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Mull of Kintyre Review

I wish to announce the publication today of the Mull of Kintyre review, the report of the independent review of the evidence relating to the findings of the board of inquiry into the fatal accident of an RAF Chinook helicopter at the Mull of Kintyre on 2 June 1994. It is right that I should begin this statement by paying tribute to the 29 people who died in that accident, one of the worst in the history of the Royal Air Force. As is well known, the passengers were members of the Northern Ireland security and intelligence community who were travelling to a meeting in Inverness, and their deaths were a huge blow to the security of this country. They were also a human tragedy for each of the 29 families who were devastated by the loss of their loved ones. I pledged while in opposition that I would set up a review, because I had worries that an injustice might have been done. The official conclusion that the accident was caused by the negligence to a gross degree of the two pilots on duty that day, Flight Lieutenants Jonathan Tapper and Richard Cook, had been criticised almost since the day it was reached. Doubt had been cast on the findings in different ways by the fatal accident review held in 1995, by the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee of the House in 1998 and 2000, and by the Select Committee appointed in another place in 2002. A number of Members of the House have continued to voice their doubts over the findings of gross negligence, and I wish to acknowledge the unflagging interest in the case shown by my right hon. and learned Friends the Members for North East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) and for Kensington (Sir Malcolm Rifkind), my right hon. Friends the Members for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot) and for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Mr Bellingham) and others, and also by Sir John Major. I know that the Ministry of Defence considered those reports carefully, taking independent and specialist advice, but given the weight and breadth of the comments, I thought it only right to ask an independent figure to check whether justice had been done. I announced the establishment of the review—the first independent review of the evidence relating to the accident set up by the Government themselves—to the House on 16 September last year. It was my intention that its report, whatever its findings might be, should draw a line under this matter. It has been carried out by the distinguished former Scottish judge, Lord Philip, with the advice and support of a panel of three fellow Privy Counsellors, my noble Friend Lord Forsyth, Baroness Liddell and my right hon. Friend the Member for Gordon (Malcolm Bruce). I am extremely grateful to all four for their thorough and painstaking approach to the task and for the clarity with which they have presented their recommendations, which are unanimous. I held them all in high regard before, and hold them in higher regard now. Lord Philip and his colleagues have concluded that the finding that the pilots were negligent to a gross degree should be set aside and that the Ministry of Defence should consider offering an apology to the families of Flight Lieutenants Tapper and Cook. I can tell the House that I have accepted these recommendations. At a specially convened meeting of the Defence Council on Monday it was decided that"““the Reviewing Officers' conclusions that Flight Lieutenants Tapper and Cook were negligent to a gross degree are no longer sustainable and must therefore be set aside. We therefore order that those findings shall be set aside””." I have written to the widows of the two pilots, to the father of Jonathan Tapper and to the brother of Richard Cook to express the Ministry of Defence's apology for the distress caused by the findings of negligence. I also wish to express that apology publicly in the House today. Lord Philip's analysis is very clear. To put it as briefly as I can, he identifies the central point as being that, according to the regulations in force at the time, a finding of negligence should have been made against air crew who had been killed in an accident only if there was ““absolutely no doubt whatsoever”” about the matter. Although the two air chief marshals who acted as reviewing officers for the board of inquiry and made the findings had no doubts on the matter, Lord Philip is clear that that is not enough. The question that should have been asked is whether there was any scope for doubt in anyone's mind. In this case, other competent persons did have doubts, which is sufficient to warrant the conclusion that the findings should not stand. I would like briefly to make four further points. First, the report does not purport to tell us exactly why Chinook ZD576 crashed. It is central to Lord Philip's report that the exact cause will never be established, and I am convinced that pursuing the matter further would serve only to increase the distress of the families and friends of those who died in the accident. But those who allege that there has been a long-running conspiracy to cover up technical shortcomings in the aircraft will find no support here. The Chinook has had an excellent safety record since the disaster on the Mull. It has been a mainstay of our operations in successive theatres of war and has the full confidence of those who fly it. However, the report reveals that on this occasion the pilot expressed concerns that he felt unprepared to fly the aircraft. Secondly, I want to emphasise that the air chief marshals who made the decision, Sir John Day and Sir William Wratten, who are now retired, were and are highly respected and experienced airmen who acted at all times with full conviction on what was the right and proper course and in good faith. They did not reach their decision lightly and they asked for legal advice. Regrettably, that legal advice, although subsequently endorsed by independent Queen's counsel, has now proved to be incorrect. I attach no personal blame to these distinguished officers and their advisers. Thirdly, the procedures for investigating air and other military accidents were changed some years ago, with the result that it is no longer the practice for boards of inquiry, now called service inquiries, to ascribe blame to those involved, whether or not they survived the accident. This is because sometimes the business of ascribing blame can get in the way of finding out what actually happened and, more importantly, preventing any recurrence. Fourthly, the report makes one further recommendation: that the Ministry of Defence should reconsider its policy and procedures for the transport of personnel whose responsibilities are vital to national security. I accept that recommendation as well. It has implications for land and sea transport as well as air transport. I have directed my officials to ensure that the policy and procedures in place across all three services ensure that we do not unnecessarily risk so many individuals who are vital to national security in one vehicle. It is worth noting that Flight Lieutenant Tapper had asked for the passengers on the Chinook to be split between more than one helicopter. This has been an unhappy affair that has caused much reflection within the RAF and anguish for the families of those who died, particularly the families of those who were wrongly found officially to have been negligent to a gross degree. I hope that this report and the action I have taken in response to it will bring to an end this sad chapter by removing the stain on the reputations of the two pilots.