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Defence in the World

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Woodspring (Dr. Fox). When he referred to the danger posed to us by Russia, I at first thought that he was using an old Conservative party speaking note, but as he developed the argument I could see that he was referring to contemporary circumstances. My judgment of the current situation is not the same as his. The 20th century has not been kind to Russia and I urge him to try to look at things from Russia’s point of view, rather than from the point of view that he adopts, namely, that we always have to think the worst of the Russians and to fear their intentions. Russia is a state that is in transition from a very difficult historical background and we should give it a chance to make that journey, rather than always looking for the worst and asserting it as a new threat. I do not see the situation in the same way as he does. The communities that I represent in Newcastle and North Tyneside have a long association with the armed services. As well as building warships for the Royal Navy at Swan Hunter and fighting vehicles for the Army at BAE Systems in Newcastle, our community has service personnel in each branch of the armed forces. We are particularly strongly represented in the artillery, the infantry and the Royal Marines. I identify myself and the community that I represent with the remarks made by the Secretary of State and the hon. Gentleman in applauding and honouring the bravery of our service personnel. Today’s debate is an opportunity to discuss what we expect of our armed forces and what support we give them to undertake their tasks. The cornerstone of the debate is our membership of NATO, which I strongly support, and the question of how best to make an effective contribution to NATO, bearing in mind our other obligations. We need to ask what it is we are setting out to do. What are the budgetary constraints? What are the capacity constraints? Those questions have not changed. I was first elected to the House of Commons in 1983 and arrived just in time to take part in the great debate about the original Trident programme. My view then was that we should do what other European members of NATO do and rely on America’s strategic deterrent, and not duplicate it ourselves. There is only so much money that can be spent on defence. My view then was that our money would be better spent on supplementing NATO’s conventional capacity, which we were more likely to use, rather than duplicating the strategic nuclear capacity. I could envisage no circumstances in which we would ever use that capacity, let alone independently of the Americans. Back in 1983, that was regarded in the Labour party as a very right-wing view, because it was pro-American and showed both a commitment to and confidence in NATO. Unlike other recently elected MPs at the time, I would not join the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament because of its opposition to NATO. I hold the same view now, and it is one of the small ironies of Labour politics that that view is now regarded in the Labour party as a rebel left-wing view. All the key features of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent—the platform, the delivery system, the warheads and even the onshore-based support—depend in part on our relationship with the United States. The Trident II D5 missiles are leased from the US missile pool. They are manufactured, tested and serviced in the US. The warheads are US-designed, and several crucial components, without which they would not work, are manufactured in the US and purchased off the shelf. The system is reliant, too, on US software for all aspects of targeting. I think that those working relationships with the United States are beneficial, but the logical next step is to integrate the whole thing into NATO’s strategic deterrent. It is the case for having a strategic deterrent that the British Prime Minister can fire separately of the Americans that has just not been made. No Minister has been able to describe to the House the circumstances in which the United Kingdom would be completely isolated from our NATO partners with only our deterrent to fall back on. The major security threat facing Britain is not an enemy state with a strategic nuclear deterrent of its own threatening Britain alone, but not our NATO partners—the main security threat facing Britain is terrorism. The Select Committee on Defence recently concluded that the"““strategic nuclear deterrent could serve no useful or practical purpose in countering this kind of threat.””" The money that the Government plan to commit to the programme could be more usefully spent on conventional armed forces and on specialist anti-terrorism units, which could do something to make us safer against the most serious threat. In his statement to the House on 4 December 2006, the Prime Minister said that"““the investment required will not be at the expense of the conventional capabilities our armed forces need.””—[Official Report, 4 December 2006; Vol. 454, c. 23.]" I take issue with that view—the money can be spent on upgrading our strategic nuclear deterrent or it can be spent on something else. The cost of Trident in the 1980s had an impact on the budget for conventional defence equipment, and nowhere more so than on the procurement of warships and fleet auxiliaries for the Royal Navy. There are also substantial continuing revenue costs. I remind the House of the words of Coroner Selena Lynch at the inquest into the death of my constituent, Mr. Anthony Wakefield, who served with the Coldstream Guards in Iraq. He died instantly from neck and chest wounds when a bomb exploded close to his Snatch Land Rover near al-Almarah on 1 May last year. He was wearing standard body armour, but not Kestrel kit, which has added neck and arm protection. The coroner’s finding was that Anthony Wakefield may have survived the roadside bomb blast if he had been equipped with Kestrel body armour. That is not my assertion—that is the coroner’s finding. Recording a verdict of unlawful killing, she said:"““it is regrettable that our soldiers cannot all be provided with what they need immediately””." There are choices facing the House today. I believe that our first priority is the immediate well-being of our service personnel. We should ensure that front-line troops get all the equipment that they need—and that should be our priority. Strategic defence systems do not exist in a vacuum. If the argument is that Britain must have an independent strategic nuclear deterrent as well as the security of NATO’s American deterrent, surely it is open to other nation states to argue that they, too, need a similar independent strategic nuclear deterrent. The hon. Member for Woodspring referred to the situation in Iran. Its near neighbours—India, Pakistan, China and Israel, and now America in Iraq—all have some form of nuclear weapon capability, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Oldham, West and Royton (Mr. Meacher) pointed out. Our contribution is to say that we need to upgrade our weapons system and that Iran should not have those things at all. I do not see anything in that argument that would make the people of Iran feel more secure or less isolated. If ever there was a case for renewed diplomatic activity and for trying to find a peaceful way forward, surely this is it. The real argument for Britain’s independent nuclear deterrent is not military at all—the real argument for the possession of an independent strategic nuclear deterrent is that such a deterrent is vital for Britain to maintain its ““big power”” role in the world, including our permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council.