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Defence in the UK

That is the point that I was seeking to make, and my right hon. Friend has made it much more succinctly. Of course, he is absolutely correct. Decisions are being made now, but the payment problem will not arise until after the next general election. That will exacerbate the situation by limiting the choices of an incoming Government. No one in this House or the UK doubts for one minute the bravery, determination and skill of our armed forces, but we as a nation have failed in our engagement in Iraq, and although heavily committed in Afghanistan, our forces are struggling from a lack of appropriate equipment, especially protected vehicles and air power. Iraq and Afghanistan are two wars for which the United Kingdom, and more specifically the Army, was totally unprepared in terms of both weaponry and training. On more than one occasion, I have welcomed new kit, which has proved most excellent, but we still lack sufficient numbers of protected vehicles, helicopters and airlift capacity. Both training and weaponry have been more suited to conventional warfare than to the sort of counter-insurgency operations to which our troops have more recently been committed. The United Kingdom is now too small, militarily speaking, to engage well in both conventional and counter-insurgency warfare. We have recently been most heavily involved in the latter, and given the present instability in various parts of the world, that is unlikely to change in the near future. The future Army structure, for which the Army has been completely reorganised, is concentrated on a medium-weight capability based on airlift. With the life of the Hercules C-130K coming to an end in 2012 and the J-type not due in service until 2026, combined with the A400M programme looking extremely dubious, a hopeless mess is likely in a few years unless a decision is taken in the near future. Otherwise, some difficult decisions will have to be made by an incoming Government. It is highly likely that not one A400M will be delivered within the framework of the contract for the whole order of 25 aircraft. The Minister will not disclose in answer to my parliamentary questions what the penalty clauses are or who will pay the damages for late delivery. I should have thought that quite an important point. Nor is the problem the much quoted "lack of funding". We need only look at the Merlin helicopter as an example. According to RAF presentations, it is a superb aircraft, and I do not doubt that it is in certain circumstances, but it is also very expensive. The six Danish aircraft cost the United Kingdom £29 million each; the RAF Mk 3 costs £19 million, and the Royal Navy Mk 1 costs a cool £39 million, and their running costs are £34,000 and £42,000 per hour respectively. Yet the Merlin cannot fly in Afghanistan without, according to a parliamentary answer, a £1.8 million upgrade to each aircraft to fit new blades—presumably Carson blades—because the aircraft cannot fly hot and high, which the Huey helicopter could do more than 40 years ago in the Vietnam era. Following the fanfares extolling the excellence of the Pinzgauer, WMIK and Jackal vehicles, their safety has been promoted by quoting their respective speed, off-road performance and manoeuvrability, and yet we find that they are now being used for convoy patrols. When I have tabled questions to the MOD about this, the reply has always come back that that is due to the choice of commanders. I bet, however, that it is a case of Hobson's choice: that is the vehicle with which commanders have been provided, and they have no choice but to use it or walk.