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Global Security (Non-Proliferation)

I thank the Select Committee and congratulate it on a first-class report. The report and the Government response—which, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Sir John Stanley) said, is rather more comprehensive than some departmental responses to Select Committee reports—provide what amounts to a formidable work of reference for anyone interested in the challenges of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and how British policy in particular has evolved. Both the hon. Member for Ilford, South (Mike Gapes), the Chairman of the Committee, and my right hon. Friend addressed their remarks with the seriousness and depth of information that the subject deserves. I was particularly interested by what my right hon. Friend said about the need for attention to be paid to questions of both intermediate and tactical nuclear weapons. I agree that we must not forget those issues in our initial concentration on the talks between the United States and Russia about strategic weapons. I have heard Senator Nunn say publicly that many senior military officers in the United States army have grave doubts about the efficacy of tactical nuclear weapons. His argument is that the generals believe that such weapons are never likely to be used and therefore soak up a huge amount of resources, both in terms of expenditure and the men needed to guard the weapons on the battlefield, that could better be employed elsewhere in the United States defence budget. I see challenges arising in the attitude of Russia. I understand that Russia is seriously concerned about the inferiority of its conventional forces. It faces a demographic crisis, with the numbers of young men of military age falling in future decades. There must be a risk that Russian Governments will rely on tactical nuclear weapons to counter a balance of forces that tilts against their interests. My right hon. Friend is correct that we must press forward with the agenda that he described, despite the difficulties. As several speakers have said, the review of the non-proliferation treaty, which is due to commence in May, is of great importance. My party has long taken the view that it is vital to our national interest that the NPT review should succeed. The hon. Member for Kingston and Surbiton (Mr. Davey) was kind enough to draw attention to the speeches of my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) that suggested a number of specific measures that the United Kingdom should advocate in the conference. The treaty rests on three pillars, each of which needs to be strengthened. First, there should be firm controls against proliferation and a bar on more countries becoming nuclear weapons states. Secondly, civil nuclear technology should be shared with countries that need it for their domestic energy programmes. Thirdly, as representatives of a number of non-nuclear states have told me, nuclear weapons states should deliver on their commitment under article 6 to work towards multilateral disarmament. The first step towards the last objective has to be the achievement of a strategic arms reduction treaty 2, or START 2, between Russia and the United States of America. I confess to some disappointment that the timetable on that has slipped. I will be interested to hear what the Minister can say about the Government's assessment of the prospects for those negotiations. I hope that the Obama Administration can persuade the United States Senate to ratify the comprehensive test ban treaty in the not-too-distant future. I hope that the British Government say clearly to our friends in Washington that the United Kingdom favours their ratification of the CTBT, because there is sometimes misunderstanding on Capitol hill about what America's allies want. The spread of civil nuclear technology is essential if we are to continue to persuade non-weapons states to maintain that status. There is a fear among some that the review of the treaty might lead to caution in the developed world in sharing civil nuclear technology with the emerging economies and developing countries that want to develop civil nuclear programmes. The quid pro quo is that, obviously, we need a regime of checks and controls to ensure that such technology can be shared, while reducing to a minimum the risk that technology and nuclear material could be used to provide a weapons capability to those countries that do not now possess one. There are three elements to such a deal. First, we need stronger powers for the International Atomic Energy Agency, such as making the additional protocol mandatory. Secondly, we need to have effective sanctions against countries that sign up to the non-proliferation treaty but then flout the rules to which they have agreed to subscribe. For example, there might be provision for a quick reference direct to the United Nations Security Council once the IAEA has reported a serious breach of its controls. Thirdly, we need to find ways in which to extend international control and supervision over the nuclear fuel cycle, particularly over enrichment and the distribution of enriched materials. As hon. Members will know, many different proposals have come from different politicians in this country about how that might be achieved. That has to be a key element of any successful review of the NPT. I hope the Minister will say a few words about the diplomacy that the Government are using in the approach to May, because the more I consider the issue, the more it seems essential that we work not just with the other nuclear weapons states, but with emerging powers around the world that take a key interest in the matter. When I saw a South African delegation earlier today, they impressed on me that because South Africa has voluntarily given up its nuclear weapons capability, they have a particular interest in the subject. Japan sees itself as the victim of nuclear weapons, because of the two bombs in 1945, and it, similarly, wants to see the NPT review succeed. Sometimes it will be easier for an Asian, African or Latin American power to talk to other emerging and developing countries around the world than it will be for us or the United States alone to persuade such nations to take the course that we hope they will follow. I hope that the Minister will say something about the Government's objectives on persuading the nuclear weapons states not currently within the ambit of the non-proliferation treaty—India, Pakistan and Israel—to accept some kind of non-proliferation regime. In terms of building international confidence and persuading other countries not to go down the nuclear weapons route, that seems important. I have two final questions to ask the Minister. The first is about the future of nuclear doctrines within NATO, a point that my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling mentioned. He was right to say that five countries, led by Germany, have indicated that they would like NATO to become much less reliant on nuclear weapons as a central part of its military strategy. France, of course, takes a very different view on that issue. I would be grateful to hear how the British Government are approaching that debate within NATO. Finally, I hope that the Minister will say a few words about Iran. When I met the new director general of the IAEA last week, he impressed me with the rigour of his analysis and his clear view that the evidence suggested that Iran was indeed moving towards the development of a weapons capability. The latest IAEA report is critical of Tehran's continuing refusal to co-operate with the international inspectors. What approach are the Government now taking? Do Ministers believe that it will be possible to accelerate the long drawn out talks on a further package of targeted sanctions? Are we asking countries that have a relationship with Iran, such as Turkey, India and Brazil, to intervene diplomatically and make clear to Tehran the gravity with which its drive towards nuclear weapons capability is seen around the world?