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Armed Forces: Future Defence Policy

My Lords, on behalf of the Cross Benches, I add to the tributes that have already been paid. This debate is about defence, and in Afghanistan—I wonder if anyone is not going to speak about Afghanistan—the rationale is that the forces are there to prevent further terrorist attacks in countries in the western world. Therefore, defence must be interpreted widely to include measures taken to increase stability and reduce the opportunities and the desire to join the terrorist movement. In this sense I fear defence has not succeeded and is not succeeding. We have to face the fact that the war against insurgency is not working. Consider that prior to the elections in August the US drafted in an extra 21,000 troops and NATO 5,000. This did not prevent the considerable and widespread violence that accompanied the first round. In addition to over 70 ISAF deaths between January and June of this year, more than 1,000 civilians have been killed, compared with just over 800 in the same period last year. A recent expert assessment reckons that to make an impact on an enemy as amorphous as the Taliban one would need a minimum of 660,000 troops well trained in counterinsurgency. Not even President Obama is considering this. Experience from around the world, but particularly from Afghanistan in the past three decades, tells us that insurgency is only sustained by the support, albeit reluctant, of local populations. If people had alternatives in protection, income and access to basic services they would be far less likely to support the insurgents. The failure of the Armed Forces to create areas of real and sustained development, together with the recent rapid acceptance by the greater part of the international community of the results of a fraudulent election, has led to profound disillusionment; and the loss of credibility is severe. This in turn encourages the Taliban and makes it easier for it to recruit. Let me continue with these rather bleak facts. The US military recently estimated that there are about 100 al-Qaeda operatives dispersed across Afghanistan, none of whom are capable of mounting a serious terrorist attack in the US or Europe. Yet we continue to pour troops in and accept what appears to be an accelerating number of deaths, as was so tragically illustrated earlier this week. We know that the real threat comes from the militia who are trained in the tribal areas of Pakistan and trickle across the border regularly. The recent Pakistan army’s onslaughts on both the Swat valley and south Waziristan cannot be deemed successful if the enemy has simply melted into the hinterland, only to reappear when the army withdraws. Meanwhile, and despite protestations, Pakistan, for many complex geopolitical reasons, continues to support, or at least not effectively stop, the Taliban crossing into Afghanistan. If our concern is to deprive al-Qaeda of the base from which it plots the destruction of the West, would we not do better to direct our firepower against terrorists in the tribal areas straddling the border by increasing military and other support to Pakistan? It seems we do not fully take into account either the structure of the war in Afghanistan or the motives of its enemy. The Taliban is made up of hundreds of fragmented and disenfranchised groups, some with ethnic loyalties, others of them foreign, and each having different agendas and different incentives. Unlike during the time of the Soviet occupation, this war has no front line and the Taliban does not control any areas; it attacks but does not have to spend resources on defence. It moves constantly, recruiting on the way and drawing insurgents from distant villages, thereby reducing any loyalty to a local area. Its intention is to create terror, not to overthrow a Government, far less to mount terrorist attacks abroad. Its fight is cheap and it has real impact. The war is becoming a more general insurrection aimed at the foreign forces and yet we appear to continue responding as though it is a traditional war, and the sombre and relentless death toll goes on. It can only end badly. However, the coalition could do much better, most particularly if it were able clearly to define its military and development objectives. I am sure that all of us welcomed the PM’s Statement, repeated in this House on 14 October, which included admirable hopes and plans. I very much welcome today’s statement by the Minister when he introduced this debate. My concern is that the huge resources required to keep our young men and women in position in Helmand could, if differently deployed, dissipate the enemy and better promote the security of civilians. It seems that we cannot fully do both at the same time. This is a debate about defence, but for the present arrangements to have any impact there is a massive job ahead which starts with dealing with the suspicion—hatred, even—of foreign troops and the illegitimacy of the corrupt and inefficient Government. To begin with, given that Afghanistan is dependent for about 90 per cent of its budget on foreign aid, it is surely right to insist that the Government be accountable to donors. In the past eight years, tens of billions of dollars have provided little benefit to people, with perhaps as little as 20 per cent reaching the intended beneficiaries. Donors have to confront the Afghan Government with these shocking figures. A Marshall plan is desperately needed in which major donors co-ordinate policies, money and other resources to build in the north and the main cities—district by district, province by province. The commitment must be not as a military occupier but as a long-term investment and development partner. The tasks are to build the infrastructure of the mines and oil pipelines, and to enable the production and export of cotton, fruit, medicinal plants and herbs, gemstones and marble. There is potential for the development of telecommunications, construction materials, agriculture and related industries. These are the tools of defence; these are the tools that will enable people to withstand terrorism. I should add that Iran, China and India are all trading profitably with Afghanistan, and France and the US have embarked on building trading networks. Mining and cement works are starting up, as are manufacturing and the regeneration of ancient crafts. However, the UK still lacks even the mechanisms for trade with Afghanistan. There is no DTI representation there and DfID has no commercial interests. Finally, the constant refrain from my Afghan colleagues is, "This is our war, we should be fighting it". They want training, equipment, advice, and support, but they do not want US and UK troops occupying their land with no visible improvement to their lives. We should heed their wishes and deal with their reality.