---

Al-Yamamah Arms Agreement

I thank my right hon. Friend for that intervention. Members of the House have not been kept in the dark about the reasons for the decision. There is no mystery about the main issues in the case. The Attorney-General and I have given full explanations in both Houses, answered questions and corresponded with Members of both Houses. The key issue is the crucial importance of Saudi Arabia as a partner in the UK’s fight against terrorism. Saudi Arabia is a source of valuable streams of intelligence on al-Qaeda and other terrorist activity that may represent a threat to our citizens in this country and abroad, and to our armed forces. Saudi Arabia also plays a key role in the Government’s efforts to promote peace and stability in the middle east. If the investigation had gone ahead, the judgment was that there was a real danger that Saudi Arabia would withdraw its co-operation on counter-terrorism. We would be deprived of a key partner in our counter-terrorism strategy and UK lives would be put at risk. The importance of the UK’s relationship with Saudi Arabia in the fight against terrorism is clear to everyone. I want to deal with some of the ill-informed and mischievous comments made by the hon. Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable) about the security services and the Secret Intelligence Service. His comments were ill-informed because SIS is clear about the importance of the Saudi counter-terrorist effort to the UK. It would not be possible to replicate the counter-terrorism effort that has been achieved with the Saudis on UK-Saudi aspects of the problem if it were necessary to work at one remove, say through the USA, or some other liaison—if that is what Members would prefer. SIS has made it clear that it shared the concerns about the possible consequences for the public interest of the SFO investigation. SIS considered that there was a risk to the UK’s national security interests from pursuing the al-Yamamah investigation, and had been informed of the threat to curtail operations directly. At no stage did SIS or anyone else who was consulted disagree with the overall assessment that the Saudi threats were real. SIS agreed that, although it did not know for certain that the threat would be carried out, it had to be taken seriously. Before the SFO decision was taken, the Attorney-General and I discussed the matter with the chief of SIS. His view was that the Saudis might withdraw their co-operation if the SFO investigation continued, and that they might decide to do so at any time. It was estimated that further investigation of the case would take 18 months. That would be 18 months of public pressure on the relationship between our countries, with allegations flying around in the media about the Saudi Government and questions being asked about the dealings of senior members of the Saudi Government—with no guarantee at all of prosecution. Having been advised of that risk, the director of the SFO concluded that it was not a risk that could properly be run in the public interest and that the investigation should be halted, and he did that according to the law. The Attorney-General agreed with the director’s decision to stop the case, having regard to his own view that the case was unlikely to lead to a successful prosecution in any event. The director of the SFO’s decision was not easy, but it had to be taken. Those who criticise the decision need to ask themselves what they would have done. Would they have risked throwing away our crucial relationship with Saudi Arabia on counter-terrorism co-operation, for the sake of pursuing an uncertain case?