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Al-Yamamah Arms Agreement

Yes, I do, and I am trying to explain to the House why, when I considered the matter, I came to the conclusion that there was absolutely no evidential basis for saying that the Attorney-General’s decision was wrong, however convenient it might be to do so from the point of view of narrow party political advantage. There was nothing whatever to support that suggestion. I do not want to take up much more of the House’s time, but the basic premise on which the hon. Member for Twickenham opened the debate is fundamentally flawed. He may argue against the system, and he might have argued against the al-Yamamah agreement in principle when it started, but if we focus on the narrow issue, the Attorney-General seems to have acted properly. In conclusion, as a result of what happened, it has been suggested that we have the wrong prosecution system in this country. It has been suggested that we should do as the Irish have done, and make the Director of Public Prosecutions and the head of the Serious Fraud Office utterly independent of Government, using a system similar to that used for judicial appointments. Thereafter, the head of the Serious Fraud Office would make his own judgment about what was in the public interest, without reference to anybody else. I can see that that model has a superficial attraction, but the reality would be different to what is envisaged. First, I have serious doubts that such an independent prosecutor would have come to a different decision. Secondly, there would be the consequence that the matter would never have been debated. Debates such as today’s would never happen again, in any circumstances, and there would be no parliamentary scrutiny. It is extraordinary to suggest that that should be the state of affairs. That is why, with all its undoubted imperfections, the Attorney-General’s slightly unhappy role, often described as a great burden, of reconciling such difficult issues will have to continue. I have not heard it said that public interest considerations should be abolished hereafter in deciding whether a person should be prosecuted. If we were to do that, there would be absurd consequences, and there would quickly be a clamour in the House about how wrong and stupid it was that some people were being prosecuted, because the consequences of bringing the prosecution were out of all proportion with the possibility of securing a conviction.