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Defence in the World

Of course we have common interests on which we should work together, but we cannot allow other nations effectively to veto our own foreign policy by exercising their veto in the international institutions. As the previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair, proved time and again, in the end it may only be the bilateral and multilateral ad hoc options that are available to us. Insisting that the only way to validate one's foreign policy is to have it stamped by the EU or the United Nations is to tie one's hands to national agendas that are different from ours—to the agendas of countries that have no intention of allowing us to veto those agendas. So we see the UK disappearing into the background on the world stage. The Prime Minister's absence from the Lisbon treaty signing was met with anger on the part of foreign politicians, diplomats and journalists. How can the Prime Minister expect to have any influence if he absents himself? One official said that"““he has no position in Europe, he occupies no ground””." At last month's NATO summit, the Prime Minister was similarly invisible. Where was Britain's voice when the issue of Georgian and Ukrainian membership was being discussed? We heard strong arguments on both sides from America, France and Germany, but virtually nothing from the United Kingdom. By the time the vital meeting with the Russians took place—on the final day of the summit—the Prime Minister had fled the scene. The last to arrive at Lisbon, the first to leave Bucharest: is that the way to promote the UK on the world stage? To compound that, the Prime Minister failed to come to the House to give an oral statement on the outcome of the NATO summit—a quite extraordinary precedent given the importance of the summit for Afghanistan, for the enlargement of NATO, for missile defence, for relations with Russia and for the unresolved issue of EU-NATO relations. The Defence Secretary told the House last week that everything was going well in Afghanistan, but a report drawn up by the Foreign Office at the Prime Minister's request and distributed to our NATO allies warns that"““Critical military gaps remain to be filled.””" That is not the story we are told on the Floor of the House; it is the sort of candour we could do with. The Prime Minister's effort to dissociate himself from Mr. Blair means that he has adopted a one foot in, one foot out approach to our deployment in Iraq. Again, this is the worst of all possible worlds. While the Americans surged into Iraq last year—despite all the obstacles and difficulties, they have made a lot of progress—the British Government were looking to get out of Iraq. Even that has failed. In the wake of his pre-election stunt to try to overshadow the Conservative conference, the Prime Minister told the House in October that he was planning to reduce the size of Operation Telic from 5,500 last September to just 2,500 by now. That simply defied the military logic, as explained by the Minister for the Armed Forces to the Select Committee in July. He said that"““in an actual overwatch situation we cannot go much below 5,000 because we have to sustain the force and self-protect the force itself.””" So it has proved. Operation Telic is now stuck at around 4,000 for the foreseeable future. The Prime Minister has made himself look foolish and devious in the eyes of our servicemen, the British public and our allies. He raised the hopes of our servicemen—who thought they were going to be home soon—and their families, and then dashed them. Southern Iraq is supposed to be a British responsibility and yet it is the Americans who have had to divert troops from central Iraq to fight in the south. I wonder what it feels like to be stationed at Basra airport watching the Americans do our fighting for us because the British Government have lost the political will and run out of the military capacity. A Labour Member said earlier that overstretch was just a myth promulgated by the Conservatives; he should listen to some of his hon. Friends, who will tell him the truth about how little military capacity we now have. The fact that we are now deploying to the Balkans the 2nd Battalion, The Rifles so soon after their return from Iraq underlines how overstretched we are. The Government's bungling in Iraq has seriously undermined our credibility with the Americans as well. The Government's failure to commit the necessary resources or show the stomach for the fight has caused a sense of private and sometimes public betrayal among the American military and politicians. Of course General Petraeus is going to say something diplomatic when he appears before the press in London, but the disillusion goes up to the most senior levels. Senator McCain has said of the British withdrawal from southern Iraq that he"““did not think it was a good idea.””" That is about as blunt as the special relationship gets in public from a US presidential candidate—the one I hope will win. While we are still talking about scaling back our forces in Basra, the US army has sent a brigade to the city. Is that what we mean by standing shoulder to shoulder with our allies—indeed, our most important ally? The underlying problem is that the Government have failed to underline the reality of their foreign policy with their