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Defence in the World

All members of NATO have to decide what to put first: their national interests and historical grievances or the collective alliance. I heard my hon. Friend's point, but I was in fact referring to Germany and France. Let me turn finally to Afghanistan and NATO. The recent Bucharest summit was disappointing on many fronts. For example, nothing was done to source the operational reserve force for the international security assistance force in Afghanistan. That requirement of NATO's combined joint statement of requirements for Afghanistan has been unfilled since Romania last provided it in December 2006. It is inconceivable that 26 NATO members cannot find an extra battalion between them to provide an over-the-horizon reserve force for ISAF in Afghanistan. It illustrates a rather sad state of affairs. It was reported in The New York Times last Saturday that the Pentagon is thinking about deploying 7,000 more troops to Afghanistan on top of the 3,200 Marines recently deployed to the south, because our NATO allies are not willing to provide the troops that the commanders on the ground need. That might or might not be correct—it was newspaper speculation—but the fact that it is being considered could lead to a dangerous shift in America's perception of NATO. We have more troops in Afghanistan now than at any other time. We are the second largest contributor of troops to ISAF after the US and sadly 95 of our brave servicemen and women did not make it back home to their families. That is a testament to the dedication and commitment of the British armed forces to bring stability and prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Of course, it is about much more than that. As important as reconstruction and democratic development are, our forces are in Afghanistan primarily for our national security and to deny the forces determined to destroy our way of life a base from which to operate. It is for our security that those people have made their sacrifices, and we should perhaps be more explicit in saying so. Our troops fought bravely this winter, retaking Musa Qala and restoring order. We have about 6,000 troops based in Helmand province, which is geographically twice the size of Wales. Some 700 of those troops—a large portion—are tied up in Musa Qala, left behind to maintain the security. When the Minister winds up the debate, will he report on the progress of the reconstruction effort in Musa Qala? When does he expect that the Afghan security forces will be able to take over some or all of the security responsibilities there in order to free up British forces to further pursue the Taliban in other parts of Helmand province? The difficulties and shortages in Afghanistan are not limited to boots on the ground. We are still facing a shortage of tactical airlift in the form of helicopters. The Prime Minister, during his time as Chancellor, cut the helicopter budget by £1.4 billion in 2004 when we were already involved in two conflicts. In December, as the Secretary of State reminded us, the Prime Minister announced that NATO will start contracting civilian helicopters to reduce the burden on the military aircraft operating in Afghanistan. Although that move has sometimes been presented to us as some sort of panacea for the tactical airlift shortage in Afghanistan, the civilian contracted helicopters do not solve the main problem of freeing up helicopters for coalition use for combat operations. I appreciate and respect the civilians who are placing their lives at risk by supporting British and coalition troops on the front lines in Afghanistan, but as with all announcements from this Government we have to examine the small print. Under the terms of the contract, only 13,000 kg can be airlifted a day, in comparison with a CH-47 Chinook helicopter that can carry up to 23,000 kg on one trip. To put it simply, we are getting two thirds of one sortie from one Chinook helicopter a day with the NATO civilian contract. We now know that the contract is for an airlift service provided by a mix of helicopters or fixed-wing aircraft, but fixed-wing aircraft have different capabilities. They require secure runways for take-off and landing and many of the forward operating bases in southern Afghanistan lack such facilities. In addition, the terms of the contract do not allow troops to be carried in the civilian contracted aircraft. Helicopter airlift, in a country such as Afghanistan, is vital for conducting counter-insurgency operations. The problem is that if our troops need to be medivac'd or a quick reaction force needs to be sent behind enemy lines, not only are those civilian helicopters prohibited from conducting such missions, they are failing to free up enough of our own helicopters to reduce the burden effectively. We need to do more, but we should never have found ourselves in a situation where we need to ask our troops to operate without all the necessary equipment. If we have failed to provide our forces with everything that they need, we have not failed as a nation to fulfil our obligations as a NATO member, which is more than we can say for a number of our European NATO allies. Many of the additional European troops who were offered at Bucharest, as well as many of the European troops who are already operating in Afghanistan, are restricted by phone books-worth of caveats, and that comes at a time when defence is high on the EU agenda. The EU has talked about a foreign and security policy, but it simply will not spend the money. Most countries in Europe spend well below the 2 per cent. of gross domestic product on defence that is supposedly the floor level. In Afghanistan, some of the major EU players are most clearly failing in their duties towards the NATO commitments. Understanding the potential of soft power is important, but soft power on its own is not enough. If we will the ends, we must will the means. Diplomacy without military support has little credibility. In a dangerous world, we cannot simply count on talking away any threat that we face. We remain a global military power, and power brings responsibility. Frameworks, institutions and agreements are all very well, but security does not come for free. Many EU politicians like to say that the role of the EU is in peacekeeping and nation building, but we can keep the peace only if we have the peace. If we want freedom, we must be willing to defend it, to fight for it, if necessary to die for it and, definitely, to fund it. In Afghanistan, we need a commitment to fight to the last, but unfortunately, at present in the south of Afghanistan, that would be the last Briton, the last American and the last Canadian—[Interruption]—and a few notable others. That cannot be sustained in the long run. There must be better burden sharing in the south of Afghanistan, because the load in fighting cannot fall on as few nations as it does at present in an alliance that wants to have a sustainable long-term future. When Secretary Gates talks about the emergence of a two-tier NATO, it is a warning about the survivability of the alliance. For EU politicians then to talk about a European pillar of NATO compounds the problem. With European security and defence policy, we see no extra funds on top of those set aside for NATO responsibilities; rather we see the double-hatting of forces that are clearly masquerading as new capacity. We see duplication and possibly competing military structures on top of an already underfunded commitment to the primary defence alliance. That is a potentially toxic mix for NATO in the long run.