---

Financial Services Bill

Let me start by thanking those of my colleagues who served on the Committee that considered the Bill, as well as the trade bodies, consumer groups and others who made representations about it. In particular, I thank members of the Treasury Committee for the time and attention they gave to trying to improve the legislation. I thank also the members of the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee, who did a phenomenal amount of work in the months ahead of the legislative process, albeit to make a series of recommendations that the Government then promptly ignored. However, we will come to that when the Bill goes to the other place. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Foyle (Mark Durkan). His contributions were from a different political party but he made a very constructive contribution to the Committee. I also thank the officials and others who work hard behind the scenes on legislation such as this.

It is a shame that we have had such woefully insufficient time to debate this massive piece of legislation, which consists of more than 300 pages and hundreds of clauses. We tabled more than 200 amendments but the best we could get from the Government, even though they have nothing else going on in the Chamber—they are padding out the legislative process—is one and a half days, with three hours for the second day on Report. We ran out of time to debate some of the key, critical issues concerning how the Governor of the Bank of England and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would manage in a crisis, and we did not even get an opportunity to debate those

crisis-management arrangements. However, I am glad that we extracted one major achievement from the Government and No. 10: when it comes to public funds, when there is a direction to the Bank of England from the Treasury, the Government will now require the Bank to report back on its progress on that direction. That is a positive change, which we did not get a chance to debate in discussions on the previous section of the Bill. I am grateful for the change.

When it comes to some of the other problems to do with crisis management, the Government are relying on a non-statutory memorandum of understanding between the Bank of England and the Treasury, which leaves gaping holes in knowing how things would work in a crisis. They say that there will be a temporary standing committee or an ad hoc committee but there is no sense of who will be on it or how it will be constructed. No advance thought is going into that and I worry that if we get into a crisis we might waste hours or even days figuring out how on earth to convene this ad hoc committee.

Similarly, there are serious difficulties to do with whether the heads of the new regulators and bodies that the Bill creates will have a direct line of communication with the Treasury or whether everything will have to be filtered through the Governor of the Bank of England, in whom enormous new powers will be vested under this legislation. There is an irony in that yesterday or the day before the Bank conceded—this was dragged out of it—that it ought perhaps to have minor reviews and partial inquiries into what went on in parts of the financial crisis. We still have not had a fundamental review by the Bank of England about its role in the crisis, and that is a great shame. It should be big enough and have the humility to undertake the review that the Treasury and even the FSA have undertaken. It is time that the Bank also opened up and looked inwardly and seriously at its own capabilities.

There are positive aspects to this legislation. We agree with the concept of prudential regulation and we wait to see the detail. The Minister said that he is going to consult on some of the macro-prudential tools. It is very important that we get right the concept of the greater systemic overview of the system—the eagle-eye view that needs to be taken rather than getting too bogged down in the detail of firm by firm, company by company regulation—but the theory needs to be translated properly into practice. That is where the devil is in the detail. In a number of respects, the Bill falls short and could have done with massive improvement. The Opposition tried their best to make recommendations, including many of those made by the pre-legislative scrutiny Committee and the Treasury Committee. I sometimes see the Minister as—I will not call him an irresistible force—an immovable object resisting time and again attempts to improve the Bill.

We need more transparency and accountability for the regulators that the Minister is creating. The degree to which the new Financial Conduct Authority will publish its minutes is still unclear—we need a firmer commitment from the Government on that—and as I have said, the crisis management memorandum of understanding is still insufficient. There is a severe risk that costs that firms pay in their levies to the new regulators will be duplicated and that there will be inefficiency in the expense of splitting the regulator and

having two new regulators. We know that the PRA is already in aggrandising mode, securing beautiful new offices in Moorgate right next door to Threadneedle street because, apparently, Canary Wharf is far too far away. It is about 12 or 13 minutes on the tube, but apparently that is a major problem. So millions more pounds are to be spent on those offices in Moorgate, and the Government have resisted attempts to bring about greater efficiencies by means of the Bill.

