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Defence in the World

No, I did not, nor did I give any time in conversations for such a criticism to come up. I heard a non-stop welcoming of the UK commitment to the relationship with the US and of their deep debt of gratitude to us for standing alongside them even when the political going got tough. Although it is true that the US would like to see expenditure rise across all their NATO allies, the UK comes in for the least criticism and rightly so. The Secretary of State talked about the roulement and the 600 extra troops in the south of Afghanistan. That begs some questions which I hope the Minister of State can answer. If more British troops are to be deployed in the south—the most dangerous area where we are most likely to see casualties—what extra equipment will we get for them? Will we get more helicopters and armoured vehicles to give them support and protection? If the Government are saying that there will be more troops but the same level of equipment, many people will think that we are carrying not a fair share of the defence burden, but too much and asking too much of our troops with too little given in return. When the Minister of State replies can he tell us about the medical facilities envisaged for the increased number of troops in the south? Along with many colleagues and Labour Members, I have been in the field hospital at Al Shaibah in Basra where the level of medical care is exceptionally good. That is partly because they have a CT scanner available at all times. Are there plans to have such equipment put in place in southern Afghanistan? Without it there is a big gap in the ability to diagnose and treat. Is it true that we still have no neurological services based in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the risk that our troops are facing there? It cannot be acceptable that the nearest place to treat neuro-trauma would be hospitals in Pakistan. If we are going to put our troops at increased risk and send increased numbers of troops into battle zones, the least we can do is ensure that we provide the level of medical care that they may require, should they be injured. The Secretary of State dealt extensively with Iraq. Again, I discussed this subject widely in Washington. All hon. Members would like to believe that the troop surge that President Bush is trying to achieve will be successful and bring greater stability to the area in and around Baghdad. Many of us will be sceptical about whether or not it will be successful, but we hope that it will. It is essential to recognise one of the basic weaknesses of our position in Iraq. This takes me back to an example that I may have cited in the House before: a commander in Basra who said to me, ““Forget the briefing you have had up to now. If you want to understand the situation in which we find ourselves, just imagine 1920s Chicago in the desert. We have gangsters, racketeering and militias. The big problem is not the level of democracy in Baghdad, but the lack of non-corrupt policing and a functioning judicial system.”” We still fail to grasp that institution building is essential for any chance of democracy taking hold in the longer term. On frequent occasions the point has been made in the House that Britain is a liberal democracy, but we were liberal long before we were democratic. There were 150 years between Adam Smith and universal suffrage; and 100 years between abolishing slavery and women getting the vote. It was our liberal institutions that allowed our democracy to be stable. They underpinned and gave structure to our democracy. If democracy were simply the exercise of electoral mechanics, Gaza would be the beacon state in the middle east. I hasten to suggest that it is not. We need to understand the need for realistic time scales for the noble aspirations that we have in trying to bring some of these countries up to the level of expectations in terms of the market economy, human rights and judicial freedoms that we take for granted. We need to be frank with the British people about the potential future of Iraq. By providing troops and training and by trying to build institutions we can buy the Government of Iraq some time. We can buy them time to provide stability for the growth and strengthening of their governmental structures, but we cannot guarantee them success. Ultimately, they have to find a political solution whereby both the Sunni and Shi’a populations recognise that they must have mutual co-existence or face mutual destruction. There is a limit to what we can achieve, even with the best will in the world and whatever commitments we are willing to make in terms of manpower, military resources or financial assistance. A reasonable recognition of our limitations in the real world alongside realistic expectations about the time scale would go a long way towards reassuring the public that we are not trying to bite off more than we can chew.