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United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973

We have such limited time that my hon. Friend will have to forgive me for not giving way. The third factor, which is very significant, is the statement made by President Obama on behalf of all members of the coalition in which he said that this is not simply a question of a ceasefire, but that the Gaddafi authorities are required to withdraw from the various towns and cities they have been threatening. If they do not do so, under the cover of darkness or at some future moment we could face the same problem again. Those are the components available to the coalition and authorised by the United Nations, and I believe that that cannot be seriously disputed. The second part of my remarks relates to the end game. What will happen if Gaddafi not only announces a ceasefire, but is forced to respect it, as is likely in the next few days? Does that mean it is all over? I do not think that that would be an appropriate interpretation of the resolution. Even if he introduces a ceasefire that seems genuine for a few days or a couple of weeks, we would have to be satisfied that he was not going to break it as soon as a no-fly zone resolution is withdrawn, because it would be incredibly difficulty to have it reinserted again. We would have to be satisfied that the Gaddafi regime, if it remained in power, would continue to be sincere about a ceasefire resolution. It might mean that bombing by coalition forces or raids that damage or destroy elements of the Libyan army are not required, but we would certainly be required to maintain the resolution in force so that it could be re-enacted with all severity, even if it appears that a real ceasefire has be conceded in a few days' time. What does that mean for the future of Libya? Well, we just do not know. We cannot pretend to predict what will happen, because so much could and ought to depend on the actions of the Libyans themselves. There might be an uprising in Tripoli, and there might need to be civilian protection in that area—in the capital city—as well. Gaddafi's own cronies—his own generals and Ministers—might defect as they were doing just a few weeks ago when they realised the game was up, but the most important consideration, if we are to get rid of the Gaddafi regime, is for the Libyan people to liberate themselves. If air power has now been removed from the Gaddafi regime, if the blockade prevents use of the Libyan navy, and if it is possible, as I have suggested, in certain circumstances for military supplies to be made available to some of the insurgents for the protection of civilians, then that provides an opportunity whereby, if the Libyan people themselves overwhelmingly, as they seem to, want to get rid of that noxious regime, they will have the military means, the support of the international community and the well wishes of the Arab League to do so. In that way, we can all be satisfied that a job will be truly well done.