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Intelligence and Security Committee: Annual Report 2007–08

This afternoon we are debating what is, compared with some of its earlier reports, one of the more detailed and informative reports that the Intelligence and Security Committee has produced. I follow others in the Committee in congratulating the committee on its work. I need no convincing that the committee does important and very detailed work. I am not fooled by the notion that asterisks mean that something has not been gone into seriously. However, I am sad that more of the committee's work does not get into the public domain because I believe that, were it to do so, that would help public understanding of the agencies and the important work that they do. I think that that is necessary. Although I have to disagree, I congratulate the member of the committee who introduced the debate—it is a great innovation that he is doing so—on the ingenuity of his argument that asterisks are a guarantee of the probing nature of the work done by the committee. Having said that, I think that important work is done. The committee has arrived at a number of notable conclusions and recommendations. The Government have in some cases responded to them in a rather cursory fashion. Of the 17 recommendations and conclusions of the committee, 11 of them get just a one-line response. I hope that the Minister will take that observation away to see how the Government could increase the level of response to the committee's work. That is particularly necessary for a number of the findings that point to some problems or weaknesses in the central intelligence machinery. I want to consider some of those in greater detail but, before I do so, I want to say that I share the opinion of many others in this House in valuing the probity and integrity of the work done by the intelligence agencies. It is extraordinarily important to our national security. The committee criticised the decision to subsume the role of the Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis within the role of the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee—a point made by the previous speaker. It is an important issue. The committee stated: ""given the importance of the Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis post, we are very concerned by the plan to subsume the role within the Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman’s post as this may actually lessen the priority given to this crucial role. The Committee is disappointed that the post has not been maintained as a distinct and separate role"." That was a recommendation of the Butler report and we take it seriously. We think that the post should exist and that it is important. As the Minister is here today, I hope that he will be able to tell us when a separation is going to take place again and when a proper career specialism in intelligence analysis will be recreated. Secondly, I turn to another point mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. A related finding of the committee concerns the Defence Intelligence Staff. We know from the Butler report that the DIS was described as a critical part of the intelligence community—indeed it has one of the larger intelligence analytical capabilities in the UK—and yet we know that efficiency savings which resulted in staff cuts have taken place in this capability despite the fact that the Butler report recommended extra funding to allow DIS to have a greater influence on national intelligence assessment. We know why because we know what happened in the case of the Iraq intervention. I should like to know from the Minister, if he can tell me, how these two considerations are reconciled. This is a matter of concern. The committee’s third finding also relates to a recommendation made in the Butler review concerning the role of the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Head of Security, Intelligence and Resilience in the Cabinet Office. These two roles have correctly been separated, although I have to say that the grades of both posts are now lower than they were when they were combined. On a point of note, we on these Benches would look carefully at the role and grading of the JIC chair and the security adviser. In our view, they must have the necessary authority to carry out their important roles, and of course they have to deal with the heads of the agencies. There is also a new line management role for the Cabinet Secretary, so I am quite confused about the central arrangements. It is clear from the committee’s report that the Government have not taken it seriously in so far as this could negatively affect the functioning of the central intelligence machinery and the UK’s analytical capability, and I hope that we can be given some reassurance on that point. There is one other problem I want to raise which relates to the centre. The committee placed a question mark over the value of the Government’s National Security Strategy, saying: ""We have questioned whether the strategy will achieve any benefits in real terms or whether it is simply a paper exercise … The National Security Strategy does not create new areas of responsibility for the Agencies or the wider intelligence community. The Heads of the Agencies have indicated that they were consulted about the strategy and are broadly supportive of it, but that they do not envisage that it will result in any significant change in direction for them"." I want to make a number of comments about that. People will have differing views on whether the National Security Strategy as it exists at the moment is an operational or primarily a descriptive document, but I find it surprising that even if it would not result in a change in the roles of the agencies, it does not provide for them. These days the agencies seem to be absolutely central to the national security of this country and I believe that they should be part of the debate. I hope that in the future—we do not know when the Government will create it—the Prime Minister will finally, having proposed a Joint Committee of both Houses on national security, cause it to come into being; that these issues will be debated and that the agencies will be a part of that debate. I am aware that my noble friend Lady Park of Monmouth does not think that the committee should ever meet in public but I am afraid I disagree. There are occasions when it would be right and appropriate for the world to know how important the agencies are to our work and to take part in those aspects of their work which are perfectly capable of being open to scrutiny. Their contribution to the National Security Strategy is one of them. We are not asking for and should not receive operational information, but the strategy is something the public should know about, understand and be supportive of. It is much harder for them to do so if they are kept in the dark. I wish to raise two or three points on strategic direction. The committee rather worryingly calls into question the issue of intercept evidence. This was dealt with in detail by the previous speaker and I shall not go over it again. The only point I wish to bring out in this discussion is that there is a tension between two public goods: the need to protect sources, national security and the operational capabilities of our agencies on the one hand, and the need for the evidence necessary to put people behind bars on the other. In the end, that is the greatest deterrent against terrorism. Two things will enable us to overcome the terrorist menace. One of them is putting people behind bars, and the other, as has been correctly said, is a fruitful, positive Prevent strategy. Putting people behind bars is important for the public good and I remain unconvinced that it is not possible to find a way to add to our ability to do that—I know that it is no silver bullet—by using intercept evidence in criminal trials. My second point concerns the Prevent strategy. The committee rightly said, and its members are not the only people to feel this, that it is difficult to measure its real success or outcomes. This is partly because of the inherent nature of the strategy itself. Nevertheless, it is important because significant money is being