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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, the White Paper on continuing the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent virtually presents Parliament with a fait accompli, with only a few details about the number of submarines and whether, how and when we need to refurbish the ongoing D5 missiles to be decided. With the world as dangerous and uncertain as it is, the future so unpredictable, and some volatile regimes apparently intent on doing us or our friends harm, it is so easy to say that we would be mad to forgo our own ultimate weapons system and must not do so—a widely held view, to which Her Majesty’s Opposition have signed up. I feel, however, that my most useful contribution, in the interests of wider analysis and debate—until now conspicuously absent—is to act as devil’s advocate to that view. There are a number of other factors which the Government should consider very seriously before, as the song of The Good Soldier Švejk read, just keeping on keeping on, almost as if the world had not changed at all. First, it is difficult to see how the United Kingdom can exert any leadership and influence on the implementation of the non-proliferation treaty—if that is what we and the rest of the world want and, essentially, need—if we insist on a successor to Trident that would preserve our own nuclear-power status well into the second half of this century. On the other hand, abandonment, even perhaps before Trident finally wasted out, could be seen as a bold and striking decision intended to show that the country is resolved to return to the position of moral and ethical standards for which it was once widely recognised—and seems largely to have forgotten recently—and to exert some real leadership in the modern world, as the right reverend Prelate mentioned. Some major international player must take a lead in this. While making a further 20 per cent reduction in superfluous warheads may be seen as a gesture in the right direction, it hardly compares with abandoning Trident in favour of properly funding our Armed Forces with what they need to meet the commitments laid upon them, so that they can act, in that much vaunted phrase, as a force for good. Secondly, even our present nuclear deterrent cannot be seen as being truly independent of the United States in any substantial or useful sense. It continuously relies on the United States for the provision of components for, and regular servicing of, the D5 missiles—although not for the warheads, nor the launching submarines—and for US information on certain aspects of operation. Any successor to Trident would, of necessity, be even more dependent on the United States, with significant and unsatisfactory implications for a proper, two-way US/UK relationship. While this country has, in theory, complete freedom of action over giving the order to fire, it is unthinkable that these terror weapons, which are virtually unusable because of the catastrophic consequences for guilty and innocent alike at a time when most weapons systems are scrupulously becoming more selective, would ever be launched or seriously threatened by this country—itself intensely vulnerable to such weapons—without the backing and underwriting of the United States. It is difficult to assign high probability to any scenario now discernible under which our own nuclear capability would be necessary because the United States was somehow not involved. NATO speaks for itself. In the Middle East the United States would certainly be the guarantor of Israel if any other Middle East country seriously threatened it. Meanwhile, should our own country become subject to some sort of nuclear blackmail—from a terrorist group, for example—it must be asked in what way, and against whom, our nuclear weapons could be used, or even threatened, to deter or punish. Our present weapons system has shown itself completely ineffective as a deterrent to the threats and scale of violence we currently, or are likely to, face—particularly international terrorism. The more you analyse them, the more unusable such weapons systems appear. To use or threaten to use them against those who do not possess them would be to invite the outcry and retribution of the whole world; while for a country of the size and vulnerability of the United Kingdom to do so against a nuclear power would be to indulge in mutual suicide with untold consequences. With potential threats so diffuse and indirect, it would be virtually impossible to think of any obvious target, even if either the political will or any potential advantage existed, both of which are most unlikely. The philosophy of the Cold War was an entirely different matter. The much cited ““seat at the table”” may no longer have the resonance it once did. Political clout is likely to come much more from economic strength, as expressed by the G8. Even major-player status in the international military scene is more likely to find expression through effective, strategically mobile conventional forces capable of taking out pinpoint targets than through the possession of unusable weapons. Any military case for continuing our own nuclear capability can be made, as the White Paper admits, only on the absolutely general and long-term basis that, in an uncertain and changing world, it might feel comforting to have such a powerful weapon in the armoury in, say, 25 or 50 years’ time—just like an insurance policy against something which one hopes, and in this case has some reason to believe, will never happen. The really bald point is whether this country can afford nuclear deterrence considering what we are likely to get out of it. A successor to Trident, tied to the existing submarine-launched missile system, would cost at least £25 billion, judging from some of the estimate over-runs on various projects, and probably even more. That is a vast amount over 30 years, which our defence budget—now under immense pressure, already revealing massive funding gaps, particularly in the crunch period 2011-20—could not possibly cope with, as the noble Lord, Lord Owen, with all his experience, has said. It would simultaneously have to provide the many things likely to be required and used in the defence field, as the Prime Minister has said. After the most careful thought, if the British deterrent comes to be seen more as a status symbol like an American Express gold or platinum card, rather than a serious military weapon of war adding to our Armed Forces’ effectiveness, even for hard battle—the Prime Minister’s phrase, not mine, but one to which I thoroughly subscribe—and enhancing the security of our nation, £25 billion would be a great deal to pay for something so nebulous and doubtful. I can imagine the Treasury’s reaction if the argument ““You never know what lies around the corner”” was used to justify the proper size and shape for our conventional forces, which history has shown are always on call in the national interest. Therefore there must be a strong, perhaps over-riding case for the Government to continue to review such an important decision carefully, unemotionally, and taking into account changes in the international scene and in technological developments, even if this means delaying the decision. Before putting firm recommendations to Parliament, they should look first at other non-nuclear and sub-strategic options for our armoury with a far greater utility factor—cruise missiles in some form might be one option—which would still enhance both the deterrent power and the effectiveness of our Armed Forces. The aim at all times would be to achieve a greater flexibility in utility and selectivity of targeting than an exclusively megatonne nuclear solution can possibly provide, and at far less cost. Before Parliament is asked to endorse any Trident replacement, it should be made aware not only of the realistic costs—I stress realistic—but of how these costs are to be met and, if it is to be out of our defence vote, which is almost certainly going to be the case, of what compensating savings would have to be made to accommodate that replacement. If not, an assessment of the value and impact of such a decision would be incomplete. My final devil’s advocate question, although one which I hope noble Lords will feel is worthy of serious consideration, is: would this country not be better off morally and militarily without a new nuclear weapons system?