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Defence in the World

I know nothing of any such policy as the one that the hon. Gentleman describes as admirably consistent. Let me make it perfectly clear: the Liberal Democrats remain completely committed to NATO and believe that NATO and the United States are our critical military allies. But we can see that the countries of Europe cannot possibly expect the United States to make as much provision for our security in the next 50 years as they have in the last 50. The United States has every right to expect Europeans to do more on our own behalf and to shoulder more of the responsibility for our collective defences, and it is incumbent on us to do so. Therefore it will remain the case that people joining the British armed forces will join just that—the British armed forces. However, on different occasions they might find themselves deployed under the flag of the United Nations or of NATO, or, in other circumstances, as part of a European force, as they already have been in Bosnia and are being deployed in other parts of the world. I do not think that anybody should have any hang-ups about that. It is an entirely healthy thing, and I hope that the Europeans, in years and decades to come, will shoulder more responsibility in looking after our own defences. We have a larger population, and a larger GDP, than America and it is wrong for us to expect the Americans to do so much on our behalf. In the years to come, we must do more on our own behalf. There is a problem. We know that the black hole in the defence budget is variously estimated at between £21 billion and £35 billion. The British taxpayer deserves to know how much debt he or she is expected to carry and the attitude of denial—we have heard about MOD witnesses being unwilling to give candid answers to questions—is simply unacceptable. We will not get the procurement budget under national control until we open procurement up to much more detailed parliamentary scrutiny, such as many other western democracies take for granted. Things are far too secretive and opaque, and letting the sunlight in will help bring the budget under control. The strategic defence review must determine the future of procurement; it must also be considered in the context of wider questions, such as what we want the armed forces overall to do. We have touched on the nuclear issue. We are approaching the eighth non-proliferation treaty conference in New York this May. It needs to be made clear what the Government are hoping to see as an outcome from that, and also what we are prepared to offer during the conference in order to try to achieve that outcome. While Russia and the US continue to discuss possible cuts of up to a quarter in their nuclear arsenals, the UK Government are unwilling even to review their nuclear policy during the course of the strategic defence review. Of course the UK must look towards a multilateral process for our eventual disarmament, but at present that goal seems ever more distant. Similarly, despite the supposed urgency of the replacement decision back in 2006, the Government seem happy to push back the initial gate decision, which was originally scheduled for last December, and there are now concerns that these delays will leave less time to debate the subsequent main gate decision, which, according to the National Audit Office, threatens the overall programme timetable by increasing the technical and commercial risk. Overall, we need to be asking serious questions about the role of our nuclear deterrent, and whether we are going about delivering it in the most effective way. The Government's record on defence leaves a great deal to be desired. We keep hearing from them that no specific requests from the military have been turned down. That may be literally true, but it is a misleading assertion, because any specific requests from the armed forces are made only in the context of the financial straitjacket within which they know they are operating. We also hear about the additional moneys that the Treasury contributes to the conflict in Afghanistan, and previously the conflict in Iraq, but the problem with that is that it is only really contributing to the marginal and additional costs of those conflicts, not to the total cost. To use an analogy, if I ask a very good friend to drive me up to Scotland on a matter of life and death and offer to pay for the petrol for the journey, they may consider that that has covered the cost of the excursion, but if I do that time and again, that will eventually take a toll on their car, which will also have to be addressed. I believe that that is exactly the analogy we should draw in respect of what the Government have done. The Treasury has given additional moneys to cover the marginal costs, but no stock has been taken of the depleted capital of the Ministry of Defence, or the effect on its equipment and its manpower. There will be a lasting painful legacy from our undertaking two operations during the course of this decade without adequate resource underpinning them, and we will feel it for many years to come. I am delighted that there will finally be a strategic defence review, but there must also be a defence procurement programme in place to support our troops—our servicemen and women—and ensure that they are properly equipped to do the job. We have to make sure that that is the case, and that they are properly equipped to do the job we send them out to do.