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Armed Forces: US Missile Defence

My Lords, I am not certain that I can answer the question on Azerbaijan, so I will write to the noble Baroness, but I think that my next paragraph will answer the first part of her question. In November, the US formally presented its proposals. These included federating Russian radar sensors into a joint missile defence architecture; creating joint missile defence data exchange centres in Russia and Europe; and the phased activation of the European architecture. That was an important point—that it can be activated in response to any increase in the ballistic missile threat from countries of concern. These discussions have been encouraging, and although a solution is still some way off—again, some noble Lords in the debate were sceptical that a solution would be found—we do believe that good progress is being made. In considering the way ahead, we are conscious of the importance of NATO allies sending clear messages to Russia, and of our own commitment to upholding the principles that have served European security so well since the end of the Cold War: openness, consensus, transparency, engagement, honouring politically binding and legally binding obligations, and host state consent for the presence of foreign military forces.  We will continue to work through NATO to promote these principles and we urge Russia to work with us to do the same. US discussions continue with the Polish and the Czech Governments on the basing of the additional missile defence assets in Europe. These discussions are taking place in a demanding diplomatic environment, and the sensitivity and importance of this issue requires that detailed negotiations be conducted at all levels. It is not our policy to comment on diplomatic negotiations between foreign countries. As they are bilateral, the UK plays no part in them, but we are kept apprised of the outcomes as part of a wider discussion with the US on the progress of the ballistic missile defence programme. If these negotiations have implications for the UK, we will report them to Parliament. There have been reports in the international media that UK and US Governments are also discussing the basing of interceptors here in the UK. I say now that that is simply not true—there are no plans to base interceptors here. If in the future we decide that the acquisition of such technology becomes essential to the security of the United Kingdom, we will re-examine this position. This re-examination would come not from a desire to follow blindly the defence policy of other nations—as we have been accused of in the debate—but from a recognition of our need to ensure our national security against emerging threats. The Government have also made clear the role we believe that an effective missile defence system could play. We already contribute to the US system through the early warning information provided by RAF Fylingdales, and the information routed through RAF Menwith Hill, and we co-operate closely with the US on technology programmes. The Government have been criticised over the way that they announced the decision to allow US Governments to use the satellite relay station at RAF Menwith Hill to route early warning data to the missile defence system. The original decision to allow the US to use RAF Menwith Hill as a relay station for satellite data was taken in March 1997. The purpose of the relay station was then—and remains—to warn the UK and the US of any missile attack on our countries. What the Government agreed to recently was that the US could use this same satellite data in their missile defence system. The fact that satellite early warning information flows through RAF Menwith Hill has not changed. All that is different is that the US Government are now able to use this early warning information to inform their missile defence systems of possible missile launches from states of concern, and to assist in the interception of these missiles. The Written Statement that was given in another place on 25 July—it was quoted by my noble friend Lord Young in his excellent speech—was not ““sneaked out”” or ““slipped out””, as the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire observed, or ““buried””, as the noble Lord, Lord Luke, stated. The Government’s agreement to this arrangement was given in an exchange of classified letters between the US Defense Secretary, who wrote on 29 June 2007, and the Secretary of State for Defence, who replied on 16 July 2007. The timing of the announcement to the House on 25 July, just prior to the Summer Recess, was therefore entirely appropriate. The Ministry of Defence also produced a press release on the Written Statement on 26 July. Ballistic missile defence is not a weapon of first strike. It is not a sword, but a shield that could protect against the emerging threat of the long-range missiles that are being developed, or acquired, by states of concern—states that one day may wish to use them to harm NATO countries. The prospect of a nuclear, biological or chemical warhead detonating in Paris, Washington, Rome or London is horrendous, and I am sure that you will agree that we should strive to prevent this eventuality all costs. If there is anything that we as a Government can do to reduce this threat, we have a responsibility to do it. I was asked a number of questions by noble Lords. I will rattle through them as quickly as I can in the time I have, and I assure those noble Lords whose questions I do not answer that I will of course write to them. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, asked about the Prime Minister’s Statement of February 2007, referring to the article in the Economist that suggested that the UK was negotiating with the US over the siting of MD interceptor missiles here. It was these proposals to which the Prime Minister was referring. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, also asked me about Germany’s request for more multilateral discussions on missile defence, and stated that the UK had not responded. The UK provides regular updates on missile defence activities through NATO. This includes statements on UK policy and on missile defence, and updates on co-operation with the US on its BMD system. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said that my right honourable friend Des Browne, the Secretary of State for Defence, had misled the House on the issue of Menwith Hill. I strongly reject any suggestion that the Secretary of State for Defence misled Parliament over the request from the US for the use of Menwith Hill for missile defence proposals. In April last year, the UK Government had received no request from the US. A formal request was received in a letter from the US Defense Secretary, dated 29 June. The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, and other noble Lords, made strong points about the issue of sovereignty in relation to Menwith Hill. The Government take the issue of sovereignty extremely seriously. Menwith Hill is United Kingdom territory. The base is under the command of an RAF officer—there is no question of UK sovereignty being compromised. My Lords, we have had a good, in-depth debate on missile defence.   Many issues were raised, and many interesting and informed questions asked, and I hope that I have provided satisfactory answers to as many of those questions as I could in the time.   I will write to noble Lords whose questions I was unable to answer today. I will not go into detail about the operations at Menwith Hill, which are highly classified. However, I undertake to write to noble Lords on the matter in more detail. The noble Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Marlesford, asked whether the UK will accept US interceptors if negotiations with Poland fail. There are no plans to offer the UK as a potential site for interceptor missiles should negotiations with the Polish Government fail. However, as the Secretary of State for Defence said in his Written Statement on 25 July, the UK, "““will keep this under review as the threat evolves””.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/7/07; col. 72WS.]" My noble friend Lord Giddens asked about the threat to the UK from hosting missile defence assets. The 2003 report by the House of Commons Defence Committee agreed that the upgrade to Fylingdales would not increase the threat to the UK. Even with the US now able to use Menwith Hill to route early warning satellite data through its missile defence system, the Government feel that the situation has not changed. The US missile defence system is designed to counter a limited threat from a state of concern and these missiles would be limited in terms of numbers and their ability to accurately strike their target. It is felt that it is unlikely that a state with limited opportunities to strike against the US and her allies would wish to target a relatively small target such as a radar station, which it may not hit, when a large population centre offers a more attractive and potentially devastating target. The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, asked about the economic benefits to the UK from BMD. The UK signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2003 that allows bilateral information exchanges and co-operative work that prepares the way for fair opportunities to be given to UK industry in participation in US systems. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked about the uranium enrichment bank. The UK accepts concerns about climate change, and the longer term availability and affordability of fossil fuels will lead to increased interest in the generation of nuclear power. We support the right of countries to undertake to develop nuclear technologies for safe, secure and peaceful uses. We are working on the creation of a viable, attractive and internationally agreed regime of nuclear fuel assurances under the auspices of the IAEA, which will make it unnecessary for nations to develop technically complex and expensive in-country enrichment and reprocessing facilities. I see that I am out of time. I still have a good bunch of questions to answer, and I will answer them in writing. I thank noble Lords for a rigorous, well-informed and robust debate.