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Armed Forces: Nuclear Deterrent

My Lords, the existence of any warhead would help to deter an enemy, but you have to have a credible system which is deployable at all times and capable of doing the whole job, not just a proportion of the job that sounds attractive on the day. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, the White Paper makes it clear that most of the six points are at the heart of the Government’s policy on non-proliferation. I want to confirm that. On the proposal for an international nuclear fuel bank, a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, we are actively engaged with the IAEA to take forward those proposals, although I cannot say what the likely conclusions will be. We must pursue that discussion with great energy. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and my noble friend Lord Judd mentioned the pattern of the work in which we need to engage to be credible. We continue to be active on disarmament internationally. In 1998, we ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. We support the proposal for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty and the call for the immediate start of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Finally, as mentioned by a couple of noble Lords, we continue to make progress on the 13 practical steps towards nuclear disarmament agreed by consensus at the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Some noble Lords have argued that it is hypocritical for the United Kingdom to maintain its deterrent while arguing that others cannot develop one. It is not, because, as I have said, the NPT recognises legitimately the UK as a nuclear-weapons state and has imposed certain obligations, which we fulfil. My noble friend Lord Young of Norwood Green spoke of the desire to deal with this by multilateralism, which we must do in order to overcome any allegation of hypocrisy. The noble Lord, Lord Garden, is right to describe the proliferators—potentially Iran and most certainly North Korea—as having obligations but not ones which they would change on the basis that they were attentive to what we are doing rather than their own interests. As states they undertook not to pursue nuclear weapons and to ensure that their civil nuclear programmes were under IAEA safeguards, and they have not fulfilled those obligations. I do not think that we are the hypocritical ones in this equation. They signed up to the treaty and they are now actively undermining it. While we are setting an example of disarmament, they are escalating armament. There is no evidence or probability that unilateral disarmament by the UK will make it any more likely that this position would change. It is instructive to note the international response to the Prime Minister’s announcement of our position. There has been no great outcry. Incidentally, I have other polling results for the Labour Party, which I shall share outside the Chamber if that is helpful—they are very much closer to the Conservative outcome. There have been three main reasons why there has been no outcry. First, our record on disarmament is genuine and shows that we are a constructive actor in international negotiations. Secondly, alongside our decision to maintain our deterrent, we have announced a further 20 per cent reduction in our warhead stockpile, so we have reduced by nearly a half since 1997. The United Kingdom is consequently recognised as being honest about its obligations under the NPT. I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, about the centrality of the NPT. I do not think we should lecture others, of course, but we must try to sustain all aspects of that treaty. Finally, my strong impression is that few if any expect us to do anything different. Why? Because very few believe that the conditions for unilateral disarmament exist. We must build the durability of the treaty, as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, also said. That must be how we also consider the final decisions on the numbers of boats and warheads. This takes me to the fourth issue: the reasons why the Government have been criticised for the rationale behind the decision. The Government are clear that we wish to maintain our nuclear weapons capability, only because of the power of such weapons to deter states that may seek to threaten or blackmail us with nuclear weapons. The noble Lord, Lord Powell of Bayswater, drew from firsthand experience on this central point. It is reasonable, therefore, to ask who those states might be. Indeed, this was the first question we asked ourselves, and the answer is that we do not know. We do not know because you cannot predict these things with absolute confidence, not in today’s world. We are talking here about 50 years into the future. Thirty years ago, almost nobody would have predicted the fall of the Soviet Union, or the emergence of the kinds of asymmetric warfare that have taken place. Who truly knows? As the pressures of proliferation mount, what will happen 30 years hence? I think that it would be rash and irresponsible to assume today that we will live in a world which will be completely secure and non-malign, without the need for the nuclear insurance. It would be unforgivable as a gamble for the British people. The noble Lord, Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank, gave us wise, historical advice on this. We do know some things, however. We know that none of the existing nuclear weapons states proposes unilateral disarmament. We know that large nuclear arsenals remain and that some are being modernised. So we must deal with these possibilities, preparing for the worst, while continuing to work for the best. We must assume that the international security situation will continue to be tense, with conflicts driven by extremism. We conclude that, although some of it is not quantifiable, we must certainly prepare with very great care. I want to say a few words about terrorism. We do not believe that the nuclear deterrent is effective against individual terrorists—I have never heard anybody in the House make any such proposition. The United Kingdom has an intensive strategy for managing the risks from terrorism and the Government are investing heavily in a range of capabilities to deal with them. But we still need to insure against a different range of potential threats that