Proceeding contribution from Lord Tyrie (Conservative) in the House of Commons on Monday, 22 February 2010. It occurred during Debate on Report from the House of Commons Reform Committee on Rebuilding the House.
Report from the House of Commons Reform Committee on Rebuilding the House
If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I shall not give way. The first of those three counts is the growth of presidentialism, the second is the growth in the power of interest groups, and the third is the understandable enthusiasm in the modern media for encouraging those other two counts. The Committee's proposals will do something, if only a little, to act as a counterweight to all three of them, but before discussing how much the proposals will do this, I want to talk about those challenges in a little more detail. On presidentialism, we have just heard an interesting speech suggesting a separation of powers. I do not think that this is practical politics, even if it is good theory. All the pressures on a Prime Minister will be for him to appeal beyond party and Parliament, and instead to appeal directly to the public. That will not change. In fact, I think that it will grow, and that eventually the problems to which my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex (Mr. Jenkin) alluded will resurface. The public choice theorists were right about the tyranny of interest group politics. They said that policy could be disproportionately influenced by a relatively small number of voters, often, but not always, in the centre ground, and often influenced by vocal interest groups. That leads to a tyranny not of the majority, but of the minority. It is no coincidence that at present the agendas of all three major parties are very similar. That does not necessarily make them right, of course. This kind of politics gave us the middle way of the early post-war years, the monetary policy that collapsed in the face of inflation, and a growth policy that folded in the face of excessive regulation and interest group power led by the unions, which culminated in the ungovernability of Britain. There was a period in the '80s when we appeared to be able to roll back interest group power, but interest groups have returned and their influence is now considerable. Understandably, as we approach the election, parties are rushing to influence the swing voter in the political centre. We need only look at the speed with which all the parties now produce policies to satisfy the lobbies on health, aid and green issues, to name but three. The fact is, however, that we have a massive economic crisis, and if fiscal policy is to be stabilised the toxic link between interest groups and Government spending decisions must be countered and counterbalanced. I think that independent-minded Back Benchers can help in this regard, but only if the parliamentary tools to do the job are available. The third area I mentioned is the change in the balance of power from Parliament to the media. We live in a media age, and the power of the media to set the political agenda is greater than ever. We need only think of issues such as immigration, law and order, and prisons and sentencing policy. Very few people who have thought about prisons policy think we have got it right at present, but it is very difficult to get any change. A Justice Select Committee report set out what is wrong, but no party wants to be on the wrong side of a newspaper campaign on prison reform policy; it is just too risky, particularly in the run-up to an election. In the face of this headwind of presidentialism, interest groups and the media, what can the Wright Committee's proposals accomplish in acting as a counterweight? We can apply three tests to see if they will be of some use. First, will Parliament shape the political discourse a little more than at present? To what extent can we wrench setting the agenda back from the media? Secondly, will these reforms temper the growing power of patronage in the hands of the Executive, and particularly of the leadership, in an age of increased professionalism in politics? We should be under no illusion that the more we turn working in this place into a full-time salaried job, the greater will be the efforts of our parties at the centre to control how we get selected. Thirdly, it is also inevitable that in a fully professional, salaried House, a higher proportion of those selected will want Front-Bench jobs, and the result of that will be greater dependence on party leaderships and Whips. My hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Sir Nicholas Winterton) made that point, and my hon. Friend the Member for North Essex referred to it. In respect of all three of those issues, the Wright Committee proposals can do something to help. There is much inexorable logic to the growth of presidentialism and of the power of the media and interest groups. So they will not do a lot, but they will do something. We have to be realistic. The Executive will not lie down like a lamb in response to a request from our Committee for more scrutiny powers. With the media being more powerful, the Prime Minister will see it as a prerequisite for hanging on to power to get reported by them and he will use his presidential tools to ensure that. Also, the Whips will, if possible, suppress any signs of independence; in the eyes of a Whip, "scrutiny" means "making trouble", and that will remain the case. Reform will be difficult, therefore, and fundamental reform will be impossible; it would be blocked entirely. That is why these proposals score; they score because they are incremental—and one of them is both incremental and potentially extremely effective. The election of Select Committee Chairmen by secret ballot of the whole House has the potential to alter the terms of trade between the Executive and the legislature, just as the '79 reforms have over the past 30 years led to Select Committees becoming serious institutions in this place. Through the election of Chairmen, the legislature will have spokesmen who are accountable to Parliament and who have been put here to do that job by us. The Select Committee corridor will gain, and the Committee of Chairmen, the Liaison Committee, will also be empowered, such as, perhaps, through demanding more frequent appearances by the Prime Minister—I certainly think they should do that. Over time, that could develop into there being more effective scrutiny of a presidential Prime Minister than we currently have. All these changes in respect of Select Committees will, of course, come at the expense of the Chamber, but I think that that should be the case. We are one of the last Parliaments in the world which still tries to conduct so much scrutiny of a modern Executive in plenary session. The idea that in the late 20th or early 21st century an Executive can be held to account in this way is a fanciful illusion. In debates there is rarely much light to match the heat generated. Of course there are exceptions—I mentioned the debate on Iraq, and the debate on embryo research was another. However, it is important to remember that the first of those was made possible by the weakness of party discipline and the second by a free vote, such as we are having tonight—I began by saying that somehow we had been let out. The business committee proposals can and should be judged not so much on whether they can revive the day-to-day scrutiny of the Executive in the Chamber, but on whether, on the really big issues, a reformed machinery can force the Executive to provide sufficient time for major set-piece debates on substantive issues. I began by discussing the Blair and Iraq example, where scrutiny could have been better and that might have led to a different result—that applies in respect of post-event scrutiny too. I wonder whether the time has now arrived for us to have a set-piece debate on a substantive motion on Afghanistan—if these proposals were already in place, we might have got one. When a Select Committee Chairman is alert, he or she can do as much as anybody to ensure that this place is empowered again, and that is what these proposals would do. They are only a small step in the right direction, but it is one that we should take, and soon.
Secondary information
- Type
- Proceeding contribution
- Reference
- 506 c98-100
- Session
- 2009-10
- Chamber / Committee
- House of Commons chamber
- Subjects
- House of Commons Democracy Public bills Members Parliamentary procedure Parliamentary scrutiny Politics and government Reform Select committees Whips Backbenchers Paper petitions e-petitions
- Link
- View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk
Librarians' tools
- Timestamp
- 2026-02-25 15:23:52 +0000
- URI
- http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_622743
- In Indexing
- http://indexing.parliament.uk/Content/Edit/1?uri=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_622743
- In Solr
- https://search.parliament.uk/claw/solr/?id=http://data.parliament.uk/pimsdata/hansard/CONTRIBUTION_622743