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Coroners and Justice Bill

My Lords, I find it disappointing that the Government’s objection to the notion of having a special commissioner for terrorist suspects is based on the idea that it would somehow obstruct speedy or fair process. This idea is part of UK experience; it has been in operation in Northern Ireland. Why is it considered wholly unsuitable to be deployed in current circumstances? I find this very difficult to understand. It is a great pity that the Government are not prepared to accept that the reassurance that such a process and such an individual would provide is suitable to our current circumstances. After all, we may have to live with this for a long time. When we debated the proposal, your Lordships’ House was not convinced that extending the role of independent custody visitors or that of the statutory reviewer of terrorism legislation, the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was a sufficient step. I do not at all suggest that these people do not do a very important job—they most certainly do—but it is a great pity that the Government have taken the stance that they have. We need to enlighten ourselves on certain issues regarding how the system that the Government are proposing will operate. The proposal does not satisfy the point that is constantly made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is that the current arrangements for judicial authorisation of extended pre-charge detention do not satisfy the requirements of either habeas corpus or Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I do not believe that the Government’s ideas will meet those requirements. However, in the spirit of wanting to know how this might operate, I ask the following probing questions. The first relates to the role of the statutory reviewer of terrorism legislation. If the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has always had—as appears to be the case—the power to review the operation of Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and the related codes, can the Minister confirm whether he has attended any detention hearings so far and whether he has reported on them? If he has not done so, why is that the case and why did not the Government ask him so to do? Secondly, I am sure that the Minister will agree that the noble Lord already has a significant amount of work to do in relation to the operation of other parts of terrorism legislation. It would be helpful to know whether discussion has taken place with him about how much extra time looking at the whole position of the detention of terrorist suspects will involve. Thirdly, it would be helpful to know how it is intended that the noble Lord will go about his work. Is it the intention that he will visit the majority of terrorist suspects? Will his office be given any additional support for this task? Will he be able to feed in to detention hearings, or will this be only an ex post facto task? That is an important point. Is this going to be a living part of the procedure or is it simply going to be a case of reviewing in order to comment on, and possibly find fault with, what has previously happened? That relates very much to the findings of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. My second set of questions is about the role of independent custody visitors, who have been put forward as important people in this scenario. First, will police authorities be required to prioritise terrorist suspects for visits by independent custody visitors? Will this actually happen? Secondly, will there be additional training and guidance for custody visitors in preparation for this task? These are not things that custody visitors normally do. Related to this, is it the intention that there will be a specialised cadre of custody visitors? I come back to the specialist nature of the task. This is why it seems to us that an independent commissioner would be so much better. Thirdly, what are the grounds for denying independent custody visitors access to records of interviews? I am absolutely prepared to believe that there would be legitimate grounds, but it would be helpful to know how those are defined by the Government, because the amendment does not specify what these grounds are now or might be in the future. Without some specificity, it is obviously possible to restrict the role of custody visitors so that they could not report fully on the detention of terrorist suspects. That is an important point in practical terms. Related to that is my fourth point. Can the Minister confirm that in cases where the independent custody visitor had concerns after having heard records of interviews and/or having spoken to the suspects, he would then be able to communicate them to the judge before a detention hearing? This comes back to whether this is an academic, ex post facto activity or whether it is intended to apply safeguards within the procedure as a living procedure. That is very important and it will be a requirement if this is to be a real safeguard. Fifthly, how will the Government act on the visits and reports of independent custody visitors? Even now, some of the recommendations of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, are ignored. Therefore, what hope will custody visitors have of being able to influence the operation of Section 41 and the related codes of practice? I worry that the Government’s proposals will neither achieve comprehensive monitoring of the detention of terrorist suspects nor improve the procedures of detention hearings. Therefore, the Minister’s response to my points will be very important as regards how effective and acceptable the Government’s ideas are as an alternative to what we think should be the case. I very much look forward to the Minister’s explanation of how the proposals will work in practice. I should add that, should the Conservative Party enter office, we will want to revisit this topic.