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Proceeding contribution from Stephen Timms (Labour) in the House of Commons on Tuesday, 18 October 2011. It occurred during Debate on bill on Pensions Bill [Lords] (Programme) (No. 2).


Pensions Bill [Lords] (Programme) (No. 2)

I could not have wished for a more effective endorsement of the case that I have put to the House. I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The Government's waiting period would incur significant costs through lost contributions for 500,000 employees at any one time and amounting to 7% of an average worker's fund over a lifetime. Those losses undermine the principle of auto-enrolment and substantially outweigh the benefit from the small reduction in the annual costs to employers. Amendments 19 and 20 would link the earnings trigger for auto-enrolment to the increase in either earnings or the lower earnings limit for national insurance. As the Minister set out earlier in his exchange with my hon. Friend the Member for Aberdeen South (Dame Anne Begg), the Chair of the Select Committee on Work and Pensions, the Bill will link the level of earnings at which people are auto-enrolled to the higher income tax threshold, with the level reviewed in future according to a number of factors. However, like the three-month waiting period, this measure will exclude a significant number of people from auto-enrolment. Those people will by definition be lower-paid workers, who we know already save proportionately less than others. We also know that they are disproportionately likely to be women. Earlier the Minister touched on the aspiration that the income tax threshold will in due course rise to £10,000. As my hon. Friend said, there would be a worry if all those earning less than £10,000 were in due course excluded from auto-enrolment as a result. The National Association of Pension Funds has pointed out that that would exclude 17% of all employees and 27%—more than a quarter—of women employees. Adrian Beecroft might be pleased about that, but the Minister should not be. Pension contributions would remain payable on earnings above the national insurance threshold under the plans in the Bill. The TUC has pointed out that moving to that scenario would create a big cliff-edge, so that people would get to, say, £10,000 and suddenly find a large chunk of their earnings deducted, having previously not had anything deducted automatically. That would create a significant disincentive, which the Bill ought to avoid, to enrolment. We have heard about the basis on which the Government intend to raise the earnings trigger. Their worry is that saving will not deliver sufficient benefits in retirement to be worth while for many people earning below the income tax threshold. However, the Government's own report shows that most people earning around £8,000 to £9,000 a year will not be earning consistently or permanently in that range, as the Minister underlined, but will move up the income scale.


Secondary information

Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
533 c839-40 
Session
2010-12
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
Age Contributions Advisory services Women Finance Fees and charges Employees' contributions Financial services Index linking Workplace pensions Pensions State retirement pensions
Legislation
Pensions Bill (HL) 2010-12
Link
View this Proceeding contribution on www.publications.parliament.uk