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Defence in the World

We look forward to hearing the answers to these important questions, which relate to the relationship between Ministers and the armed forces whom they lead. The Defence Committee visited Iraq last summer, and we hope to do so again this summer, subject to the points that have already been made about our medical fitness. Every time we go to Iraq we are immensely impressed by the men and women of our armed forces whom we meet. They are absolutely outstanding and so are their achievements. Obviously, questions remain about the coalition mission in Iraq. The US surge seems to have been successful in many respects in controlling the levels of violence. The Iraqi security forces seem to be growing in capacity, although they still need support. In that context, I believe that the recent operation in Basra, led by the Iraqis with the support of the British and the Americans, was not a bad thing but a good thing. It was the Iraqis taking control of their own destiny. Let us never forget that that is what we want them to do. The more they can do that, the less necessary the presence of our troops will be. Moving on to Afghanistan, as we reduce our troop levels in Iraq, however slowly we are able to do that, we have increased our commitment to Operation Herrick. We now have about 7,800 service personnel in Afghanistan—more than any other country apart from the United States. On the Defence Committee, the hon. Member for Midlothian (Mr. Hamilton) has drawn attention to the real risk that the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are conflated in the public's mind. They are very different operations; they arise from different circumstances. We must make the case for each of them separately. An unpopular incursion into Iraq, although it has achieved some real successes, looks likely to drag down in the mind of the public the much more difficult incursion into Afghanistan. The events of 9/11 are fading gradually into people's memories as history. The horrors and fears that 9/11 raised are diminishing with time, although in reality the dangers of al-Qaeda and international terrorism remain absolutely huge. Of course, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are reminded of the important point that when we invade a country, we need to be sure what we will do with it when we have been successful, and we need to provide the resources to secure the peace as well as the war. That is what we in the west have failed to do. The Defence Committee visited Afghanistan in April last year. We hope to return to Afghanistan later this year. In the report that we published in the middle of last year, we concluded that reconstruction efforts required a strengthening of the comprehensive approach. There is no one answer to the issues; there is no silver bullet for Afghanistan. We said, among other things, that more work was needed to support the training of the police and the judiciary, and that much more work was needed on the winning of hearts and minds in Afghanistan and, indeed, at home. We were, of course, concerned that the burden of fighting and of the resources going into Afghanistan was falling disproportionately on a handful of NATO countries, but I have already paid tribute to the Netherlands and Canada for the outstanding nature of their contribution. Other countries are also contributing a great deal. I have said that Afghanistan presents a much larger task than Iraq. NATO is trying to create a democratic Government in a country that has no real history of one, and which seems to exhibit little desire for one. The raw material of Afghanistan—resources, education and infrastructure—and the availability of weapons practically everywhere, make the task hugely challenging. That challenge is not yet matched by the political will and the resources in the developed world to get the whole country on to a viable road; until it is, we will not succeed. The future of NATO and ISAF are closely linked. Some NATO members are simply not pulling their weight in Afghanistan; others are bearing greater burdens than are reasonable. We welcome President Sarkozy's announcement of additional French troops to be sent to Afghanistan. I would welcome even more French troops being sent there. Problems remain—there are national caveats and problems of force generation—but that is symptomatic of the broader soul searching that is needed in NATO as a whole. We as a Committee published a report on the future of NATO earlier this year. We thought that it was an important contribution to the debate, and some of our conclusions moved in these directions. We said that the strategic concept of NATO needed to be renewed. Next year is the 60th anniversary of NATO. It needs a new focus. It needs a new clarity of purpose. It needs new political will, above all. That was what we identified as the major shortcoming of NATO at the moment. The point is not just that many NATO countries have fallen considerably below the target of 2 per cent. of GDP, but that the populations of the NATO countries seem to have forgotten what NATO is for. They concentrate much more on the European Union than on NATO, while still being less and less prepared to pay for the defence in which they are clamouring to have a greater say. It is a very odd business. The Committee placed great importance on the outcome of the Bucharest summit; it was a vital summit for the future of the defence of the western world. I was extremely disappointed that we did not have an oral statement on the outcome of the summit even from the Secretary of State for Defence, let alone the Prime Minister. That meant that we did not have the opportunity to question the Secretary of State or the Prime Minister on NATO at a crucial stage. For example, what is the response to Russia when it begins serious talks with separatists in Georgia? What is the response to the shooting down of an unmanned aerial vehicle owned and flown by Georgia? Those two things were a direct response to what came out of NATO. We needed an oral statement. NATO is the linchpin of our security. We must make sure that it adapts to the challenges of today. If we do not, the United States will lose interest in NATO, and if the US loses interest in NATO, NATO will be dead. The future of the mission in Afghanistan is very important to the future of NATO and to its whole credibility, the upholding of which forms part of the most important duty of Government—the defence of our country. I must not take up too much time, so I conclude by saying that we must not let our natural focus on Iraq and Afghanistan obscure the many other commitments of our armed forces. We still have substantial forces in Cyprus, although they are often part of the reserve that rapidly goes backwards and forwards to Iraq or Afghanistan, and we have just deployed 600 additional troops to Kosovo. It is essential for the UK to train for, and to be prepared for, the events that we are not facing now but may face in future. However, we are not doing that, because there is nothing left in the locker. We have been told that by the Chief of the General Staff. We must lift our eyes, we must lift our ambitions, we must lift our pride and we must lift the priority that we place on the defence of our country and on the wonderful men and women who undertake that task on our behalf. That requires leadership and commitment from the very top.