. It is worthy of note that the US, as was acknowledged by the Minister, with its vastly greater resources, still seeks to push the replacement date for its submarine fleet as far into the future as is practicable—I think that 2045 has been mentioned. It is hard to credit that at some time around 2020 the bottom will drop out of all our submarines and they will no longer be of any use. Submarines are designed with a minimum life and are built to a very high standard. It must therefore be a logical engineering decision to extend that life. If, however, Trident must be replaced and the only viable option is a new fleet of submarines, so be it. But let us explore every viable choice first to ensure that we reach the most cost-effective solution. Refurbishment of the existing fleet must surely be the most attractive option. Modification of the Astute class submarine, despite the delay in bringing them into use, must also be fully considered. The noble Lord, Lord Owen, mentioned the possible utility of cruise missiles. Of course, the great problem is their range, but, as the noble Lord said, there is no reason why, given an extended life for the present fleet, we might not be able to design a missile which will be far more adaptable, far cheaper to develop and, ultimately, of far greater utility than the present system. I do not intend detaining noble Lords for long. Resources are finite. I passionately support the doctrine of expeditionary force, which has been outlined in successive defence papers. The deployment of our people to conflicts which are often far from our shores ensures that they remain the best fighting men and women in the world. For their quality and morale to be maintained, they must have the tools and rewards for the job. We require adequate numbers of people and pay that is commensurate with the risks they run on our behalf. Soldiers who run the risk of being killed for six months of each year when they are deployed probably deserve much greater rewards than if they are sitting at home indulging in weekend war games. They also require proper accommodation, and sea and air cover. It is unthinkable that an expeditionary force can be mounted without the proposed aircraft carriers. They are expensive. Equally, the heavy lift that we need by air is expensive. The rapid effect system and future soldier technology will cost billions. As the noble Lord, Lord Owen, said, it is difficult to imagine that decisions on the replacement of Trident can be taken in isolation. Of course they cannot. If the defence budget is not to be expanded to cover these many needs, the money has to come from somewhere else—it does not grow on trees. The list of requirements is endless. Resources are finite. If we wish to do everything that we say we are going to do, we must have these resources. Surely, we cannot contemplate replacing Trident at the expense of the men and women who carry out such valuable work for us every day.