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Coroners and Justice Bill

My Lords, I have not spoken in any of the earlier debates on this matter and, indeed, have been more than happy to listen to the advice and experience of those in an excellent position to treat the subject, but I respectfully believe—late though the hour is in relation to these debates—that there is a fundamental misconception that goes to the very heart, core and kernel of the issue. The misconception is this. The case put forward by the Government in the House of Commons was that the public saw the provision as enabling a person who detected infidelity in a partner or wife to kill that partner. That has never been the law. That is the misconception. I appreciate that that can easily be misconceived, because the fact of infidelity, along with dozens of other situations, can prove a trigger to a core conclusion by a jury that there has been a loss of self-control of such magnitude as would justify a verdict of manslaughter rather than murder. The Government have themselves misconceived the situation. I ask the House to indulge in this simple test. Clause 45(4), which covers one situation that can trigger a defence of provocation, states: "““This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things done or said (or both) which—""(a) constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, or""(b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged””." The Bill itself provides for a situation where mere words could be a provocation that a jury would have to adjudicate on. It would be a misconception to say that surely it is wrong that there should be justification for killing a man or woman on account of what that man or woman has said—mere words. If we were to say that, we would be falling into exactly the same misconception as is at the very root of the Government’s attitude in this matter. It is not the fact of infidelity that justifies the taking of a life; it is the situation—it is a matter not for the defence to prove but for the prosecution to expunge—where the jury cannot expunge the fact that there could have been a loss of self-control of such magnitude as to reduce the case from murder to manslaughter. In that context, bearing in mind that the law of provocation is some 300 years old, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, reminded us, that it was codified in Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 and that it has never made any reference to infidelity or any other specific condition, it has allowed the law to have as broad as perimeter as necessary, bearing in mind the myriad situations that could be relevant to this issue. In those circumstances, what one has to look at is not the trigger condition—I appreciate that there is a trigger provision in Clause 45—but what the jury has to decide, which is whether what has happened has so unhinged, disintegrated or destroyed the control of the defendant as to render his act less than murder, but rather manslaughter. The very fact that the public have a misconception about this matter does not justify this measure. I believe that the Government have looked upon it very sincerely and have come to the wrong conclusion because they have asked the wrong question. If this matter is not dealt with now, in the creative way that this House suggested, it could prove to the disadvantage of women. I have profound respect, as has the House, for the noble Baroness, Lady Gould of Potternewton, and I appreciate the strong, sincere feelings that are abroad on this matter, but it does not help the situation to pander to those misconceptions, to use legislation to fuel them and to do so in such a way as to do a disservice to the administration of justice.