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Proceeding contribution from Bernard Jenkin (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Monday, 22 February 2010. It occurred during Debate on Report from the House of Commons Reform Committee on Rebuilding the House.


Report from the House of Commons Reform Committee on Rebuilding the House

I will come to that point, my hon. Friend need not fear. The truth is that our Parliament is no longer composed mainly of part-time citizen parliamentarians, but of professional politicians, most of whom wish, or have wished, to become Ministers, or who are Ministers. When an MP becomes a Minister, he virtually ceases to function as an MP. Ministers continue to do their best for their constituents, but they cannot hold the Executive effectively to account, because they are the Executive. That is ironic given that the House has become obsessed by conflicts of interest, and one need think only of the Register of Members' Financial Interests, outside interests, Members of Parliament owning investments, retiring Ministers taking jobs in private sector businesses that they regulated and the role of lobbyists. A Minister's loyalty is to the Executive, but as an MP, his loyalty should be to Parliament. Inevitably, that presents a fundamental conflict of interest on occasion. One is reminded of Christ's words in Matthew 6:24:""No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other."" Christ was, of course, referring to God and Mammon, but he might as easily have been talking about the House of Commons and the Prime Minister offering a ministerial salary to one of his Back Benchers. It is worth considering that before the second world war perhaps 50 Members of the House of Commons were on the Government payroll; today, 141 MPs are on the payroll. In a parliamentary system, there must be a recognition of that conflict of interest. As the parliamentary ombudsman recently told the Public Administration Committee—this is quoted in the report—there is""no visible distinction between Parliament and government."" That is something that we must address. We have also seen the increasing power and centralisation of political parties in recent times. As has been said, political parties are indispensable, but Members of Parliament are no longer elected and then apply to take the Whip of this or that party. Parties are now defined and regulated by statute. The Burkean principle of MP as representative has been progressively eroded and replaced by the notion of MP as party delegate. Party leaders can now get rid of MPs they do not like, as we saw in the Conservative party before the last election. They can also block candidates of whom they disapprove. For the modern political party, the House of Commons has become more of an electoral college for the office of Prime Minister than a deliberative assembly. That must change. Parliamentary government arose precisely because Parliament wanted to limit the power of the Crown. That is why the Commons insisted in 1713 that no demand for money would be met unless proposed in the House by a Minister of the Crown. Today's Standing Order No. 48 derives from that time, when it was one of the very few Standing Orders of the House—quite why it is No. 48 is perhaps a reflection of the Alice in Wonderland atmosphere of this place. The House has two options. First, we can embrace the modest proposal from the Wright Committee for a House business committee. That will not challenge the ultimate authority of the majority to get its way, but it will increase transparency, allow some discourse and create more of a requirement for some explanation. A tactful and rational Government have no need to fear such a reform. If that fails, we will need to discuss something far more radical and start a process of visibly removing the Executive from Parliament altogether, although I have to tell my hon. Friend the Member for Stone (Mr. Cash), who is now addressing the Clerk, that I am still far from persuaded that that would be desirable or achievable. It is far preferable, before we turn to the radical option, that we consider the chance for moderate reform offered by the report. The proposed House business committee can begin to redress the imbalance of power in the House, which so corrodes good government and accountability. There can only be strong government if it rests on a strong and more independent Parliament.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
506 c96-7 
Session
2009-10
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
House of Commons Democracy Public bills Members Parliamentary procedure Parliamentary scrutiny Politics and government Reform Select committees Whips Backbenchers Paper petitions e-petitions
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk