Proceeding contribution from Lord Tyrie (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Thursday, 9 October 2008. It occurred during Topical debate on TOPICAL DEBATES Financial Stability.
TOPICAL DEBATES Financial Stability
I strongly agree. It is important that we alert people to the myth that is being propagated, which is that, somehow, this crisis blew over on a transatlantic breeze. Of course, it was partly made here as a result of excessive borrowing by the Government, the corporate sector and individuals. Furthermore, the crisis has been made worse by the failure to act quickly. Throughout, we have had a reactive policy from the Government. This is the first time that they have been prepared to look comprehensively at what has been a deepening crisis. The package was not the product of several weeks of hard work, still less months, and one has only to look at the Treasury press release to see how thin it is. It is absurd—in fact, it is an insult to the intelligence of us all—that the Chancellor and the Prime Minister should suggest that it was the product of a lot of deep work. So we are left with a lot of questions that now need to be answered. My hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Mr. Hoban) asked quite a lot of them, but I will add a few in general terms. First, is this really a voluntary scheme, or were the banks, as appears to be the case, dragged to the table to agree to it? What will the Government do if the full £25 billion window is not taken up? There is first-mover disadvantage to taking up such deals. The banks that ask for the money are perceived by the markets to be made weaker as a consequence. Secondly, will the facility be drawn down and will it be allowed to be drawn down primarily by the weakest banks? Will there be limits as a proportion of market capitalisation for each bank? There are great risks to the taxpayer from pouring most of the money into the weakest banks. The upside for the taxpayer will obviously be much smaller, but, on top of that, the strengthening of the balance sheets, and therefore the propping up of the management of the weakest banks, might get in the way of the consolidation of the banking industry, which is what we need. We need the sector itself to run that consolidation around the management of the strongest and best banks. For those reasons, in Monday's edition of The Times I advocated a comprehensive scheme in which the Government would take a stake across the whole sector. The third question revolves around shareholder activism. I strongly support greater shareholder activism in the corporate sector—the hon. Member for Leeds, East alluded to that—which should include oversight of compensation and small business lending. Should the Government be involved in that process? I would much prefer them not to be. I would like them to commit to handing all the corporate governance functions and aspects of the package to the Financial Services Authority. Furthermore, I would like the Treasury to make it clear that in exercising that shareholder influence the FSA will act on the same basis as all shareholders—that is, long-run profit maximisation. The reason for that is something we should not forget: the health and prosperity of those banks represent the country's savings and pensions. The last thing we want is the recovery of the banks, which will come, to be suffocated by politically inspired excessive regulation. That brings me to another issue. We have heard a lot of vague talk about more regulation. We do not want to find ourselves being drastically over-regulated by a panic response. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the United States will engage in exactly that overreaction. We should ensure that we are well placed to benefit from it. That is what happened over Sarbanes-Oxley—we picked up some of the listing business. It is what happened many years ago over what was known as the interest equalisation tax, which enabled the eurodollar deposit market to come to the UK. Regulation needs to reflect the lessons of the crisis, but it also needs to have in mind the fact that there will be opportunities in the recovery phase for the UK and for UK businesses. That recovery phase will come. The fifth question is, what will be the criteria for judging whether the Government's package is a success? The Government should give us confidence, and give confidence to the markets, that we know how to measure that success. They should also give us some indication of contingency planning for what we would do if it turned out that those criteria were not being met. I could throw out a few examples, but obviously I am not trying to devise anything remotely full or comprehensive. Will it be a return to normality in the inter-bank market or the commercial paper market, or in relation to commercial lending generally? We need to be given some indication of what constitutes a return to normality. The absence of guidance on what the Government would do in such circumstances has been damaging the markets further in recent weeks, prior to the announcement of the package. I would like to raise a number of other issues, but I shall raise only one to enable other hon. Members to speak, although I suspect I may burn up the remainder of my speaking time. The issue of lower interest rates has already been mentioned today. The half-point cut is welcome and I completely agree with the criticism made by the hon. Member for Leeds, East of the policy of the Liberals: at the first sign of difficult anti-inflationary gunfire, they want to start to tear up the system that has been put in place. That is what it would mean if we were to alter the inflation target. On the other hand, although I do not make a habit of trying to second-guess the MPC, I do not think that they have got it right this time. Interest rates should always be set at the equilibrium point between a balance of risks. We can easily ask ourselves what those risks are at the moment. Is the risk of a sharp economic downturn, and the accompanying monetary contraction, bigger or smaller than the dangers of deeply embedded and prolonged inflation? That is the choice that the MPC needs to consider. I think it is clear that the balance of risks lies on the side of the danger of contraction, and that points to lower, not higher, interest rates. Cuts can always be reversed if the economy recovers quickly and confidence returns, and if there is a return to a risk of embedded inflationary expectations. However, that is not the crucial issue for the country at the moment. The crucial issue must be to get through this crisis by showing vigorous Government action—whatever is required to ensure that confidence returns to the banking sector. I strongly welcome the package, but I regret that it has come so late, and only after strong pressure, especially from the Conservatives—over the weekend, and in some detail in the press on Monday and elsewhere, completely contrary to what the Liberal spokesman suggested. The Government must now start demonstrating that they are doing far more of the contingency planning to bring confidence to the market than they have shown in the previous 14 months of this deepening crisis.
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- Assets Debts Bank services Banks Credit Bank of England Borrowing Investment Financial institutions Financial Services Authority Financial markets Local government Public expenditure Mortgages Loans Lloyds TSB Housing market HBOS Government guaranteed credit Royal Bank of Scotland Abbey National ING Bank Landsbanki Bradford and Bingley Heritable Bank
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