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Defence in the World

If the hon. Gentleman will have a little patience, I shall come to exactly that issue towards the end of my speech. Some 4,000 British troops remain in Iraq. Some of our forces are embedded in, fighting with and mentoring the Iraqi security forces, enabling them to take eventual control of their own security affairs. Those on the ground argue that British troops are playing an important role, and that this is no time to be talking about withdrawing them from Iraq. We should listen to those voices, but the Government need to explain continuously to the British public, with clarity, exactly how they see the role of British troops developing and how the overwatch operation will change over time. In particular, there needs to be an honest appraisal of the risks posed to our troops, directly and indirectly, from Iran. General Petraeus has been openly critical of Iran's involvement in Iraq, and two weeks ago, Admiral Mike Mullen, the US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, blamed Iran for its"““increasingly lethal and malign influence””" in Iraq. He went on to say that recent operations in Basra had revealed"““just how much and how far Iran is reaching into Iraq to foment instability””." That is an important matter. The Secretary of State has all but said that Iranian involvement has led directly to the deaths of British troops in Iraq, but we need to hear more about what is being done by British forces and at the diplomatic level to counter the threat that Iran poses to Iraqi stability. The hard-won gains of emerging democratic authority, improving stability, and the sacrifices made by coalition troops and the Iraqi people cannot be allowed to be put in jeopardy by the actions of the Iranian regime. I would like to turn, as the Secretary of State did, to another part of the world that is a little closer to home. Many pages of European history have been written in the Balkans, which have always been vital to Europe's geo-strategic interests, and there has been no shortage of armed conflict over its territory over the centuries. The images of the wars being fought in Iraq and Afghanistan mean that it is easy wrongly to assume that peacekeeping in Kosovo will be a more straightforward affair. Let us make no mistake, regardless of how benign things may appear in Kosovo, our troops there will still be at risk. That is why we found it extremely regrettable that we were not given an oral statement on the deployment of our forces there last week. I am pleased that some of the questions that we subsequently asked were answered by the Secretary of State today, although some remain. In his written statement, the Secretary of State said that the troops would be deployed ““until 30 June””. In his letter to me, he said that this ““initial deployment”” would be ““reviewed with NATO”” at the end of June. Exactly what does that mean? What are the chances that British troops will be in Kosovo beyond the end of June? This Government have a track record of raising expectations that troops will return only to dash them later. The House would expect to be given some clarity about why it was termed an ““initial deployment”” and exactly what ““reviewed with NATO”” will mean. Perhaps the Minister for the Armed Forces will deal with that question directly in his speech. I was interested to hear that what happens in Kosovo will, again, be paid for entirely from the reserve, but that raises a basic issue that comes up again and again. Not only are we carrying the military burden through our troops, but our taxpayers are carrying the full burden, because there is no proper financial burden-sharing of what NATO does. As the Leader of the Opposition said recently, there needs to be far better financial burden-sharing in both NATO and the EU. Again, I hope that the Minister for the Armed Forces will answer some of those points. I understand that in addition to sourcing the requirement for the operational reserve force that is now being deployed to Kosovo, the 2nd Battalion, The Rifles was also serving as our spearhead land element. Which unit will take over while that one is in Kosovo? Do we have the capability to react to the unexpected? Let me paint a picture of the wider political situation facing us in Kosovo. Serbia is trying to include northern parts of Kosovo in its general election later this month; there are unconfirmed reports that Serbia is massing troops and munitions along its border with Kosovo; and there are media accounts of tension along sections of the Macedonia-Kosovo border. Our troops are going to face many risks in a volatile environment and very challenging circumstances. There is no doubt that, as always, they will perform superbly. If we made a commitment to NATO to provide the operational reserve force for the Balkans, we have an obligation to the alliance that we must fulfil, but the problem with this mission goes beyond the obvious question of overstretch and touches on questions of Government planning. As a country, we are more than fulfilling our obligations to the NATO alliance in Afghanistan, as one of my hon. Friends said in an intervention. Last year, once 10 December 2007 was established as the day that international mediators would submit their findings on the future of Kosovo to the United Nations Secretary-General, it became no secret that Kosovo would most likely declare independence sometime during the first quarter of 2008. Considering our high operational tempo in Iraq and Afghanistan and when our forces were so overstretched, why did the Government continue to make that commitment to the ORF during that time period in Kosovo? Did the Government try to persuade other countries to take on that responsibility at a time when the UK's armed forces were doing so much elsewhere? I hope that the Minister will deal with that point directly. Bearing in mind the Secretary of State's response to another question, we will keep a close eye on this issue and table parliamentary questions on any potential impact that operations in Kosovo will have on the airbridge to Afghanistan and Iraq. The concern is not without justification. New figures show how regularly our troops are delayed returning from Iraq or Afghanistan. Given that they have to report to the flight line many hours before a flight, it is a huge issue when 11 per cent. of all flights from Afghanistan are delayed by more than six hours, leaving our troops often on the floor or losing days of leave. That can have a significant impact on morale, as anyone who has spoken to our forces there will attest. It is simply not good enough.