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Proceeding contribution from Lord Astor of Hever (Conservative) in the House of Lords on Wednesday, 24 January 2007. It occurred during Debate on Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent.


Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Drayson, for arranging this very important debate. I echo his words in paying tribute to the skills and professionalism of our Vanguard crews and their support staff. The House will know from what my noble friend Lord Howell said in his excellent opening speech that my party sees no difficulty in supporting the Government’s policy as set out in the White Paper. We believe that the arguments put forward represent the only responsible course of action. My right honourable friend David Cameron, in his initial response to the White Paper in another place, said that, "““I agree with the Prime Minister both about the substance of this decision and about the timing. It is a vital matter for our national security, and it requires a long-term approach””.—[Official Report, Commons, 4/12/06; col. 24.]" Our reservations and questions, so far as the White Paper is concerned, relate not to the policy itself but rather to the will and ability of the Government to carry the policy proposed through, fully and in a timely manner. The policy set out in the White Paper will entail a short-service life extension for the present system. Will the Minister confirm when that programme will be formally authorised? The real argument is no longer about the nature and relevance of deterrence, nor is it about the use of nuclear weapons. It is about the decision that this country will retain, for the foreseeable future, a secure and recognised ability to respond conclusively, anywhere in the world, should circumstances demand it. To ensure that, we need to get right, first, the platform, secondly, the missiles, including their launch and guidance systems, thirdly, the warheads and, fourthly, the phasing and control of the costs. On the platform, we accept that only submarines provide the necessary security and range. The right course is therefore to build an appropriate number of new submarines—the new Vanguards, for short. Whether the appropriate number is three or four does not require an immediate decision, but it has implications that will need to be weighed in the overall cost of investment. In their excellent speeches the noble Lords, Lord O’Neill and Lord Rodgers, called for a three-boat fleet. I tend to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, in wishing to see a four-boat fleet, as all sorts of unforeseen circumstances can occur, and technology needs to be improved enormously before we reduce the number of submarines to three. It has been suggested that Britain should wait as long as possible before making any decisions, so that our future needs might become clear. However, the future is always uncertain and there is no reason to suppose that it will become any more predictable than it is today. The Government estimate a 17-year period from starting detailed studies until the first patrol by the new submarines. We do not think that excessive, bearing in mind the difficulties encountered with the Astute-class submarines. Will the Minister ensure that the MoD learns from the mistakes of the Astute programme? It will be essential that industry collaborates far more than it has to date to drive down costs in the manner envisaged by the DIS, and the MoD must be consistent and clear about its operational requirements. The noble Baroness, Lady Symons, called in her excellent speech for the length of the procurement process to be shortened, and asked some important questions about how the contractor will be selected, about timetables, and about how costs will be monitored and controlled. The building of submarines is an essential skill for which, for many reasons, we need to retain sovereign capability. The Defence Select Committee in the other place emphasised that if the Government want to continue to maintain their nuclear submarine capability—and its workforce—then there must be a continuous rhythm of work, especially once the Astute programme is finished and the Vanguard successor starts. The Select Committee was also concerned, as was the noble Lord, Lord Moonie, that we may be losing the skills to build and maintain a replacement for Trident. The shortage of engineers was of particular concern. What are the Government planning to do to address that? Concerning the missiles, it is necessary to have a ballistic missile capability—because of their much greater range and more certain penetrative power—as well as conventionally armed TLAM cruise missiles, which we have now acquired. Ballistic missiles are the only system that can deliver the global effect at place and time of choice, with autonomy through national and international air space. For the missiles, we should be content to look to the United States in furtherance of existing detailed arrangements. It has been made sufficiently clear—not least in the evidence of the Ministry of Defence to the House of Commons Defence Committee—that a degree of procurement dependence does not carry with it operational dependence, notwithstanding cries to the contrary. The United States is already committed to a life extension programme for the Trident missiles themselves. If the United Kingdom is to participate it needs to make a decision this year, which may be driving the decision timescales as much as the lead time to build the new boats. What assurances have the Government sought and received from the Americans that we will be able to participate in the US Navy’s life extension programme for the D5 missile? There is plenty of scope for Britain and the US to work more closely together on submarine, nuclear reactor and warhead design and build—as well as developing more affordable acquisition, operation and support strategies. On warheads, the continued well-publicised determination of Russia to retain and update its ballistic missiles, mentioned by the noble Lords, Lord Garden and Lord Rodgers, taken with the efforts of several other countries to acquire nuclear warhead capability, makes it self-evident that we should retain ours. Can the Minister comment on the point made by my noble friend Lord Hamilton and the noble Lord, Lord Owen, that our new Vanguard should be able to launch cruise missiles with conventional warheads? On the cost of the new submarines, the Government will need to provide a more detailed explanation of how and from where they will find the money. When my honourable friend Julian Lewis asked the Prime Minister whether extra funds would be allocated outside the defence budget to pay for the renewal of the deterrent, the Prime Minister’s answer was that that was ““very much sui generis ””. I have most of my Latin. Does that mean that the extra funding will be found or not? The noble Lord, Lord Drayson, gave some comfort on the issue in his opening speech, but that has concerned many speakers and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, will reinforce the commitment given by the noble Lord, Lord Drayson. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, pointed out that the Armed Forces are already irresponsibly underfunded and must not suffer further from the continuation of the deterrent. My noble friend Lord Hamilton was concerned that the new submarines might come at the expense of the carriers, and I hope that the Minister will be able to reassure him on that point. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Drayson, went some way to reassure the House on that last week at Question Time, which we very much welcome. The Royal Navy continues to have considerable conventional duties to perform, but the Government are busy mothballing ships to save money. The Navy does not want its conventional budget to be raided to pay for the new generation of nuclear deterrent. I hope that the Minister will address the chilling but probably accurate observations by my noble friend Lord Hamilton and the noble Lord, Lord Owen, on that issue. My noble friend Lord Marlesford asked about reusing the existing designs of the Vanguard submarines. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, took a pop at the Liberal Democrat Front Bench and rightly pointed out that we should not deprive our children and grandchildren of the security benefits that we have enjoyed. The noble Lord enjoys taking a pop at me from time to time at Question Time, so I hope that he will not be embarrassed if I say that I agreed with most of his speech tonight. Like my noble friend Lord Marlesford, I was a bit confused by the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I always listen with great interest to his speeches, but I was surprised that he rehashed the argument that this is all about the Prime Minister’s legacy. It was a manifesto commitment and I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Garden, that the objective of a deterrent is to deter the use of other deterrents. I also agree with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, that it would be unwise to abandon the security of those submarines. The noble and gallant Lord is a very distinguished submariner himself—the only speaker, I am sure, who has commanded a nuclear submarine. I hope that his speech will be carefully read—especially his advice that the present boats are hugely expensive to maintain and that it would be impossible to push their use beyond a five-year extension. Just as we welcomed the line of policy in the SDR—as the noble Lord, Lord Garden, said, that is now nine years ago—that the Royal Navy will be provided with two new large aircraft carriers, so we welcome the policy to continue, for the foreseeable future, this country’s recognised ability to respond through the Royal Navy with a global reach. As the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, said, we will be safer with this deterrent than without it, but, bearing in mind the appalling delays with the carriers, I hope that we will not see similar delays in drawing up and signing contracts for the new submarines.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
688 c1184-7 
Session
2006-07
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
Subjects
Costs Arms control International cooperation Nuclear weapons Nuclear fuels Procurement Proliferation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Terrorism USA Trident submarines Iran Nuclear submarines North Korea Guided weapons Trident Cruise missiles
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk