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North Africa and the Middle East

A trend seems to be developing whereby those on the Government Benches ask three questions under the guise of a single intervention. On the issue of arms exports, it is a matter of record and the records were rightly published transparently by the previous Government. I have also made it clear that if changes need to be made in relation to the consolidated agreement between the European Union and ourselves on arms sales, I will support the efforts of the Governments in that endeavour. On the second issue, may I make a general point and then a specific one? The general point is that in trying to understand the stimulus to the changes that we are seeing across north Africa and the middle east, it is indisputable that engagement with the outside world has contributed, in part, to the extraordinary courage, passion and bravery that we saw from demonstrators in, for example, Tunisia and Egypt. In that sense, it is important that the default setting of the international community should be engagement with countries, even where there are profound and long-standing disagreements. On the specific issue as to whether it was appropriate in the early years after 2001 to engage directly with Gaddafi, I find myself in agreement not with the hon. Gentleman, who is a Back Bencher, but with his Front-Bench team, who generously but wisely have recognised that foreign affairs at times involves dealing with those with whom one has profound disagreement in the service of a greater good, which in this case is the security of the United Kingdom and the broader international community. We were trying to address a situation in which Gaddafi had, by any reckoning, armed the IRA—he was responsible for the largest arms shipment to the IRA—and so had actively sponsored terrorism against United Kingdom citizens. He was also in the course of developing a capability for ballistic missiles, for nuclear missiles and for other weaponry. There is and will be the opportunity to look more broadly at what other lessons can be drawn from our engagement with Libya, but I do not resile from the difficult judgment that was exercised at the time to engage with Gaddafi, notwithstanding his record, in the service of what I think was the right judgment to make British citizens more secure.