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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Drayson for his candid and eloquent presentation at the opening of the debate, and to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, for an outstandingly thoughtful response. I hope I do not embarrass him by saying that I am on the same page. This is a discussion about global discipline and the contribution to international security systems, and it is absolutely true that we are none of us islands unto ourselves in this system of global integration. I thank all those who have taken part in the debate. I was very pleased to see that there is a good deal of cross-party support for many of the principles underlying the Government’s decision. That was clear from the summary given by the noble Lord, Lord Astor, a few moments ago. If the House does not mind, I shall immediately run through the issues that he put to me before I move on. First, he will not expect me to comment on the formal authorisation of the programme. That is never announced before contract; it is a commercial issue. The MoD will certainly take the lessons of the Astute programme very seriously; it is important to have clear operational requirements. On skills, the noble Lord sought assurances about what we and the Americans have said about the D5 missile programme. I think it is helpful to note that there is agreement. I will return to the issue of cruise missile submarines later but will say now that we do not envisage the dual use of them. I will also return to the issue of funding, because it must be found. It is quite clear that it will not compromise the carriers. The Navy may take a little encouragement from the fact that HMS ““Dauntless””, a £1 billion destroyer, was launched only yesterday and that another is on the way. This is all good news. Whether or not the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, is the devil’s advocate in this, he plainly discounts any role for the deterrent at the moment. Either one agrees or disagrees with him, and I disagree with him. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, is plainly no advocate for the devil, but he made similar points about the credibility of the purpose of the programme, and I hope to show in my concluding remarks that it is not hubris that drives us but prudent defence. I hope to address all the issues raised. On 4 December, the Prime Minister announced the Government’s decision to maintain our independent nuclear deterrent. He stated that we had decided to build a new class of submarines to act as a platform for the deterrent, and, further, that we had decided to participate in the United States life-extension programme for the D5 missile. Finally, he announced that we will now cut our stockpile of operationally available warheads to fewer than 160, a cut of nearly a half compared with the plans of the previous Government. He made it clear that he hoped for a substantial public and parliamentary debate on that process—a process which, as the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, said, started with the party manifestos. It has been a consistent part of Conservative Party manifestos, and I believe that the debate has momentum in all the major political parties and well beyond, which is useful. Critics of the Government’s decision have raised issues of morality, legality, hypocrisy, rationale and cost, which I shall look at in turn. There are issues of balance in all of them, as the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, said. I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Garden, set out some of them. I welcome the overall grasp of the subject injected into the debate by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce. His knowledge of these matters probably goes well beyond that of almost anyone in the House. Moreover, it is objective knowledge. The noble Lord, Lord Garden, has shared in that to some extent, and he has done a fair bit, if I may compliment him, to re-establish some sense on his Benches that they will need to deal with the diverse views, as he put it. First, on morality, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, tested this ground. I do not entirely agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Archer and my noble friend Lady Kennedy, but I respect their views. Some have suggested that the possession of nuclear weapons is morally corrupting and cannot be justified under any circumstances. They are entitled to hold that opinion and I am entitled to disagree. Moral judgments are rarely simple. As Sir Michael Quinlan has said, any proponent of the absolutist moral argument against the possession of nuclear weapons must argue that, even if a Hitler were to possess nuclear weapons, it would be morally wrong for the United Kingdom to possess a counterbalancing deterrent force. The noble Lord, Lord Roberts, mentioned the blitz. I do not know what he thinks would have persuaded the Nazis to call off the Luftwaffe, but I believe that it was our forces and the will of the people of the United Kingdom not to live under a vile dictatorship. For more than 50 years, as my noble friend Lord Gilbert said, Governments of the United Kingdom have judged the continued possession of a nuclear deterrent to be morally preferable. Why? Because the morally worse outcome is to accept a real risk of a nuclear attack on this country’s vital interests, which would of course have catastrophic consequences. The Government are firm in our view that the judgment remains applicable today. We see no fundamental change in global circumstances that alters the moral calculus, nor, may I say, do other nations. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester, who had generally welcomed the White Paper, spoke in this context of the role of ambiguity. He said that it was ethical to ask those questions. It may be ethical not to answer the questions. The answer may allow a power devoid of the ethics that we espouse to inflict the harm that we strive to avoid. Our aim by deterrence is to avoid use. The bones of the strategy developed over the decades have been well understood by the public without elaboration of hypothetical situations. My noble and learned friend Lord Archer asked what were the strategic purposes. They are to prevent Hiroshimas in a world where nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented. By the way, we do not use megaton bombs, as was suggested. That is the point of having a deterrent. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Roper. Given the moral equation here, renunciation makes no sense in the light of the dangers and insecurities of the world or the likely pattern of the period ahead. I turn to legality. As my noble friend Lord Drayson said, it is entirely lawful for the UK to possess nuclear weapons, and for us to maintain and renew our capability. The UK is a recognised nuclear-weapons state under the non-proliferation treaty. Renewal of the Trident system is fully consistent with our international obligations, including those on disarmament under Article IV of the treaty. That article does not establish a timetable for unilateral disarmament, either nuclear or general, and does not state that replacement or updating of currently held systems is unlawful. Indeed, since the non-proliferation treaty came into force, all five nuclear-weapons states have taken steps to update their deterrents. These are the facts pertinent to the legality of the UK’s continued possession of nuclear weapons. Nothing I have heard this evening changes that. The Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary have been clear in their insistence on more work on the non-proliferation treaty, and I have no doubt that they will continue to be clear in debate. The potential use of nuclear weapons—