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Foreign Policy

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Howell, for securing the debate and for the thoughtful and provocative way in which he opened it. It is a privilege to follow the powerful speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Symons. I shall concentrate on the part that defence has played in the Government’s foreign policy in the past decade and the way in which the Armed Forces have been called on to implement it. Wars of choice are certainly an optional extra when it comes to formulating and implementing foreign policy objectives. As has been said in this debate and on many other occasions, this Government have been remarkably proactive in their foreign policy engagement with adversaries or with those whom they have perceived to be potentially hostile to our national interests. Whether this policy has been adopted as a broad strategic approach, or on a case-by-case basis, there has been a clear determination in the past decade to engage, to lock horns if necessary and to move against perceived threats, even well before they have developed into any hostile action. Given that we are a member of the Security Council, the G8, the Commonwealth and other international groupings, and given that we are a stable nation with a remarkable history of empire and experience and with a worldwide and deserved reputation for determination and courage, British Governments understandably like to see us as a major player in the world. However, we must never lose sight of the fact that, just as the Falklands conflict of 1982 gave our international reputation an enormous boost, which ran for a decade, so too will our current and recent performance be taken into account in today’s international judgment. The past alone is not enough on which to maintain our reputation and the respect of others. We must still make sufficient effort to sustain that reputation today. In the past 10 to 15 years, our Armed Forces have been involved in expeditionary warfare on a scale quite unmatched since the Korean War. In particular, the periods of action, Sierra Leone apart, have not simply involved delivering a short, sharp shock and then returning to the normal peacetime round of exercises and training; they have been spread over months. Indeed, action in Iraq and Afghanistan will be spread over years, so much so that the preparation and training for these and other possible operations have suffered severely. This Government have shown little hesitation in using our forces to further their policy objectives. Our forces are rightly admired for their ability to respond effectively and in a measured way, but it is now clear that there is a serious and growing mismatch between the demands that have been placed on the Armed Forces in the past decade and their collective ability to deliver. Buried not far below the surface are the financial restraints—and consequently the capability restraints—on our fighting strength. Not only have the front-line fighting units been reduced in the past decade, with the loss of ships, battalions and squadrons of fast jet aircraft putting more pressure on those that remain; so, too, have the many support activities that are so central to expeditionary warfare. Units such as transport, communications and supply are now dealing with the demands for major operational support in two theatres of actual fighting. Only the quality and determination of the hundreds of units and individuals in these activities have enabled them, so far, to cope, despite the fact that many equipments are well past their operational lifespan, have been deployed in extremes of climate or lack spares to keep them fully serviceable. Even the most determined and supportive industry cannot replace and make good deficiencies at the flick ofa finger. New procurements can take years. The problems with helicopter shortages and adequately armoured vehicles have hit the headlines, but there are many more, less visible but essential, requirements, which take time with training and support to bring into use. The conclusion to draw from such examples—let alone from the mismatch that is acknowledged to exist between planning assumptions for operations and the actuality of the past decade—is that our forces, and in particular certain parts of them, are overcommitted. Prompt decisions are now vital to reduce and rescale the level of our overseas commitment. But this is to attempt to make good that which has gone wrong. For too long, defence spending has been preconditioned on what can be afforded rather than on what must be provided to meet our expeditionary involvements. The harsh reality of Iraq and Afghanistan is that, for the tasks set by this Government, the Armed Forces are underprovided for. If we were involved in a major and imminent threat to national survival and security, it would have to be all hands to the pump for our Armed Forces, regardless of their capabilities. But that is a war of necessity. Our involvements in fighting over the past decade have been in conflicts of choice—of our choice. War has been the optional extra. It is morally indefensible to continue like this, putting so many lives at risk, now that the limits of our capabilities have been exposed in action. Moreover, the types of conflict in which we are currently engaged are not like those with another state, where the outcome—success for us—can be measured and seen in the reaction of the enemy’s Government. Conflict with terrorism does not have the same set of rules. It is not like a game of chess, where there is an outcome that is recognised by both sides. The fight with terrorism is not subject to any such set of rules. In particular, the outcome of conflict with terrorism cannot be—and never has been—an achievement of armed forces. They can help to keep the lid on terrorism, but resolution is a matter of politics, not the gun. The conclusion must be that if our Government wish to tread the world stage and use the Armed Forces where they see a need for them, they must provide the forces with the capabilities and the staying power that these policies may call for. If that is thought to be beyond our means, Ministers must curb their desires to be world policemen and bringers of good to far-flung corners of the globe. This is only a new twist to an old lesson about the need to be prepared for war in order to avoid being dragged into one. With the Comprehensive Spending Review coming up, now is the time for this Government to indicate whether they wish to be able to participate in wars of choice anywhere in the world or whether they are resigned to playing the less forceful role of all other European nations. Without a large and sustained increase in the defence budget, it would be wrong for a Government to think that at present strengths the Armed Forces can any longer underwrite global interventions on the scale of the past decade, or in future wars of choice. It is pay up or give up time for this Government.