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House of Lords: Reform

My Lords, we seem to have been here before, if I may say so, and on a number of occasions. I am very conscious of that fact. But there is one change that I welcome: the three Front Benches seem to be in agreement that the proper way forward is an 80 per cent elected and a 20 per cent appointed Chamber. However, one thing has not changed: my profound disagreement with my noble and learned friend Lord Irvine of Lairg—and, no doubt, his profound disagreement with me. I have to say—and I think that I am entitled to say it—that my position has not changed at all. I remain in favour of what was expressed to be Labour Party policy in the years before the 1997 general election, when we campaigned on a platform that the House of Lords should be predominantly but not exclusively elected. I accepted that then and I accept it now. I am pleased to see that the Government now share that view, although it has taken 10 years. The result of the debate in the Commons last week clarified the position somewhat. There was a majority for an 80:20 House and an all-elected House, and it is now for the Government to decide which option they are to pursue. The importance of the debate and the vote in the Commons, however, is that the Commons have decided firmly—very firmly indeed—that the day of the wholly appointed House is over. There is some doubt about the validity of the100 per cent vote. It is said on good authority that some of those who voted in favour of an all-appointed House also voted in favour of an all-elected House. I find it difficult to understand the logic of that position. It seems to me to be playing parliamentary games with a serious parliamentary issue. So we should commend the Commons for accepting a hybrid House split 80 per cent elected and 20 per cent appointed. I have a very simple view on this issue which I hope is not totally naive. People who make laws should be directly accountable to those who have to obey the laws that they make. In other words, if you legislate, you should have a democratic mandate. What I do not think is acceptable—and in principle I do not think that many other people, even in this House, would find it acceptable—is that people who make laws should be appointed rather than elected. It is certainly not democratic, nor is it properly representational. Elections are, after all, the way in which public accountability of the legislature is guaranteed in every western democratic society; and that accountability certainly cannot be achieved by a wholly or predominantly appointed House. The House of Commons has now voted for that mix of 80 per cent elected and 20 per cent nominated. What is important now is to look at the function that each of those two groups will be there to fulfil. The20 per cent should, I think, broadly resemble the present-day Cross-Benchers. I take the point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, on the quality and the calibre of those who sit on the Cross Benches, or at least some of them. That point was echoed by the noble Lord, Lord McNally, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine, and the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. It seems generally accepted in this House that, on the whole, independent Cross-Benchers are a good thing rather than a bad thing. I totally agree with that. It is desirable that senior doctors, educationalists, Chiefs of the Defence Staff and very senior civil servants should have some place somewhere in the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Clearly they cannot be inthe Commons, because they would not stand forelection, but with the history of Cross-Bench representation in the Lords it would seem to be ideal for this House. However, if the 20 per cent are to be genuine Cross-Benchers, then the 80 per cent should represent the political side of the work of this House. In this day and age, you cannot legislate without parties and the whole paraphernalia of government and opposition. The idea that legislation could be properly considered and passed by a second Chamber that was chosen either by lottery or by indirect sectional elections is absurd. There would never be the discipline necessary to get the legislation passed. But I think that it is idle to pretend that we can turn this Chamber into one that is less political. It will still be a House through which legislation will have to pass and, if so, there are bound to be party differences on what that legislation should incorporate. It seems nonsense to pretend that we can be a proper legislative Chamber without active political parties and, dare I say it, active political whipping. Of course there are alternatives; namely, that this House should cease to be a legislative Chamber. In that case, it would become of a group of distinguished and experienced people discussing great matters of state but having only advisory functions. Frankly, that is not how I see the future of this second Chamber. If we are to be a proper legislative Chamber, which I want, then we need the authority and the credibility to be one. That in turn means that we need to get our authority from the people and not from the Executive. To be an effective check on the power of the Executive, one needs that legitimacy. But in the end it depends what you want for a second Chamber. If you want a proper legislative second Chamber, then you have to have a majority of elected Members. If you want more of an advisory Chamber, then it does not matter. I have often heard the argument that to move in this democratic direction would be to produce a Chamber that is in direct conflict with the House of Commons. I do not accept that that is necessarily so—nor do I accept that conflict between the two Chambers is necessarily a bad thing. Other legislatures seem to have resolved the problem of having two democratically elected chambers, one of which is predominant and the other subservient. What it needs is an acceptance by both Houses of their role and a proper mechanism to resolve disputes between the two Houses. This is, after all, the position in the United States, where both the chambers are now elected, where both know the extent and boundaries of their power, and where there is a system in which disputes between the two Houses can be resolved. For the life of me I do not see anything in principle here that the House of Commons should be running scared of. What may be required in this country is something analogous to the concordat that was reached last year between the judiciary and the Executive. This was the first one that properly regulated relations between those two arms of government. Something similar could surely be accepted between the two Houses of Parliament and, if necessary, enshrined in legislation. Of course, the Commons are the superior House and should remain so. No one is suggesting that the powers of this House should be amended so as to make them equal to those of the House of Commons. But this is not a debate about the powers of the House of Lords; it is primarily a debate about its composition. We took a dramatic step some years ago in removing the automatic right of hereditary Peers to sit in the legislature. I hope that we shall now move to a situation in which nominated Peers will play a lesser role in the affairs of government and elected Peers will play a greater role.