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Intelligence and Security Committee: Annual Report 2007–08

I must begin with a profound apology. I have read and written about the wrong report. I read Could 7/7 Have Been Prevented? with great care, but I have only just been able to read the major report that we are considering today. So I deeply apologise. My comments will necessarily be very fragmentary, but perhaps the Committee will allow me to make them just the same. I would in any case have said that the existence of the committee, and the reports that it produces on the basis of full access to knowledge of secret operations, is in itself a guarantee of good government and the protection of the population from serious threats from our enemies. That is true of the committee to a high degree. It goes far with its authoritative reports, based on real knowledge, to prevent the use of intelligence as media fodder. I quote from the Hutton report—a discussion between persons with no status in the intelligence hierarchy, or indeed in government, discussing a draft by e-mail. The writer comments in the e-mail: ""Ownership, the foreword is good but whose voice is it? Do we need a minister to sign it off? Probably not. Who will issue the text? Us? The Cabinet Office? Why don’t we issue it in the name of the JIC? Makes it more interesting to the media"." The existence of this committee has gone far in making it much more difficult than it was for people who are not in a position to speak, and do not represent anything, to do so. I also believe very strongly that the existence of the committee itself makes it highly undesirable that we should pursue the further suggestion that there should be open meetings of the committee. There is no way in which that can be done without a threat to sources. It seems to me that the degree of knowledge and detail that the committee produces is enough. We should not allow a situation in which anyone can come to ask questions and have to get answers. From that point of view, I again commend the committee and its existence. In my very brief reading, I have noted with great pleasure the 10 per cent of SIS officers who are working in joint operational teams with the Security Service. I had experience of this in the IRA context, and it is extremely valuable. I notice that there is some concern about the SIS spending too much time and diverting resources to tackle the current terrorist threat, and therefore perhaps neglecting long-term challenges. I suggest that jihadism is a long-term challenge, and it is an international one. Therefore, it is entirely proper and necessary to devote the resources. Other than that, I can only say with great apologies that there are many other things that I should have liked to have said. One thing I will say which will not surprise the noble Lord sitting opposite me is that I commend very strongly the position that the committee has taken on the question of intercept. I hope that note will be taken of that when we discuss it again, as I believe we are due to do at the Report stage of the Policing and Crime Bill. I shall not waste noble Lords’ time by trying to produce a hasty comment on an admirable and deeply interesting document. I am very sad not to be able to do more, but I look forward to what everyone else will say, particularly perhaps my neighbour, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller.