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Afghanistan and Pakistan

My Lords, with the leave of the House, I shall repeat a Statement made in another place by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister. The Statement is as follows. "With permission, Mr Speaker, let me begin this Statement on Afghanistan by once more paying tribute to our Armed Forces. Since 2001, our forces have been fighting in Afghanistan one of the longest military campaigns of recent times—longer, indeed, than the world wars of the last century—as part of our century’s fight against global terrorism. At all times, our Armed Forces have shown the highest professionalism, dedication and courage, which make them the most admired and best in the world. They have endured heavy and tragic casualties and deserve our utmost gratitude. Let me acknowledge the presence as visitors to the House today of members of 19 Brigade who have served with distinction in Afghanistan. Decisions to continue military action are as critical as those that commence military action. There are two prior questions that people ask of our mission with our American and coalition allies in Afghanistan: one about the present, one about the future. Rightly, both questions have to be answered. The first is why, today, our Armed Forces are in Afghanistan. The second is how and when Afghanistan can take responsibility for its own security so that our troops can come home. The origins of our intervention in Afghanistan and the scale of the terrorist threat are known to us all. Around the world, thousands of men and women of all religions, including thousands of the Muslim faith, have been murdered in al-Qaeda outrages. The London 7 July bombings cost 52 lives and injured over 750 people. Most recently, we have seen the 2006 Heathrow liquid bombs plot, the 2007 London and Glasgow bombings and this year an al-Qaeda-inspired conspiracy to target shopping centres. There are now over 120 convicted terrorists serving sentences in British prisons. The security services report to me weekly on the hundreds of would-be terrorists who seek to operate within and to target our country. Now, to counter this ever present threat we have, since 2001, trebled the resources available to our intelligence services. We have more than doubled the number of operatives and today nearly twice as many regular police officers are engaged in full-time work to counter the terrorist threat. Suspect travellers are now checked at the border in real time against watch lists and an increasing number are excluded on national security grounds from Britain. Because this is a fight for hearts and minds against violent extremism and those ideologies that would pervert the true Islamic faith, we have stepped up our work with our allies to expose the damage that murderous and violent ideologies do and to support those working across all faiths to uphold the common ground of dignity, tolerance and respect for all. Our security in the UK and our effort to counter terrorists and their propaganda have been and continue to be strengthened at all levels. Faced with the terrorist threat, some have argued that the most effective strategy is simply to defend Britain within our own borders—a fortress Britain. Some have asked why British troops are in Afghanistan at all if al-Qaeda can organise in Britain, in Somalia, in Yemen, in other places and even in internet chatrooms in every part of the world. But as long as the Afghan-Pakistan border areas are the location of choice for al-Qaeda and the epicentre of global terrorism, it is the Government’s judgment that we must address the terrorist threat at its source. Indeed, as long as three-quarters of the most serious terrorist plots against Britain have links to these Pakistan-Afghan border areas, we should be failing in our duty if we did not work with our allies to deal with the problem where it starts. A more stable and secure Afghanistan and Pakistan will help to ensure a safer Britain. Since 2001, progress has been made in driving al-Qaeda into the mountains of Waziristan. Today, for the first time since 2001, tens of thousands of Pakistan troops are now in Waziristan and, with President Obama, I have been urging Pakistan’s leadership, most recently in a conversation with President Zardari on Saturday, to step up its efforts not just against the Pakistan Taliban in this region but also against al-Qaeda. As an international community, we must intensify our support for the action of the Pakistan authorities, improve co-operation with Pakistan in the months ahead and press ahead with our development programme amounting to two-thirds of a billion pounds over four years, focused increasingly on the border areas and on encouraging the development of schools to counter the propaganda of madrassahs. It is essential that progress in driving al-Qaeda from Afghanistan is matched by actions not simply to isolate but to defeat al-Qaeda within Pakistan. Success in driving al-Qaeda into Waziristan has led some to propose that it is now sufficient simply to target al-Qaeda there. To explain why this is an inadequate response we must understand the al-Qaeda network, its long-standing links with the Afghan Taliban and the extent to which al-Qaeda continues to seek, as in the past, a Taliban-controlled permissive Afghanistan, which would allow it unfettered opportunities to plan and launch with impunity its attacks on Britain and other countries. Our task is to prevent the Taliban from giving al-Qaeda that safe haven. While stabilising Afghanistan will not solve all our challenges in Pakistan and elsewhere, instability in Afghanistan can only increase the risk of conflagration where the rest of the world can least afford it. This is why the safety of people on the streets of Britain requires us to deny al-Qaeda the space to operate across Pakistan and the option of returning to operate in Afghanistan. This is the considered view of the 43-nation coalition, which is a unique force of NATO and non-NATO members led by the United States of America and supported by clear United Nations resolutions. Today, our