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House of Lords: Reform

My Lords, I am 40th in a list of 70. We have reached the stage of the debate where everything that can be said has been said, but not everyone has said it. Therefore I shall give my explanation of my vote. My vote is simply for an all-appointed Chamber, with safeguards, including the Appointments Commission. I shall do so not just on the principle that if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it—I do not suggest that there is no room for improvement, and noble Lords in earlier contributions have made suggestions for that—but essentially because an elected Chamber, the alternative to an appointed Chamber, has far greater disadvantages than the current arrangement. I stand amazed at my own consistency. To protect myself I looked up my vote in the equivalent position in February 2003, and note that I again voted for an all-appointed Chamber and for nothing else. At least I protect my back on that. I also recognise that, following last week’s vote in the other place, there has been a fundamental change in the political context. The change since the vote in February 2003 has presumably been influenced by the change of membership after the last election, with new Members influenced by their first experience of ping-pong and consequent late hours, but also by the current allegations of cash for honours. Some say that the final majority for an all-elected Chamber was due to deliberate sabotage by those favouring no change—but that is not so clear. We cannot be sure of the motives of those who voted so overwhelmingly for an all-elected Chamber. It is surely quite a respectable position to hold that the only logical alternative to 100 per cent appointed is 100 per cent elected, and that hybrid solutions, of whatever balance, are inherently unstable and will not last. Indeed, last week’s vote marked a major change from our usual pattern of constitutional development, broadening down from precedent to precedent. I suspect that many in that overwhelming majority ignored the subtle interrelationship between the component parts of our constitution, as well as the many unintended consequences that follow; not only the step on the road to disestablishment of the Church of England, but also a major step on the road to a written constitution, with a constitutional court and judges appointed for their perceived political leanings. In a perfect world, there should perhaps have been a constitutional convention, looking not only at the relationship between the two Houses but also at that between Westminster and the devolved administrations, as well as reform of the other place itself. But that comprehensive approach is not the way we do constitutions in this country, however compelling the case may be for that convention. To suggest it now would be considered as just another delaying tactic. In my judgment the debate last week ignored the argument that if we seek such a radical change we cannot limit the exercise; we cannot fail to look in the mirror and see the need for reform of the other Chamber as well. What should be the guiding principles of reform? Fundamental should be the aim of preserving the best of your Lordships’ House today, after the 1999 reforms, as a deliberative and revising Chamber, with opportunities for second thoughts for Government and Opposition. It is one of our key constitutional checks and balances. This House is an expert Chamber, a point very well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howe. We are also a less partisan Chamber. Mr Straw argued that the reforms would preserve the primacy of the other place. That can surely only be partly true. Yes, the other place will elect the Prime Minister and retain the power of the purse, but elections are bound to create a second Chamber that is more assertive and more likely to challenge the other place. What, then, are the claimed advantages of a wholly or partially elected Chamber? These include that the second Chamber will be more legitimate and more accountable. That legitimacy will depend on the level of participation at elections. If few vote, the legitimacy will be correspondingly reduced. Further, if there is PR on a party list in large constituencies, on the European election model, there will be only limited accountability to the electorate. A totally elected Chamber will lose part of its expertise. The noble Baroness, Lady Howe, gave a litany of those on the Cross Benches who make a substantial contribution. Even if, as seems unlikely, many senior figures from the professions are prepared to take a party label to get into a wholly elected second Chamber, it is even more unlikely that they will be selected at party caucuses or selected high enough on the party lists to be elected. We saw an illusion of the idea that new elections would draw on a totally different reservoir of talent in the elections to the Welsh Assembly. Again, if there is, say, a 12-year term, how will that make those in the elected Chamber more accountable? What sanctions will there be if they fail to attend or attend only fitfully? What happens if they switch parties? What accountability is there at the end of their 12-year term when they do not have to face the electorate again? Even with open lists, there will not be much transparency. Even if the lists are open, it will be difficult in multi-Member constituencies for the electorate really to know the candidates and to move the position of those candidates in the list. The real choice will again be left to the ever-reducing selectorate of the political parties. So, much will depend on the process of selection and the voting system. I am very sceptical of the claims for greater legitimacy and greater accountability. Obviously, any solution is a matter of balance and there is no perfect balance of all the relevant factors. One hundred per cent elected ignores the very special contribution that Cross-Benchers make to the quality of debate. Today’s debate is surely only the starting point of what promises to be a long march and a long process with several votes along the way. Like the vote in the other place, tomorrow’s vote will be only an expression of opinion on the ideal solutions. Later there may have to be compromise. Then I and others may have seriously to consider voting for the less attractive option of 80:20. For now, I shall vote only for option one—an all-appointed Chamber as amended.