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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, I draw attention to my declaration of interests in the register. I support the case made in the White Paper for modernising our nuclear deterrent. Indeed, I regard it as self-evident. My reservations, which I shall come on to, relate to the number of warheads and submarines. In essence, I do not believe we can have fewer than four submarines to enable one to be on patrol at all times, and I have some concern that the Government may be preparing an escape route on that. Before coming to those issues, I shall make a few general observations. First, on the non-proliferation treaty, about which the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, spoke eloquently, it is a major objective to make it more effective. However, as we heard, Britain has set a good example by greatly reducing the size of its nuclear deterrent force. Other countries have greatly reduced their stocks of nuclear warheads, although more could certainly be done. I do not think it would be right to say that modernising an existing nuclear deterrent by one of the countries that was recognised to be in a special position by the NPT sets a bad example, especially not if one effect of that modernisation is to make the nuclear weapons safer and, possibly, less indiscriminate. I note that there are people—indeed, one is sitting very close to me, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall—who argue that we would never be prepared to use our nuclear deterrent, even in extremis. That fails to understand the resolve of our prime ministers to make choices with huge consequences, and I make that comment based on very close-quarters observation of some of them. Some noble Lords have argued that we face a new breed of enemy who is impervious to the threat of nuclear retaliation. That ignores the experience of the first Gulf War when the late Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction but did not use them because he was told very explicitly indeed what the consequences of using them would be. In that case, deterrence certainly worked. Even the baddest of enemies—and we are likely to face some very bad and nuclear-armed enemies in future—have a well developed sense of self-preservation. They are much less likely to use nuclear weapons or pass them on as proxies to terrorists if the price of that is retaliation. Only nuclear weapons deter the use of nuclear weapons; nothing else does. The nuclear threat is not as clear and present a danger just now as it was at the height of the Cold War, but we are not talking about ““just now””; we are talking about a deterrent capability stretching into the second half of this century. No one can have a precise idea of the sort of enemy or threat we shall face in that timescale, although it is clear that there will be more nuclear-armed countries, possibly many more, and some of them will be unstable and aggressive. So why allow an insurance policy against nuclear attack that we took out decades ago to lapse now in such troubled and potentially dangerous times? In that dangerous world, it is highly likely that Britain will again have to intervene militarily in regional conflicts, as we have recently, and rightly, in Iraq and Afghanistan. The difference will be that in future some of those conflicts are likely to involve nuclear-armed regional states. Without our own nuclear deterrent as a back-up, we could not take the risk of intervening with conventional forces. In other words, it is essential that we are able to prevent ourselves being deterred, and only possession of an independent deterrent can guarantee that. I do not entirely shy away from arguing that we should also preserve the deterrent for reasons of status, although, of course, the primary arguments are all military. Our status is earned by our contribution to preserving peace and stability, which gives us the influence to pursue wider British objectives and interests. We are more influential, in particular, on national security issues, than several comparable G8 countries, such as Germany, because we are more willing and able to make an effective military contribution in times of crisis and our nuclear deterrent guarantees that we shall continue to be able to do that whatever threats face us. Turning to the choice of system, I am sure that the Government have made the right choice in sticking to Trident for the same reasons that guided the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, to choose it in the first place. A submarine-based system provides the most effective form of deterrence with the smallest footprint. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Owen, said about cruise missiles. First, I hope that he is wrong that the Ministry of Defence failed to examine carefully and in detail the case for cruise missiles. Not to have done so would be extremely unprofessional, and I would be most reluctant to believe that of the Ministry of Defence, as I know it. Secondly, I think that there are genuine question marks over the range and capability of cruise missiles. Perhaps I am old fashioned, but I still believe that there is something in the old maxim of preferring to stick with nurse for fear of something worse. Sticking to the Trident system may turn out to be the best course. It has also been suggested that the lifetime of the existing force could be considerable extended. In recalling past alarms about cracks appearing in our nuclear submarines and the need to withdraw them from service for extended periods, I rather doubt that some of the wilder claims made for extending the life of our submarine force could ever be justified. I disagree with those who argue that the money spent on our nuclear deterrent could more cost-effectively be invested in conventional forces. We do indeed need more investment in conventional forces, but surely the point is that those forces could prove ineffective in a whole range of future circumstances unless we can prevent their use being deterred by nuclear weapons in the hands of others. That is what our nuclear capability enables us to do. My final point is to urge the Government to remain firm in their resolve to maintain adequate numbers of warheads and submarines. I find the White Paper less than wholly reassuring on that point. We already maintain only a minimum deterrent, in line with our goal of reducing the number of nuclear weapons overall. But you cannot have your disarmament cake and eat it. Given the range of threats, which the White Paper rightly identifies, the head room for further reductions in the number of warheads simply does not exist. I am also deeply sceptical whether it is possible to build the sort of submarines needed to ensure that one is on patrol at all times if we have only three in total. We must be able to meet the operational and targeting requirements of keeping our deterrent credible. It would be a false economy to save millions if that makes the expenditure of billions on a deterrent system ineffective. I hope very much that the Government will not weaken in their commitment to maintain continuous at-sea deterrence by building the number of boats required to achieve that and that there will not be pressure to abandon that position either by Treasury cheese-paring or by a need to appease those who oppose our nuclear deterrent altogether.