---

Armed Forces: US Missile Defence

My Lords, I am grateful that so many Peers have come to take part in this extremely important debate. The debate has had two specific purposes. The first—and I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Young, said what he did in the last few minutes—relates to what I can only describe in quite strong language as virtually a contemptuous treatment of Parliament. Over several years now, we have consistently had responses from Ministers to the effect that we are not entitled to comment on anything to do with this bilateral system—and it is a bilateral system, not, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, suggested, a NATO system. I will give two recent examples. On 14 June 2007, Mr Hoon said: "““President Putin’s offer to include the radar at Qabala in Azerbaijan in the US ballistic missile system is a policy issue for the United States government””.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/6/07; col. 1215W.]" It was not an issue for anybody else. In a debate in this House on 22 November, when my noble friend Lord Wallace raised a question on this matter, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—I know that we all regret that she is indisposed at the present time and not able to take part in this debate—replied: "““The bilateral discussions between Russia and the United States over co-operation on ballistic missile defence are not for the UK to comment on””.—[Official Report, 22/11/07; col. 924.]" Yet we find ourselves faced with a proposal for a substantial increase in the facilities at Menwith Hill. We even face the possibility of the United Kingdom becoming the next area for a ballistic missile interceptor system. However, Parliament has been entitled to talk about this hardly at all over the past few years. As my noble friend Lady Falkner said, it is extraordinary that it should have been left to one opposition party to bring this matter to the attention of the House. That is the first point and I think that we should make it very seriously. If Parliament is to be treated as a significant part of the decision-making processes of a democracy, the Government have to be more open, more frank and more informative about this crucial aspect of our defence policy. The second, wider issue was raised by the noble Lords, Lord Giddens and Lord Hannay, and by many others: how do we deal with the extremely disturbing situation that we face in the world at present? Let me refer back, as did the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, in an interesting historical speech, to the fact that the period in which there was the greatest advance in not only controlling the dissemination of arms but in creating far less opportunity for terrorists was immediately after the end of the Cold War. Last month, I attended a conference in the United States at which Mr Gorbachev pointed out repeatedly the extraordinary advances that were made at that time: a reduction of some 6,000 nuclear missiles, destroyed between the United States and Russia; a huge advance in securing nuclear materials; and a huge advance in establishing a whole set of safeguards for the whole world with regard to the Cold War legacy of a huge number of nuclear materials and weapons strewn across a vast range of the world. It was in that period immediately after the Cold War that Ukraine, Kazakhstan and other countries completely gave up any ambitions that they might have had for developing a nuclear weapon. At the conference, Mr Gorbachev repeatedly said that there had to be a return to multilateral controls because, without them, it is impossible to see how we can control the dissemination and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is simply an illusion to suppose that some form of missile defence in eastern Europe or, for that matter, in the United Kingdom can deal with an issue so great as this. It is a tragedy that we have seen a gradual erosion—as the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, said in his eloquent speech, and as the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, pointed out—of the whole system of arms control and disarmament that has protected the world for the past 40 years from the possibility of a major nuclear exchange. Let me say one more thing about that period. Gradually a large part of the world became committed to looking at some of the dangers of terrorism. It is vital to point out to those who believe, as the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, did, that the proposal called MAD—mutually assured destruction—still holds good that many of the most serious situations involve not state actors but non-state actors. We have to address that problem. The noble Lord, Lord Powell of Bayswater, made somewhat light of Russia’s reaction to the attempt to place missile defences in central and eastern Europe. I do not believe that we should treat it so lightly. Russia may be exaggerating; she may be going over the top. But anyone in this House or elsewhere who has studied the history of Russia will know that a consistent theme runs through it: the fear of encirclement, which was mentioned only in the past two weeks by such players as the Russian Foreign Secretary and the Russian Prime Minister. Russia’s reactions may be emotional and not wholly rational, but that does not mean that they are not real and do not need to be taken into account. We already know what Russia’s response has been. Just in the past few days, she has withdrawn from the crucial conventional forces in Europe treaty, which has limited the number of troops and conventional weapons based in Europe to the great advantage of peace in the world. We know that Russia is now talking about the possibility of a nuclear response to the use of missiles or the return of missiles as an anti-missile defence in central and eastern Europe. It is true that General Baluyevsky, head of the central command of the Russia armed forces, may be going over the top in what he says. But when he says that Russian missiles are automatically trained to respond immediately to any missile attack and that there is the possibility therefore of a grave mistake that would lead to nuclear-tipped weapons landing in Europe, we would be very foolish not to take that threat at least fairly seriously. As others have said in this debate, on top of that the Russians are now talking about moving towards a more sophisticated system of missiles that would be capable of withstanding anti-missile defences. I do not know whether that is true, but it is a significant question that needs to be addressed and about which Parliament should hear the concerns that many people have. In the short run, more disturbingly to me, Russia is showing signs of ceasing to co-operate with the western world, and with the United States in particular, in the very area where its co-operation with the United States has been most successful: the securing of nuclear materials, control