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House of Lords: Reform

My Lords, the White Paper, of which we are only being asked to take note, makes no real attempt to explain why the change to an elected House while retaining our current roles would lead to better governance, scrutiny and decision-making. It does not do so because the change probably will not bring about that result. Indeed, a persuasive case can be made for saying that the result will be a move in the other direction. Neither does the White Paper seek to address the implications of a move to an elected House for the relationship between your Lordships’ House and the other place and for the working relationship between Members of your Lordships’ House and Members of the other place. It does not address that issue because to have done so might have jeopardised the likelihood of getting a majority on an elected option in the other place, which was, after all, the name of the game, not improving or even maintaining the quality of governance of the United Kingdom. I am not prepared to vote for a change of this constitutional significance—namely, to an elected or partially elected House—when those who want the change are not prepared to put all their cards on the table and tell the full story about the changes that they are seeking to achieve and the benefits that they believe will accrue, and why. That could have been done. After all, the White Paper referred to elected Chambers in other countries and how they work, albeit totally ignoring among other things the impact of our party-political culture in this country, which is highly adversarial and rarely consensual. The position now is that, as the full story slowly emerges about the intentions, changes and implications arising from the votes in the other place, views may change on whether this should or should not be an elected House, or the extent to which it should be elected. But it will be too late to reconsider, because the argument will be that the decision on composition has already been made in the other place and cannot be reopened. If the view is that the powers of your Lordships’ House should be strengthened so that the other place cannot pass either some or all of its legislation without the agreement of this House, then of course this would have to be an elected House. If it is not proposed to increase the virtually non-existent powers of your Lordships’ House in relation to the other place, and instead to leave it as a revising Chamber able to take a second look at proposed legislation but not able to prevent the other place from getting its own way or to make legislative decisions of its own that do not have the support of the Commons, it is difficult to see how that role is enhanced as opposed to weakened by having a House that in composition and make-up would very likely be close to a clone of the other place. Your Lordships’ House has influence, not power, but that influence arises in significant part precisely because our composition and make-up is totally different from the other place’s, and not simply from the fact that the Government of the day cannot automatically get their legislation through unamended immediately on a whipped vote. Perhaps what will emerge on role and powers is somewhere in between the two positions that I have mentioned, in which case, and depending on what emerges, there could be a strong argument that that would both improve governance and demand a change to an elected or partially elected House. However, it is just not credible to argue that if your Lordships’ House is elected, it will not change anything in relation to powers and working relationships with the other place. To vote now for your Lordships' House to be elected or partially elected is to vote for a major change without knowing what the constitutional significance, implications and intentions of that decision will be. An elected or significantly elected House of Lords will be as party political in its approach and outlook as the other place. If the Government of the day have a majority in this House because the House is elected on a similar basis to the other place, this House will rubber-stamp what the other place has done and the revising role will diminish considerably. If the Government of the day do not have a majority in this House and the House is an elected body, then party-political considerations will be the predominant, if not the only, factor in determining the approach of whichever parties are in government or opposition at the time, rather than a view that the role of your Lordships' House is primarily that of a revising Chamber inviting at times the other place to reconsider its view. The result will be that the Government of the day find that this House insists on its amendments much more frequently and on many more Bills, since the restraint of being a non-elected body and thus giving way to the elected body will have gone, and the Parliament Act, with its associated delays, will have to be invoked on a regular basis. For a year or 18 months prior to the likely date of a general election, the Government of the day will find it very difficult to get any legislation through and in this area will effectively be powerless. Whether or not one regards consistent and regular blocking and delaying of legislation as a plus or a minus in the context of effective governance will no doubt be influenced by whether one is a supporter of whatever party is in government at the time or a supporter of whatever parties are in opposition. However, to suggest, as the White Paper does, that, if your Lordships' House was an elected body, that would not change existing conventions and working relationships between the two Houses is, to say the least, optimistic. An elected House would also mean the end of the direct link between a single Member of Parliament and his or her constituents. If your Lordships' House is elected, every elector will have at least two people in Parliament who have been elected to represent them. There are arguments for and against such a development, but it would be a major change, and one on which the White Paper chooses not to dwell. The argument that this will be no different from the current situation between Members of Parliament and Members of the European Parliament is without substance. MPs and MEPs have totally different responsibilities and operate in totally different legislatures. We are talking about a situation in which two or more people, quite possibly from different political parties, will represent constituents and be involved in considering the same legislation, each able to raise issues with and ask questions of the same Ministers on behalf of those constituents. That bears out the point that we are being invited to vote for something very different from what we have now, against a background of silence and secrecy or ignorance about the likely and intended ramifications and constitutional implications. That is no basis for making major constitutional change. While I recognise that the other place will probably force through its intentions without regard to the likely views of your Lordships' House, I would not wish to be in a position of having voted for a probably irreversible significant change in one area—an elected or partially elected House—in the absence of any agreement or understanding about what that decision would mean for the surely not unimportant consideration of its impact on improving the quality of governance and decision-making and law-making in this country.