---

Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, during the Cold War, I was a strong supporter of the policy of nuclear deterrents, albeit with some spiritual fear and moral trembling. I believed that there was a nuclear stalemate, and it could not conceivably have been in the interests of one superpower to initiate armed hostilities against the other. Although, thank God, that particular threat has passed, I entirely agree with the White Paper that we continue to live in a notoriously risky and uncertain world and we cannot calculate for sure what new threats lie over the horizon. I further agree with the Government when they write: "““The Government’s primary responsibility is for the security of current and future UK citizens””." If I might say so, I am not soft on nuclear weapons or at all sanguine about the dangers of the world in which we now live. In fact, I believe that the situation of the world is now more dangerous than it was during the Cold War; however, as all noble Lords will agree, we now face a very different kind of threat. We need to ask whether there is any possible scenario in which an independent UK deterrent would be of use. The White Paper puts forward three possible scenarios, which have been and will continue to be well discussed, and I do not intend to do so in any detail now. But while the possession of nuclear weapons can, generally speaking, be a stabilising factor, I find it very difficult to conceive of any actual scenario in which they would or could be used, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, emphasised so strongly. I will return in a moment to the question of whether they could be used. Rather than focusing on possible scenarios for their use, I wish to approach this debate from a different angle, making four main points. First, as I have already said, I entirely accept that the Government have a prime obligation to take all necessary steps to protect their citizens, and an independent UK deterrent is no doubt an extra safeguard. But is a decision to replace our deterrent really a reasonable and necessary step, or is it a safeguard too far, for reasons other than prudence? Life in this world can never be 100 per cent secure, and any attempt to make it such is bound to fail. Although we can all understand the anxiety that underlies life and the desire to be totally safe, policies driven by that are a form of hubris; that is, they attempt to achieve that which creaturely life simply does not offer. I do not often bring the scriptures into debates, but the Bible is full of warnings about people who seek their security other than where alone it can be found. This is not, I must emphasise, an argument for taking defence issues other than with the greatest seriousness. Governments ought to consider risks and be prudent. But in the nature of the case, they cannot do everything. They cannot foresee every possibility. They cannot make a country 100 per cent secure, and the attempt to do so flies in the face of reality. The question in my mind, therefore, given the highly theoretical and speculative nature of the scenarios posited for the deployment of nuclear weapons, is whether a decision to replace the UK deterrent with a modernised version, to come into operation some time in the 2020s, is simply a sensible, prudent precaution or a step too far, driven by the anxiety shared by all human beings to protect us from every possible contingency. That policy is bound to have harmful consequences, because it is based on an illusory idea of total security. There is another point which also concerns what might be driving such a policy. We are used to being one of the big players, one of the guests with our feet under the table, because of our possession of nuclear weapons. Are we reluctant to give up having an independent nuclear deterrent because we feel it would diminish our prestige, power and influence in the world? We are used to being a major power; we are comfortable with it, and it is easy to assume, unconsciously, that because in some ways we are not the power we once were, the possession of nuclear weapons somehow reassures us that we still are such a power. We need to ask searching questions about what is really driving the policy to replace our deterrent, and consider whether realistic prudence necessitates it, or whether there are other factors at work that we are, frankly, usually reluctant to acknowledge. My second point concerns the morally problematic nature of any use of nuclear weapons. The purpose of deterrence is of course to deter, to ensure that no weapons are used or threatened against us, and therefore that our weapons do not have to be used either. The credibility of deterrence depends in the last analysis on a potential enemy believing that there are circumstances in which our weapons would be used against them. What are those circumstances? I have already said that I find it difficult to foresee realistic scenarios in which, from a military point of view, they would be used. My concern is whether from a moral point of view they could be so used. In a Christian perspective, and on the basis of international law, any use of weapons has to be both discriminate and proportionate. It has to be discriminate—directed against military targets—and it has to be proportionate; that is to say, the collateral damage, above all civilian deaths, must not outweigh any possible good that might be achieved by the use of the weapons. It is good that the right reverend Prelate, the Bishop of Manchester, reminded us of those criteria. During the Cold War, given the nature of communism and its evil and the sure stability of mutual deterrence, I could just about see how those criteria could be met, but we now live in a very changed world. What was morally problematic then is even more so now, give the particular kinds of threat that we face. Some think that you can have an effective deterrent system without considering possible uses. There is no doubt that the very possession of nuclear weapons has a deterrent effect, as the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, emphasised. In the long run, for the deterrent to be credible, a potential enemy must believe that there are circumstances under which nuclear weapons would and could be used. Given the nature of current threats it is difficult to see how they would be used, and even more so to see how they could be used in a way that was both discriminate and proportionate. Thirdly, there is our responsibility to stop nuclear weapons spreading to other countries. I am not naive enough to think that if we decide not to replace the Vanguard Trident D5 system, other countries will immediately give up their own nuclear weapons, or desist from trying to acquire them. Nations are driven by considerations of self-interest. However, the fact that we persist in possession of our weapons—and, if we decide to follow the White Paper, will continue to do so at least until the 2040s—brings forth understandable accusations of hypocrisy. We are, strictly speaking, within the terms of the non-proliferation treaty, but other countries can still say, ““If they think that it is in their interests to retain a nuclear deterrent, why do they suggest that we should not have one, when we think that it is in our interests?””, as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, and others pointed out. If we became a non-nuclear-weapons power, at least we would not be open to that charge. We would also put down an important marker, like some other nations. I was glad that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, reminded us that a significant number of at least medium-power nations have decided not to go nuclear, which they regarded as being in their national interest. We could say very clearly that, in the world we now live in, national self-interest does not always demand that we arm ourselves with the latest nuclear weapons. The arming of states, especially with nuclear weapons, reflects a world based on a radical mistrust of one another. Sadly, we are right to be mistrustful. Terrible things have happened and can happen again. Yet the world cannot be built solely on mistrust; trust is no less essential. In the fine balance between trust and mistrust, on which international relations are built, to desist from replacing the Vanguard Trident D5 system would tip the balance slightly towards trust. Trust can engender mutual trust. I am not naive; this is not inevitable. It may be very unlikely, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others have pointed out, but interstate relations cannot be built on mistrust alone. The White Paper says: "““The investment required to maintain our deterrent will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need””." I find that very difficult to believe. No one can deny that what we need for the immediately foreseen threats are good intelligence and strong, well equipped, rapidly deployable conventional forces. The money saved by not going ahead with a nuclear deterrent—some £25 billion—could undoubtedly do a very great deal to enhance that capability, as the noble Lord, Lord Owen, put so powerfully. While I, like the noble Lord, Lord Roper, think that some of the arguments are indeed very finely balanced, taken all in all, it would be wiser, as well as less morally problematic—and would make for a safer world—if we acknowledged that our present independent deterrent has served its purpose well, but should not now be replaced by a new generation of nuclear submarines or new, updated Trident systems. The prudent decision now is to concentrate all possible resources on our conventional capabilities to meet the immediately foreseen threats.