over the supply of fissile materials and all the things with which we should be profoundly concerned, given the massive increase in civil nuclear power that now lies before us. Scores of countries will now have access to uranium and other forms of nuclear fuel. We will have to depend on their trustworthiness in deciding that they do not become nuclear powers. The anti-missile defences in no way address this issue, yet the issue is one of the most important to confront us today. There are those who believe that one of the reasons why the United States pursued the proposal bilaterally with Poland and the Czech Republic was Donald Rumsfeld’s attempt to divide old and new Europe. Certainly, there was no attempt to discuss the proposal with the rest of the NATO countries of Europe, although there should have been. We now know that Poland and the Czech Republic are beginning to reconsider their position. In Poland, on this very day, the Polish Foreign Minister is meeting his opposite number in the Czech Republic to see what their combined reaction should be to the American proposal. Today, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister is in Warsaw to discuss the implications of the proposal for Polish-Russian relations. A few days ago in the Czech Republic, 1,000 people demonstrated against Czech involvement in missile defence. In Poland, there has been a marked swing of opinion, with Mr Sikorski, the Foreign Secretary, specifically saying that, although the missile defence is in the interests of the United States, it is not clear whether it is in the interests of Poland. Changes of government in Poland and the Czech Republic have put this whole project at risk, yet so far the United Kingdom has not been consulted or, as far as I know, informed about the way in which these relationships are going. The most important issue in this debate was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, in an impressive speech, and in the eloquent speeches made by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, and others. I believe that the United Kingdom Government, our Foreign Office and our Ministry of Defence are increasingly out of touch with a significant movement in American opinion. The noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Giddens, referred to the proposal—the so-called Wall Street Journal letter of last year—signed by Mr Kissinger, Mr Schultz, Mr Perry and Senator Nunn, calling on a redirection of nuclear weapons disarmament policy gradually towards the destruction of all such weapons. Congress has already decided that it will not go ahead with appropriations for the ballistic missile defence system unless there is full agreement from Poland and the Czech Republic. I have already mentioned the doubts raised on that issue. Congress has decided specifically that it wants to make sure that the missile systems work. My noble friend Lord Addington spoke powerfully on whether or not they do. It is perhaps worth quoting an extremely impressive and, I believe, important editorial in the New York Times on 30 December. It states: "““Paying a huge monetary and diplomatic price to respond to a threat that does not yet exist with a system that does not yet work has always seemed foolish and counterproductive””." That theme has run through a great deal of the American debate. Does this system work? Has it been presented as working when it has essentially been manipulated to produce a successful result? My noble friend Lord Addington referred to recent tests in which it was known where the missile was coming from and what its route would be; even then, many of the tests failed. Perhaps most important are the Russian offers of co-operation made last summer. Russia did not initially respond by marching out of one multilateral agreement after the other. Incidentally, more frightening still, Russia is now threatening to march out of the intermediate nuclear force treaty and even START, which has reduced the arsenals of nuclear missiles held throughout the world by large proportions and which dies out in 2009. Have Her Majesty’s Government embarked on any serious study of the extension of that crucial treaty in order to allow for a new verification system, given that the present one will die in 2009 and it is all that we have? On the American reaction, there has been little debate—almost none, as many have said—in our Parliament. In the United States, during the presidential primaries, the Republican and Democrat candidates have put forward their suggestions and ideas. As my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire pointed out, in the case of the Republicans the discussion has largely been about whether this is directed at Russia or someone else. It is important that two of the leading contenders think that it is directed at Russia, which goes some way towards explaining why Russia is so profoundly worried about the whole development. The Democrat candidates have been discussing to a much greater extent how we can deal with the whole issue of proliferation. They have been attracted to the ideas put forward in that Wall Street Journal letter and, subsequently, in the Congress and by the body to which I belong, the Nuclear Threat Initiative. American opinion is moving towards a new approach to this huge issue. I am deeply worried by the extent to which Her Majesty’s Government appear to be still talking the language of an Administration who are shortly to leave office, as the language of an exchange of deterrents is increasingly made foolish by the existence of non-state actors and terrorist groups. I would plead that the Government reconsider their attitude towards anti-missile defence in the light of recent developments. I am not saying not that it should not exist; I am arguing that the Government should take much more seriously the possibility of co-operation between Russia, the United States and others in mounting an effective international system of defence. I will conclude with a quotation from the significant New York Times editorial, which has had deep influence on the primary elections in the United States, about the offer that Putin made last summer of sharing a Russian early warning radar system in Azerbaijan. The Americans dismissed the offer at the time, but the editorial said: "““American officers who have checked out the site have come away impressed with its capabilities. A joint United States-Russian military operation on Iran’s borders could do a lot to get Tehran to rethink its nuclear plans””." It is crucial to make sure that Iran does not move to get a nuclear bomb. It is crucial that Iran should be reassured that she will not herself be the victim of a nuclear attack; that is a crucial part of the outcome. I believe that we should look at the New York Times approach carefully and see whether we could not now get an international agreement and abandon what has been much too unilateralist, much too exclusive and much too destructive an approach.