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Global Security (Non-Proliferation)

It is good to be back, Mr. Williams. Before the Divisions, I was saying that there is a large degree of cross-party consensus as we approach the nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference in May. There are one or two differences between my party and both the Tories and Labour on Trident, and I will mention them at the end of my contribution, but first I shall focus on the issues on which the parties agree. I want to press the Minister about how the Government intend to handle the fact that the conference will start just at the culmination of the British general election campaign. Is it intended to keep the Opposition parties informed—what does he envisage? Given that it is a critical conference, we want to ensure that the British voice is heard loud and clear, so it would be helpful if he gave us some assurance on that point. My noble Friend Baroness Williams of Crosby has been very much involved in these matters—indeed, she has even advised the Prime Minister on them—and I am sure that she could be one avenue of communication on our side, if that would be helpful. As we approach the eighth review conference in New York, there is a far more positive mood, as has been mentioned by other speakers in the debate. Part of that is the timing in relation to what is going on in the rest of the world and international affairs. The election of Obama has made a very big difference, and talks have taken place between the US and Russia. Before all those events, however, some of the arguments made on the Republican side of American thought—such as Kissinger, Shultz, Perry and Nunn in their famous letter to The Wall Street Journal in January 2007—were looking ahead to the possibility of a world without nuclear weapons. That debate has really transformed the way that a lot of people think about the issue, and we should give credit to those individuals for their analysis of the intellectual underpinnings of the concept of a nuclear deterrent. They have shown that the ideas that characterised the nuclear debate in the cold war era have less application in the 21st century, when there are failed states, rogue states and potential threats from terrorists using nuclear materials. That analysis has helped to underpin the shift in thinking on nuclear weapons. Of course, one can put the negative side of the argument. In Iran and North Korea, we see serious threats to the non-proliferation regime. I wanted to press the Minister on how the British Government will approach the problem posed by so-called break-out states, whereby states such as Iran can be within the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime, even though they may be in breach of some of the rules and there may be proposals for sanctions against them, and so on. There is a danger that those states are getting right to the wire and that they then will break out of the non-proliferation regime when they have got very close to becoming a nuclear state, having kept within the strict rules up to that very moment. The Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), touched on that question: are the Government willing to allow legal changes to be made to the treaty to create sanctions for countries that do so? Sanctions are automatic and would not require a UN Security Council debate at what might be a fraught, tense moment. They are a signal in advance about what will happen and thus act as a deterrent. I agree with much that other speakers said, particularly about the importance of the US Congress ratifying the comprehensive test ban treaty. That is probably the biggest step that the Americans could take. In relation to the British Government, however, I want to put on record some Liberal Democrat concerns that hark back to the debate in the House a year or two ago on the renewal of Trident. We still believe that that decision was taken far too soon. Much of the evidence that we have heard from experts in the industry and the military indicates that it did not need to be taken at the time. The Government could have considered anything from a strategy of life extension to changing the continuous at-sea patrols to lengthen the life of submarines. A number of strategies could have been adopted to avoid the need for that decision. The reason why we were so concerned about the decision is that the conference was upon us. Britain's having made that decision seems to go against the spirit of the times and the leadership that we must show before the conference. We would like the Government to discuss the matter in future, depending on what happens at the conference. The Liberal Democrats are seriously considering and being advised on the idea that our own deterrent, if we should need one, should not be a cold war relic such as Trident, but a replacement that is not like for like. It needs a lot of study in legal and military terms, but our initial work suggests that it is possible. Apart from that important strategic disagreement about our nuclear weapons and approach to the conference, I believe that the Government deserve credit, particularly for the money that they have put into verification technologies. We know that they have worked with Norway and brought the non-governmental organisation VERTIC into that work, which is incredibly significant. If they continue to pursue that work, they will have our support.