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Defence in the World

I welcome this opportunity to take part in a debate on defence in the world, and I am glad that the Government have found time for such a debate in the last few weeks of this Parliament. I start, as others have, by paying tribute to all those who serve in our armed forces, thanking them for their courage and dedication, often in very difficult circumstances, and sending condolences to the families of those who have recently lost their lives or suffered injuries serving this country. We pay tribute to all of them. There are serious decisions to be made about defence, some of which will perhaps be taken during and as a consequence of the general election. It is probably even more true that the big decisions will be taken and debated in the year that follows, during the strategic defence review that all parties have agreed is essential. In the course of that review there will be changes, and we must above all ensure that our forces are adequately protected and that our collective security is guaranteed in whatever configuration emerges at the end of the process. Recent headlines have sometimes made it seem that there is a gulf between what the Government are doing and what the service chiefs, personnel, specialists and even the British public are saying. In Iraq, the recent parliamentary election has been praised as a milestone in Iraq's history. It was the second parliamentary election in seven years, and it has broadly been properly conducted, but the scope of the accompanying violence cannot be overlooked. At least 37 people were killed in 136 attacks, mostly in Baghdad, which consequently experienced, at 53 per cent., the lowest voter turnout of any province. While triumphal assessments are being made of the election as passing successfully and with little disruption, the reality of Iraq's continuing instability, and its potential to derail the country's political development, should not become simply an afterthought. As for Afghanistan, we have already heard much in course of the debate about Operation Moshtarak. We have been in Afghanistan for nine years, throughout which period our troops deserve praise for their service and dedication in everything they have done. When we hear first hand the accounts from service personnel when they come back, we realise what an incredible task they are undertaking on our behalf, usually in the most trying of circumstances, ranging from searing heat to freezing cold, and extraordinarily difficult geography and terrain. There is no doubt about the scale of the challenge that we continue to face, and the problems of strategy, equipment and personnel all remain. Operation Moshtarak is the most important campaign in Afghanistan since the original invasion in 2001. We are not going to win in Afghanistan in military terms alone, so it is very reassuring that NATO allies are beginning to take this sentiment seriously. It is to be hoped that the battle for hearts and minds will, crucially, turn a corner. With the most likely next phase of the operation being a planned offensive in Kandahar, a key Taliban stronghold, maintaining the coalition's momentum while minimising civilian casualties and maintaining public perception of the offensive is going to be quite a tall order. Last week, the assistant deputy coroner dealing with the cases of Corporal Sarah Bryant, Corporal Sean Reeve, Lance Corporal Richard Larkin and Private Paul Stout reached a striking verdict of unlawful killing, citing a shortage of more suitable off-road vehicles and the inadequacy of training for detecting improvised explosive devices. We should all take stock of that. Crucial shortages mean that we are still not taking sufficient measures to equip our troops properly to do the job in Afghanistan. It is shocking that the Ebex metal detector became available to those soldiers who died only four months into their deployment, up to which point the soldiers had to scan the ground for IEDs. Everybody is aware that IEDs are the biggest single threat facing our troops and failure to provide them with enough metal detectors is simply unforgivable. I very much welcome the fact that at the London conference on Afghanistan, President Karzai had changed his tune to recognise the need for the political solution alongside the military effort. Announcing his peace jirga, he spoke of inviting to talks those Taliban interested in making peace. I very much hope that that will begin the process of political dialogue, which we all hope will in due course—no one should imagine it will come quickly—lead to some sort of lasting political settlement. It is quite clear to me that stability will not come to Afghanistan quickly, so our efforts should also look to forming an international strategy that effectively engages the regional players for a wider peace. There will be no long-term or sustainable peace without the co-operation of a contact group of neighbouring forces such as Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran and other stakeholders such as Saudi Arabia. At the London conference, more than 75 nations and international organisations, including representatives from all Afghanistan's neighbours, were in attendance. All those neighbours are engaged in regional co-operation, and most are affected by the crime, drugs, terrorism and migration that spills out over Afghanistan's borders. Speakers in the debate have already referred to the Falklands. I repeat others' comments to make it clear that there is an all-party view on the issue. Britain's assertion that the Falkland islanders' sovereignty is not up for negotiation must be absolute. Any Argentine offensive would have to be met with force. It would be a spectacular error on the part of Argentina if it were to launch any offensive, but it is vital to prepare for such a contingency. The strategic defence review is essential, and long overdue. It is 12 years since the last one, and nine years into the so-called war on terror, so it is clear that some fundamental questions need to be asked again. In my view, the review must tussle with three or four key questions, the first of which is what kind of power the UK wants to be, and where on the spectrum of force projection we see ourselves. In the previous strategic defence review, we concluded that Britain wanted to be a force for good around the world, that we were committed to expeditionary warfare, that we were a willing coalition partner, and that we saw the role of our armed forces as a great deal more than simply defence of the realm. Despite the difficult experiences of the past 10 years, I believe that that was the right conclusion, and that that should remain our strategic position, but it is only right that the question should be addressed afresh in the course of a strategic defence review. We must also decide what we are committed to do on our own and what we are prepared to do in concert with others, because sustaining quite so comprehensive a range of capability as we have had in the past may no longer be feasible. We must consider what the balance should be between preparing our armed forces for the wars of today and preparing for the engagements that we can anticipate. We must consider what contingency planning we need to do for the possibility of state-on-state warfare re-emerging in years to come, and ensure that we configure our forces in the right way to meet that. However, if a strategic defence review is to be genuinely strategic, it must be comprehensive. A review would be undermined before it began if there were exceptions and exemptions from its scope. Everything—absolutely everything—including the replacement of Trident on a like-for-like basis, must be included. We must re-evaluate every commitment, including the amount spent on staffing and the remarkable number of top brass retained at the MOD, some of whom are a long way from having any meaningful field operation or duty. A comprehensive strategic defence review is the vehicle for that, but it would be neutered beforehand if a raft of exemptions pre-empted it—that would make it neither comprehensive nor strategic.