Proceeding contribution from Lord Powell of Bayswater (Crossbench) in the House of Lords on Thursday, 10 January 2008. It occurred during Debate on Armed Forces: US Missile Defence.
Armed Forces: US Missile Defence
My Lords, to avoid any possible doubt, I draw attention to my declaration in the Register of Lords’ Interests, though I do not believe that any of them are directly involved. I join other noble Lords in complimenting the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, on securing this debate; the subject is extremely important. It is absolutely right that Parliament should discuss it regularly and keep it under review, and that the Government should keep Parliament informed. I am not going to follow the noble Lord, Lord Judd, into the national parks; I very much doubt that I could keep up with him once we got there. The essence of successful defence is to identify threats in advance and make proper provision to deter or counter them. There may be no immediate or current threat to Britain or Europe from nuclear or other weapons delivered by missiles from the Middle East area, including Iran, but it would be short-sighted not to foresee a fair probability of such a threat in the future. I do not take much comfort from the recent US national intelligence estimate on Iran. Even if Iran has suspended its nuclear weapons programme as such, it continues to produce the fissile material needed for it, and resumption of work on warheads would be a comparatively easy step. Its work on longer-range missiles certainly continues. If Iran develops such weapons, other regimes in the area will follow suit and we cannot ignore the threat that could arise. Ideally, diplomatic pressure and non-proliferation measures would be the best defence against this threat, but they are patently not working in the case of Iran, any more than they did for Pakistan. Equally, no Government want nuclear retaliation to be the only option for defending against a future threat, so a modest second line of defence, in the form of ballistic missile defence, makes a great deal of sense. Of course, BMD cannot stop nuclear weapons hand-delivered by terrorists, but it is the only possible defence against missiles, if not a foolproof one. It is a useful deterrent because it reduces the chance of such missiles reaching their target, and it forces a country which might consider using them to accept that the chances of success are much reduced, while the likelihood of retaliation is just as great. Bear in mind that all countries that have so far acquired nuclear weapons have also acquired the missiles to deliver them. It is a worthwhile investment. The idea that the sort of ballistic missile defence system currently proposed for Europe presents any sort of threat to Russia’s vast arsenal of nuclear-armed missiles is frankly nonsensical and the Russians know it. It is, no doubt, the political signal of further western intrusion into what was once Warsaw Pact territory that they dislike. Sacrificing ballistic missile defence is not the way to re-establish relations with Russia. Such a cave-in would simply encourage hard-line tactics on their part in the future. The sensible course is the one on which the Americans are embarked—to discuss with the Russians how they can be included in BMD architecture, without conceding them a veto over where defensive missiles should be sited. Those defensive missiles have to be based where they can be effective. Since current technology means that they cannot catch up with an attacking missile from behind, they have to be in such a missile’s path in order to intercept it. Poland and the Czech Republic fulfil that criterion. Obviously, those countries will want to negotiate with the US about the terms and conditions of deployment there. They will certainly, sensibly, want reassurance that an incoming American Administration next year will not simply drop the proposal altogether, leaving them to suffer damage to their relations with Russia for no ultimate advantage. That is likely to mean that it will be some time before deployment can take place, which is time for further negotiations with the Iranians and to come to a sensible arrangement with the Russians. By far the best place to station such interceptors is the United Kingdom. It is a great pity that the Government are not doing more to secure their stationing here. Hosting them would secure the maximum influence over the circumstances in which they are used, while minimising our financial contribution. It is about as close to a free lunch as one gets in international security. Ballistic missile defence will be the strategic system of the 21st century. I suspect that, 10 years or so from now, we shall end up buying our own missile defence system at much greater cost. I understand that the Government originally considered an offer to host the system, but were reluctant to take on simultaneously the political challenges of replacing Trident and hosting a ballistic missile defence system. They made the right decision about the Trident system. I hope it is not too late to revisit the decision on stationing BMD missiles here and come to an arrangement that is beneficial to the defence of Britain and the rest of Europe, and a system that threatens no one: not the Iranians, not the Russians—no one.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 697 c965-7
- Session
- 2007-08
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Lords chamber
- Subjects
- Deployment Czechia International cooperation Nuclear weapons Poland Radar USA Russia Ballistic missile defence RAF Menwith Hill Early warning systems RAF Fylingdales
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
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