---

Armed Forces: US Missile Defence

My Lords, I join those who have expressed their genuine appreciation to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for giving the House an opportunity to discuss this issue. As a long-standing governor of the London School of Economics, I long ago came to admire the powerful, tough and sometimes relentless analysis—and the effectiveness with which it is usually deployed—of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall there has been a total transformation of the context in which we approach defence. The nature of the threat has become much more complex and demanding than the relative predictability of the dynamism of the Cold War. Volatility and dispersed dangers, coupled with sinister nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities are the stark reality. The remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Addington, deserve careful attention. I sometimes reflect that what has been regarded in the past as unorthodox has indeed become the orthodox. It is impossible to eliminate the dangers—again, the remarks and observations of the noble Lord, Lord Addington, were very important in this respect—but they can be reduced to a minimum with irreconcilable extremism marginalised. The battle for hearts and minds must therefore no longer be seen as a nice country weekend idea. It becomes a central, immediate, muscular priority in our strategy. A battle for hearts and minds requires vast resources for economic, social and educational policy and its implementation. This battle, together with the already existing huge demands across the world on limited military and intelligence resources, must mean that projects that pre-empt massive expenditure for years ahead—a missile defence system, like a renewed future for our own current form of nuclear deterrent, is exactly that—should be subject to the toughest possible scrutiny, analysis and evaluation to be sure that such projects are really the most effective and reliable and involve the best possible use of resources. My noble friend Lord Giddens drew attention to that important point. Do they convincingly meet not only current challenges but challenges we may face in the future? Among the new preoccupations posed by terrorism, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, and the rest, what, if any, are the Russian and Chinese dimensions in all this? Will such developments contribute to locking us into a muscle-bound inflexible and inadequate posture? We have debated this issue before but I do not believe that we have really answered the question convincingly. We and our allies owe it to our hard-pressed—indeed overstretched—service personnel in the front line to be absolutely certain. It is to them and their needs that we should look first when considering defence expenditure. Some may say that the proposed missile defence system is in any case a US initiative and that all we are doing is facilitating the priority of a friend and ally. That is naïve. The political implications and knock-on effects on our own priorities of our involvement are immense, and we need to be convinced that they are beyond question necessary in pursuit of what we believe are our own security interests, let alone those of Europe and the wider world. Surely, as the noble Lords, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Hannay, with his vast experience, argued, a multilateral approach is indispensable, as is the imperative of a regenerated commitment to global disarmament. Against that background of the imperative for intellectual rigour we shall make an unforgivable mistake if, because of whatever misplaced emotions, we allow ourselves to be seduced—as arguably we were in the saga of the Iraq war—into an increasingly irreversible momentum. We have never honestly resolved whether the route of travel was a wise, rational and justified one. There is a debate about this in the United States. Fundamental re-evaluation of strategy in both the Democratic and Republican Parties is taking place. This would be a disastrous time to add to a momentum that risks thwarting the potential of all that exciting new thinking across the Atlantic. The Government would deserve the widespread support of us all in deciding to pause, to think extremely hard and deep, and to help our American friends to do the same before proceeding—if they decide to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, raised the crucial issue of the status of the base. Defence is about defending a society that is qualitatively worth defending. One part of that reality in the United Kingdom that I passionately believe in—I make no apology for finishing on this theme—is the national parks. I declare an interest as a very active vice-president of the Council for National Parks—indeed, I live in one. In previous debates on US defence infrastructure in the United Kingdom the Government have provided assurances that any new missile defence system would not result in additional built development at Fylingdales, which is of course in the North York Moors National Park. A similar reassurance from my noble friend today would be good. I hope that she will give it. However, the fear must be that the major infrastructure needed will amount to a vast intrusion. I am thinking of the new and extra roads, buildings—the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire has already spelt out graphically what that means—fences and additional security, not to speak of the further loss of public access. Unavoidably, there will be substantial public interest in any plan that would prolong the military use of Fylingdales and could lead to a major new development in a national park. It is important, therefore, that due process is followed. This means a full environmental impact assessment, which the Government require for new, renewed or intensified military use of national parks. They require that any proposals be tested against the guidance on planning policy. This guidance includes a presumption against major developments in national parks. A public consultation should therefore take place on the future use of the site, including on whether it should remain in the national park at all, should the Government wish to sanction its use for any missile defence system. It would be helpful to have the observations of my noble friend on all this when she comes to reply. What the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, said is something that none of us can escape. Is this part of the sovereign territory of the United Kingdom? Does the law and practice of the Untied Kingdom apply? If not, why the hell not? We need clear answers on that. I hope the House will forgive me if, when speaking of the national parks, I seize this opportunity to say that there has been, of late, increasing use of the national parks for military training. As a former commissioned serviceman and a former defence Minister, I obviously believe that military training is a vital part of any defence policy, but its use in national parks should be only what is absolutely essential. The national parks should, in a sense, be the last resort. We have to face the fact that the purpose of the parks is to provide psychological and physical breathing space for a stressed nation. We allow that to be removed at our peril, in terms of the quality of our society as a whole. These are not light matters, but an illustration of the very specific implications for our own national social priorities of a scheme of this kind—quite apart from the defence implications. We have not begun to look at all that. As the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, said, the need for a major debate is absolutely imperative.