shared purpose is the same as in 2001—that is, to deny al-Qaeda space to operate. But our approach to achieving this has now to be different. In December 2007, our Government became one of the first to suggest that Afghanistan must be prepared to take far greater control of its own security. Since then we have consistently argued that to weaken the Taliban we have to strengthen the Afghan Government at national level and at local level. The approach is built on our knowledge that the Taliban has only minority support among the Afghan people and our judgment that the long-term security of Afghanistan is best secured by training the Afghan army and police, by building up civilian government at national and local level and through economic development giving Afghans a stake in their future. This has to be supported by stronger international civilian leadership to work alongside General McChrystal to deliver the civilian aspects of this strategy. It is an outline programme for the transfer of lead security responsibility to the Afghans, district by district and province by province, with the first districts and provinces potentially being handed over during next year. Let us be clear that this process will depend on the Afghans being ready to take responsibility and control: first, through more Afghan troops; secondly, through better policing; thirdly, through more effective local and national government; and, fourthly, by giving Afghans, as I said, a stronger stake in their economic future. I can also say that over time our objective is to work for and to encourage a new set of relationships between Afghanistan and its neighbours, based on their guarantee of non-interference in Afghanistan’s affairs and on a commitment to fostering not only its long-term economic and cultural links with other powers in the region but immediate confidence-building security measures from which we can all benefit. So I want the London conference on Afghanistan, to be held on 28 January, which President Karzai and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have confirmed that they will attend, to unite the international community behind a programme now and for the longer term to help the Afghans to secure and govern their own country. Against this background, our coalition military strategy is essentially to create the space for an effective political strategy to work, weakening the Taliban by strengthening Afghanistan itself—a military surge, yes, but complemented by a political surge that is, most of all, an Afghan surge. Today, I want to set out the benchmarks for this approach and in that context to give details of the numbers and deployment of our Armed Forces. First, over the coming year the coalition seeks a major expansion of the Afghan army from 90,000 to 134,000. We expect this surge in recruitment to allow an extra 10,000 troops to be deployed in Helmand, of which 5,000 will be trained and partnered by British forces. We can start now and 600 Afghan soldiers will arrive in Helmand this month—an extra company for each Afghan battalion there. A further 10 Afghan companies —1,000 more troops—will soon reinforce the Afghan army’s 205 Corps across southern Afghanistan. Increasingly, therefore, it will be Afghan forces who clear and hold ground as they prepare for the time when they can assume responsibility for their own security. Secondly, within the next six months the international community will agree with President Karzai’s Government a police reform plan. We have agreed that, in Helmand, Afghan police numbers will increase immediately to 4,100, with further increases to follow. By mid-2010, the capacity of the Helmand police training centre that we have established in Lashkar Gah will be doubled and we will double the numbers of police trainers provided by the Royal Military Police from 100 this year to 200 next year. Thirdly, on an effective and accountable local administration, over the next nine months President Karzai will be expected to implement, with our support and that of our international partners, far-reaching reforms to ensure that from now on all 400 provinces and districts have a governor who is appointed on merit, is free from corruption and has clearly defined roles, skills and resources. District community shuras have been formed in Nad Ali, Garmsir, Gereshk and Nawa, with more to come. Nationwide, the number of community development councils will increase within two years from 22,000 to over 30,000. The fourth benchmark is a clean, effective and inclusive national Government in Kabul—one that reaches out to political leaders and citizens from all strands of Afghan society. While President Karzai has agreed with us on the priority of tackling corruption with a new anti-corruption task force and, last week, the arrest of 12 leading officials, we recognise that the test is not initiatives but delivery on the ground and we will monitor carefully what President Karzai does on the ground. We support President Karzai’s call for a Loya Jirga and for reconciliation. It is the task of military forces—international and Afghan—to weaken and pressurise the insurgency, but it is right and essential that this work is combined with the offer of a way forward for those prepared to renounce violence and to choose to join the political process. Reintegration can be led, and must be led, only by Afghans themselves at both national and local levels. For Afghanistan to enjoy stability in the future, farmers and working people in towns and villages must have a greater stake in the economic future: a major Afghan-led programme backed by significant funding to identify the likely growth areas in the Afghan economy and to provide Afghans with credible economic alternatives to poppy and the insurgency. With 20 per cent more land growing wheat, this year’s wheat harvest is expected to be the highest in 30 years. Programmes funded by our development department will this year create 20,000 jobs and by 2013 will raise the incomes of 200,000 people. I turn now to the details of our force levels and deployments. In my Statement to the House on 14 