only nuclear weapons can deter, even though new threats such as terrorism have plainly emerged. We need to invest in a range of capabilities to deal with all of these threats. The deterrent can help to deter some of the risks that do occur under the rubric of terrorism. Clearly, nuclear weapons do not protect us from suicide bombers carrying plastic explosives, but I believe that some states may well be deterred from transferring nuclear weapons, or nuclear technologies, to terrorists. Let me turn to cost—I promised to address this question. Would the money spent on maintaining our nuclear deterrent be better spent elsewhere? I believe that my noble friend Lord Drayson dealt with the assurance on broad expenditure on conventional Forces. I repeat what he said: "““The Government have undertaken that any additional investment will not come at the expense of the conventional capabilities of our Armed Forces””." In saying that, I know that if it turns out not to be true, we will be held to account. But I do assert it this evening. I cannot announce for my noble friend Lord Young the outcome of the Comprehensive Spending Review, but I am quite clear about the commitment that we have made. I do not accept the view of the noble Lord, Lord Owen, although I take it very seriously. If we believe in a ballistic system, he is entitled to call for the expenditure that would match that being ensured without cutting into other things. But I do not think that we can step from that to a point at which we say that unless all these things are spelt out at the same moment, we should not proceed with the process I have described. Incidentally, we have developed a cruise missile with France, which I am told is called the Storm Shadow. I am not an expert on this, but the noble Lord may well be. However, the point about the cruise missile is this: there is a higher risk and there is a higher cost. The ballistic missile system provides a lower risk. We know the system and we do not have to build it again from the start. It is a system that is in existence and we have already paid for it, although of course it has to be maintained and updated. We have opted for what is cost-effective, not for something at a disproportionate cost, in order to achieve the minimum deterrent on this platform. We do not intend to bet at this point on a cruise missile. The noble Lord, Lord Powell, wanted me to clarify that this reflects the best of the options available. Perhaps I may say that the figures on cost have been given to noble Lords. I was intrigued to note that the cost is less than one third of what is spent on National Lottery tickets. Defence aside, the Government have invested wisely in other services in the United Kingdom such as health and education, and we are investing in international affairs by tackling issues like climate change and relieving poverty in Africa. I do not think that this is a country which can simply choose to do one or the other if we take international security seriously. We recognise that the first responsibility is to the defence of our citizens and we recognise that only nuclear weapons can provide the deterrent against nuclear threats. The United Kingdom has complete freedom of action in this, a point made by my noble friend Lord Drayson. Of course I should say to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, that the UK does so in co-operation with its allies, and indeed I doubt whether there is a modern weapons system where there are not some components bought in the international market. The debate comes down to three questions. First, do we have to take a decision on nuclear capability? The answer is plainly yes, and the full range of defence capabilities need to be assured against that background. Secondly, do we have to take the decision now? The answer in my view is clearly yes. If we fail to start our preparations now, we will miss the initial insurance premium and there will be no ready way of moving back on to a reliable timetable. No doubt later parliaments will judge whether the world is more benign, but we need to prepare now or leave no choices on credible defence for those future parliaments. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, described it as a position where we are dealing with complexity, and he is quite right. But this goes also to the skills point. If we do not start these processes, we will not protect the industry or the skills in it by ensuring that they are available to us at the point at which they are needed. That point was also made by my noble friend Lord Moonie. On the third question about the length of time of procurement, I shall make just a couple of points. Seventeen years is the best estimate of the whole project from start to finish. It is one which is very close to the view of the United States and France, and we have discussed with them their own experience of this. I do not believe that it will turn out to be radically wrong. It is right that we should try to make sure that it is as short as it credibly can be, but in desiring to give an assurance to industry, the gateway point is 2012 to 2014. I confirm those dates for when the Bill will start its progress, although it is hard to be precise within those dates. But as my noble friend Lady Symons said there must be rigorous control over costs and timetables, which have to be consistent and improving. I am sure that the Public Accounts Committee will be demanding in those aims, and we intend to meet its intentions. I shall turn to one or two more elements of the debate. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made an intriguing speech. I believe that he relied on making the appeal that anything which delays a tough decision until it is too late to make it is a preferable position to anything that forces us into making that decision. I do not think he is served well by fantasies about the entire internal dynamics of the Labour Party. It struck me as being rather like reading some of the wilder outreaches of the internet where conspiracy theory is very much more attractive than the facts. Unilateral disarmament was on occasion cheered on by those people I remember historically as having been Liberals. Sensible nuclear armament was advocated by those I remember as having been Social Democrats. It was a nostalgic return to the ““Spitting Image”” scenario of the two Davids, but only one of them is here this evening.