The key aspect that is missing is proper attention to the necessary parliamentary scrutiny of those macro-prudential tools. Many of our constituents would baulk at that phrase and ask what on earth it means. It is about the regulator and the Bank of England deciding, for example, that the minimum repayments on their credit card may need to change at a moment’s notice. The Governor of the Bank of England will have the power to say, “I’m sorry, we’ve got a particular issue coming on, so instead of paying back 2% a month, you’ve got to pay back 10% a month on your credit card.” The Governor of the Bank of England will have the power to intervene on business lending, on the terms and duration of loans, and possibly even on the cost of those loans, and will be able to do that at a moment’s notice.

We have a bit of a debate about whether loan-to-value ratios and loan-to-income ratios on mortgages will also be in the hands of the Governor. Interestingly, one of the deputy governors has said, “This is a bit too hot to handle. Maybe this is for the Treasury, which is accountable to do that.” The point is that there are phenomenal powers invested in the Bank of England, and we need that thread of accountability to come back to Parliament at some point. This is why we have suggested that there should be a super-affirmative process, rather than a rubber-stamping statutory instrument Committee which many Members have attended and where they know orders go through on the nod with a formal vote.

I detect some cynicism on the part of the Government Whips, but of course they want to nod these things through. We should give Parliament a proper opportunity to consider the impact of those phenomenal powers on our constituents and on the economy. I hope that in the other place the Government will think again about the need to improve the parliamentary scrutiny of the new powers.

When it comes to consumers, the Bill has not properly addressed what we wanted to see, particularly the powers of the Financial Conduct Authority. There has been no movement on compulsory financial education. The Money Advice Service, which is the body tasked with trying to improve the financial literacy of the population, will not be adequately focused in statute on the most deprived in society and those who are most financially excluded. We saw the Government rebut attempts today to give the FCA a proper mandate on the regulation of high cost credit. The Government refused to give the FCA a proper role to take account of social investment, charity finance and other needs. We know they have a chip on their shoulder about charities and philanthropy generally, but it is a shame that they did not recognise those needs in the Bill.

There are a number of consumer aspects, whether debt management plans, helping customers plan ahead for their mortgage finances, or giving firms a fiduciary

duty to have regard to the best interests of consumers, on which the Bill should have been improved. We have spoken separately about how the corporate culture in the financial services sector could have been improved. Today we tried to press the Government on improving the stewardship, the corporate governance arrangements and the actions of remuneration committees in reining in some of the excessive bonuses and pay packets.

It is with particular reference to the impact on the economy that I close my remarks on Third Reading. A powerful new committee is created in the Bill—the Financial Policy Committee, which will make the decisions about macro-prudential tools. It will be under no proactive obligation to have regard to growth and employment in this country. We may well see a mismatch between the obligations under which the Monetary Policy Committee remains: it must have regard to the growth and employment objectives of the Government, but the FPC does not mirror that obligation on the MPC. It is told, “Don’t do anything to harm growth”, but it is not given an obligation to have regard to the Government’s proactive—we hope—strategy on growth. Maybe that is because they do not quite understand what the growth agenda ought to be, or they do not know how to get there. They cannot see why that is important. In addition to that general obligation, it is also important that there should be an assessment of the impact of each of the macro-prudential tools on the economy—on growth and employment—but the Government have neglected to do that. Also, there was not a sufficient duty placed on the Bank of England to take care of public funds. Those are some of our concerns.

The Bill does not properly fit with the European level of supervision for financial services. There is the sense that it was dreamt up on the back of a cigarette packet by the Chancellor in opposition, when he wondered how the previous administration, the FSA, could be blamed for all the ills of the global financial crisis. But he forgot to recognise that most of the financial regulations in this country come from Brussels, the EU and Commissioner Barnier, on that conveyor belt as it throws out all the directives and regulations. The regulators that we are creating in this legislation are merely there to transpose a lot of the decisions taken in Brussels. That is essentially their function. The Bill does not properly recognise how our regulators should fit with the European decisions and those realities. We should be framing legislation not just to influence those European decisions, but to steer those decisions. The Government still have not addressed that point properly.