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Foreign Policy

My Lords, I, too, congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, on obtaining and introducing, so interestingly and ably, this debate on the challenges to our foreign policy at a very crucial time. Among many other concerns and, indeed, opportunities for our foreign policy, surely the most urgent challenge at this moment must be the establishment of a more rational, fully joined-up foreign, defence and aid policy to help lead to a greater stability in the Middle East and south- west Asia, where the Arab-Israel confrontation and the Kashmir dispute are still key and core issues. To have any hope of success, any new policy can only be developed in conjunction with the new American Administration, with this country as a valued and supportive friend, but one who is not afraid to offer our own views and experience, and as much as possible in conjunction with our fellow European partners. We cannot simply go on charging into military commitments without due consideration of what they will entail, and I am afraid that there is plenty of evidence of that with this Government. Then, when original raisons d’être are shown to have no substance, or when all the difficulties that should have been anticipated become a reality, we not only produce excuses and new reasons for what we have embarked upon but actually start to pursue these, rather self-satisfyingly, as the new aims of operations, however difficult they may be to achieve. For instance, anyone who, having read history, believes that Afghanistan, of all countries, can have a tidy, lasting, western-style democracy imposed from above or from outside, needs his head examined. As the great Duke of Wellington once said, 200 years ago: "““I always had a horror of revolutionising any country from outside for political object … if they rise up themselves, well and good, but to stir them up is a fearful responsibility.””" That still stands. It is not so much the British Army that has lost its way in Afghanistan, as a recent, rather sad article in the Economist tried to make out, as that it has never had a consistent and navigable politico-strategic way to follow in the first place and certainly not one in keeping with the resources allotted to it. It would, therefore, not be surprising if commanders on the ground are sometimes a bit perplexed as to the best tactics to follow at any given time. The Army and the Royal Marines, magnificently supported by the Royal Air Force, have undoubtedly done their very best, under the most wretchedly difficult circumstances; they have shown remarkable dedication, motivation and courage and are paying a high cost in terms of lives and wounds. Indeed, only yesterday, my parent regiment, the Rifles, very sadly lost another three riflemen. They have also had tactical successes, inflicting many casualties on the Taliban, which must have weakened the opposition. All that reflects great credit on the professionalism, leadership and esprit de corps of our forces. However, as they know, and as many in your Lordships’ House know, they have not got as far in changing the hearts, minds and attitudes of the inhabitants of Helmand province as they would have liked, and as indeed is so necessary for any real stability in the area. They have also had some serious problems with their lines of communication and supplies through Pakistan. So if we—NATO, because this, perhaps surprisingly, has been accepted as a NATO commitment—are to make any real progress in Afghanistan, and there can be no question, for a number of compelling reasons, of this country pulling out in the foreseeable future, we will need a new coherent strategy and a political and economic programme to help to put that into effect. In bringing this about, there must be no complacency; otherwise, the situation could very seriously deteriorate. I hope that the experienced and forceful Richard Holbrooke, sent by President Obama to make an up-to-date appraisal of the overall situation, will be able to extend his remit to include recommendations for a more regional policy. Now that the Iranian President has opened the door to dialogue just a chink, it may not be too fanciful to hope that this, too, could contribute to more stability in the area. A new strategy will certainly need as close co-operation with Pakistan as it is possible to get, and that in itself will require careful, skilled and subtle diplomacy of the highest order in view of Pakistan’s very difficult position. So much diplomacy is required but there are so few resources for it at the moment. We must certainly deliver aid more quickly and effectively than at present. Although I have longer-term reservations about the infusion of more troops, in the short term more troops from somewhere may well be required to give the inhabitants in the south and Helmand province proper and not fleeting protection. We must try, by one means or another, to separate from among those opposing us the more moderates from the Holy War and Arabic extremists, who still have to be dealt with not only by inducements but also with the help of meaningful negotiations, as has happened in that area in times gone by. It is no good going on slavishly and oversimplistically equating the Taliban with al-Qaeda. Here again, a study of the history of the area will show how wide of the mark that is likely to be, for al-Qaeda looks outwards and internationally, while the Taliban is essentially home-grown and inward-looking, with its inherent Afghan hatred of foreign occupation. Nor, of course, must one become obsessed with the idea so often put forward that a permanently ““tamed”” and even occupied Afghanistan is the only way to counter, and ultimately defeat, the international terrorist threat to us and to other countries. That is nonsense. What is now required is for the policy elements of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office—the noble Lord, Lord Hurd, put this so much better than I could possibly do—with the invaluable advice, no doubt, of the much respected Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, who may have sensibly been brought in to match the wider responsibilities of Richard Holbrooke and the Ministry of Defence, and with the Chiefs of Staff and their advisers, no longer to wait, as occurred under the previous regime, for No. 10 to tell them what to do but to get together, with links with their contacts in the new American Administration and with the overall American commander, and to put forward practicable options to Ministers. Those options, with the resources to carry them through, will have a chance of bringing to that unhappy area just enough stability to enable us before too long, and having disrupted al-Qaeda considerably, as we have already, to hand over any military responsibilities to the indigenous people with our heads held high.