defence policy. Since 1999, the Government have pursued an interventionist foreign policy without providing the armed forces with the necessary resources. We do not need to rehearse all the figures again. The strategic defence review promised, but did not deliver. The Government point out that they are increasing defence spending, but after the additional spending they have pledged specifically for accommodation, salary increases, council tax rebate, the carriers and Trident's successor, the increase over the course of the comprehensive spending review is just 0.6 per cent., not 1.5 per cent per year as published by the Government. The picture is worse when one factors in defence costs inflation, which was raised earlier in the debate. The spending increases are tiny in comparison with those that the Government have found so easily for other public services such as health, education and overseas aid. The numbers in the armed forces are falling: there are 1,000 fewer soldiers this year than last. Major projects have been delayed and there are endless stories of budgetary chaos at the MOD. The Government have become ashamed to come to the House of Commons to discuss military matters, hence the written rather than oral statements on NATO and our deployment to Kosovo. The MOD has found itself a prisoner of the Prime Minister's indecision. It cannot cut one of the big programmes because of the cost in headlines and job losses, but it is not being given the money to pay the bills either. General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue told the Select Committee that he suspected that cuts would have to be made"““but which they are and what they will be I do not know. We are in the middle of a planning round.””" That was months ago, yet there is no sign of any decisions having been made. When asked how the scale of difficulty in this planning round compared with others, he said:"““I think it is a greater challenge this year than it was in 2007””." When asked whether he remembered the situation ever being as much of a challenge as it is today, he replied:"““Yes. When I was an MA back in the late 1970s we had some pretty challenging times””." Of course, a Labour Government were in charge in the late 1970s. Mr. David Gould, the chief operating officer, said:"““The Chairman specifically asked whether this was as serious as we had ever known it at least in recent years. To that I would say yes, although my memory goes back to the 1970s as well and I can think of times when maybe it was worse. That is not an atmosphere in which it is easy to take big decisions on commitments.””" It was because of that atmosphere that the Committee felt it necessary to conclude in its report that the Ministry of Defence"““needs to take the difficult decisions which will lead to a realistic and affordable equipment programme””." We see no sign at the moment of those decisions being made. The national security strategy says that"““we are entering a phase of overall reduced commitments, recuperation of our people, and regrowth and reinvestment in capabilities and training as much as equipment.””" I put it to the House that that is clearly fantasy. Since that statement was published, our numbers in Afghanistan have risen and are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future, the draw-down from Iraq has been cancelled, and we have now made the deployment of 2nd Battalion, The Rifles to Kosovo. This is not a phase of reduced commitments, and nor is it likely to become one. The Government are totally detached from reality if they think that we are about to enter such a phase in the short, medium or long term. The MOD's development, concept and doctrine centre at Shrivenham has made it clear that global instability is likely to get worse, not better, over the next generation. It forecasts a relative decline in US power, continued weapons proliferation, pressures caused by big demographic changes and population growth, more famine, the effects of climate change, and increasing competition for limited resources such as fresh water, food and energy. Much of that will be concentrated in the most unstable parts of the world. Who is going to deal with these problems if we are stepping back from our role on the world stage? Future Governments will have to decide what they want the armed forces to be capable of. Will a reformed United Nations step in to fulfil the role? Dream on! And there is certainly no sign of other European nations doing so. Only on Monday, the former German ambassador to the United Kingdom told the Financial Times:"““Most EU governments will not be capable or willing to raise their defence budgets substantially””." If not Europe, then who? India, perhaps? Or do we want to see China or Russia doing more? I do not think so. The fact is that there are only three major democracies in this world that are prepared to project military power on the world stage. We are one of them, and if we abdicate our role, we will become yet more dependent on the United States, while having less influence over what it does. The debates that we have in this House on Britain's defence in the world are likely to become less and less relevant to what is happening in the world, unless we in the House are prepared to commit the resources that our armed forces need to do the job that they do so heroically on our behalf.