poured into it and we on these Benches have called for—and in office, if we get there, we will conduct—a review of the Prevent strategy as a matter of urgency. We support its objectives and we want to see it operating effectively. Thirdly, the committee expressed the opinion that there remains "scope for improvement" in the resilience and business continuity planning of the agencies. Perhaps this is also a matter for Ministers to make a priority. I do not need to go over it in detail, but it is certainly the case that we need to safeguard the operational activities of the agencies and their staff, but it does not seem necessary as a result of that to cover quite so much of the information about financial expenditure in asterisks. For example, I cannot see that great damage would be done to national security for us to know how much money is being spent on capital expenditure. While I accept the need for safeguarding information that is really important to national security, I hope that over time the line can be drawn in a different place from where it is at the moment. It would be helpful for us all to have more financial information about the way in which the intelligence account is being spent. After all, it now stands at £2 billion and is going up—it is double what it was in 2002-03—and is, frankly, about the same as the cost of a small government department. We do not know even in broad terms how the sums are divided between the agencies, what is spent on operations and what is spent on capital. I know that the agencies are operating in a challenging environment, but it is legitimate and right—and there will be increasing pressure, as the sums of money are now so big, for there to be adequate information coming forward on value for money. It is very helpful, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, told us, that the NAO will be offering help to the committee in its investigations of that issue. I hope also that the public can learn more as a result of what the committee discovers. Mention was made earlier of the problems of the IT programme, SCOPE. We on these Benches feel that this is the kind of issue where aspects may need to be kept confidential but, nevertheless, why it went wrong and what the management problems were do not seem to be matters of national security and should be discussed in the open so that everyone can learn the lessons. As was rightly said, "tens of millions of pounds" have already been spent on it, and I assume that there are likely to be cost implications in abandoning the project. That needs to be in the public domain. Closed forum discussion carries penalties, which is not to question people’s commitment. The inquiry into the 7/7 attacks was conducted in private and led to those involved and the families of the victims attacking it, not accepting it and feeling that ultimately they had not been given reassurance. That is a pity. I do not question the seriousness with which the investigation was conducted, but it is a pity that the last stage of what one hoped this work would produce— trust and reassurance—was not achieved because too much was kept back. We have the committee’s conclusions but we do not have enough of the reasoning that led it to those conclusions. Therefore, the conclusions tend to be disputed by those who are unable to see why the committee reached them. I could name a number of other instances of that kind, but I urge the committee to think hard, when things happen in the future or indeed generally, about the extent to which there is value of another kind in allowing the public to know more about what happened, not least with regard to the great achievement of the services, and in being frank when things go wrong. I have one last question. The committee does not see everything in a timely manner, and its members have made one or two comments about that. I think that it has still to see some of the material on SCOPE. As I said, there is also the subsequent problem of what the public see. I hope very much—this is really a question of trust—that the committee’s further report on the alleged complicity of the agencies in torture or in cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which was submitted to the Prime Minister in March, will be published and not suppressed. I am sure that it is a serious report; this is obviously a serious matter of public concern. There will be significant interest in it and I hope very much that it will be allowed to see the light of day. It obviously affects the reputation of our agencies, so I hope that it is a reassuring report. The failure to publish such things after an investigation adversely affects the reputation of the country. I hope very much that we will be allowed to learn more about this matter. I shall be glad to know, if the Minister is able to say, when it is intended that the committee’s report will be published. It relates to one aspect of the rather peculiar position of the committee. It is not a full-blown parliamentary committee and the Prime Minister has the last word on what is published. The final set of issues that I want to talk about concerns the committee’s operations. Your Lordships will be aware that in March last year, as part of the White Paper entitled The Governance of Britain—Constitutional Renewal, the Government proposed a number of reforms to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which I assume have the support of the committee itself. These included public briefings where they can be achieved without compromising national security or the safety of individuals. Certainly the committee has presented some of its reports in more detail, and I hope that we shall see more of that. There is also a proposal to reinstate the investigative capacity of the committee, in particular by giving consideration to creating a pool of individuals on whom it could call. I am glad to hear about the extra muscle that the committee will be given, but this recommendation seems to go a bit wider. Another reform is to explore alternative accommodation in order to emphasise the committee’s independence. It would be interesting to know where it meets now and where it may meet in the future. Is it getting other premises? A further reform is to make sure that the debates on the committee’s reports take place in your Lordships’ House. That is a welcome innovation and I hope that we will do so more thoroughly in future. It is regrettable that so few people are interested in debating this important report today, but I hope it is an activity that will also grow. I would be grateful to know from the Minister what progress has been made on these various recommendations, particularly whether there is to be a move to different accommodation or a major increase in investigative capacity. We would like to feel that the committee, which does hard and diligent work, is adequately provided for in every sense. Indeed, in our view, the committee should be upgraded. It should have the authority of Parliament behind it and Parliament should take the decisions on what is published. There will be special procedures appropriate to the sensitivity of the subject matter, but other democracies manage it without prejudice to security, so I am sure that this country and these Houses of Parliament can do likewise. Although safeguards will need to be put in place to prevent genuinely damaging disclosure of matters such as operational detail, that in no way contradicts the ability to hold more committee meetings in public, and for the committee to have a staff of its own with a power to call for papers. As I said at the beginning, this is a good and helpful report, and the detail in it is very welcome. It is a tribute to the hardworking members of the committee. As I also said, however, I would like to see even more. I am sure that as intelligence work has now become central to national security and commands so sizeable and growing a budget, it is right and necessary to have adequate accountability to Parliament and public understanding of this part of national security. As I said, we need less mystery and more open discussion, and Parliament should be at the centre of this. We on these Benches look forward to strengthening the arm of the ISC in its important work.