October, I said that to support our strategy of Afghanisation, and in particular to train more Afghan soldiers and police while at the same time maintaining the security of our forces, the Government had agreed in principle a new force level of 9,500 to be implemented once three conditions were met. I can report on each of these conditions. First, I made it clear that we would increase the number of British personnel in Afghanistan only if we were assured that it would continue to be the case that every soldier and unit deployed is fully equipped for the operations that they are asked to undertake. At this morning’s meeting of the Afghanistan and Pakistan national security committee, the Chief of the Defence Staff gave the assurance that this condition has been met both for the existing force and for the additional 500 troops. The chief reported on the continuing delivery of new equipment. Newly arrived Merlin helicopters have today been given the ‘green light’ for operations in Afghanistan, one month ahead of schedule. Compared with three years ago, we have doubled helicopter flying hours, and this will increase by a further 20 per cent in the coming months. By the end of the year, the number of heavily armoured, mine-resistant Mastiff vehicles will have almost doubled compared with August. The number of Ridgeback vehicles, a smaller and more agile version of the Mastiff, will have increased by over 75 per cent. By the spring of next year, they will be joined by more Mastiffs adapted for explosive disposal work, along with new Warthog tracked vehicles—showing the results of our investment over the last three years of more than £1 billion from the Treasury reserve in vehicles for Afghanistan. By the end of this year also, the build-up of a 200-strong counter-IED task force, along with dedicated necessary equipment, will be complete. In addition, aerial surveillance hours available to commanders have increased by over 40 per cent. A further 200 specialist troops will be deployed against IEDs by spring 2010. Three years ago, equipment and support for our forces deployed to Afghanistan, funded from the Treasury reserve, was estimated at around £190,000 for each individual there. This year it is more than double that—around £400,000 and still rising. The best possible support and equipment is what we owe those who are fighting for our country in Afghanistan. Secondly, I said that our contribution of 9,500 troops must be part of an agreed approach across the international coalition, with all countries bearing their share—a coalition whose principal member, and largest troop contributor, is of course the United States of America. We continue regular discussions with the President and his team about the coalition’s evolving strategy. America, as everyone knows, will make an announcement tomorrow. The Secretary-General of NATO, to whose work I pay tribute, reports that, in addition to the US and the UK, eight countries have already made offers of additional troops and other countries are likely to follow. It is often said that America and Britain are fighting alone. This is wrong. Excluding America and Britain, the number of international coalition troops will have risen from 16,000 in January 2007 to around 30,000 soon. I believe that over the coming months even more countries will respond and that our effort in Helmand will benefit. Last year, total international force levels in the province were around 7,000. Now they will be above 20,000, three times what they were. Our third condition for deploying additional British troops was that the military effort of the international coalition must be matched by Afghan effort. President Karzai and his Defence Minister have assured us not only that 5,000 members of the new Afghan national army corps will be deployed to Helmand, to be partnered by British troops during 2010, but that additional recruits will arrive for training in the next few weeks. With the three conditions now met, I can confirm that we will move to a new force level of 9,500. The extra troops will deploy in early December to thicken the UK troop presence in central Helmand and, from late January, they will make the transition to the partnering role that we envisage for them. For understandable reasons of operational security, we shall continue to withhold information about their deployment and the nature of activities of our Special Forces. But at this time of increasing international effort, it is right to give a more comprehensive account of our total military commitment to the Afghanistan campaign. I believe that the British people have a right to know and deserve the assurance that our highly professional, widely respected and extraordinarily brave Special Forces are playing their full role not only in force protection but also in taking the fight directly to the Taliban, working in theatre alongside our Regular Forces. I want the whole country to pay tribute to them. Taking into account these Special Forces, their supporting troops and the increases announced today, our total military effort in Afghanistan will be in excess of 10,000 troops. This force level enables us to deliver our military strategy of bringing security to the population. It will support our political strategy of strengthening the Afghan Government at national and local level as they in return take steps to govern in a clearer, more effective and more inclusive way. It will accelerate the development of the Afghan army and police, so that in time they can take over responsibility for security and thus ensure that our troops can come home. We are ensuring as best we can the safety of our forces. We are today setting benchmarks for Afghanistan to meet. In the last few months, we have worked hard to achieve a stronger military presence across the coalition, with a more equal sharing of the burden. In all we do, we will never forget the fundamental truth of this military campaign: that keeping the streets of our country free from terrorism is our utmost responsibility and that, for a safe Britain, we need a stable Afghanistan. I commend this Statement to the House".