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Weapons of Mass Destruction (EUC Report)

rose to move, That this House takes note of the report of the European Union Committee on Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The EU Contribution (13th Report, Session 2004–05, HL Paper 96). The noble Lord said: My Lords, in moving the report I would first like to express my thanks to our distinguished specialist adviser, Sir Michael Quinlan. I thank our clerk Dr Emily Baldock and our own committee specialist Pamela Strigo, both of whom contributed to the drafting and publication of this report and ensured that it was published prior to the dissolution of the previous Parliament. I also thank our witnesses who we saw both here and in Brussels and included Dr Hans Blix and Dr Annalisa Giannella, Javier Solana’s personal representative in matters of weapons of mass destruction. My thanks are also due to the members of the sub-committee which initially prepared this report in getting to grips with a very wide and difficult subject. My thanks to them for observing my repeated and boring injunctions that the report was not about the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or about weapons of mass destruction, but about the European Union’s strategy to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A difficulty arises in the first place with the term ““weapons of mass destruction””. Some of the difficulties are referred to in our report, but despite the shortcomings of the definition we decided to use it and in this report we are in effect referring to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons although it is accepted that there may be other weapons that do not fall into that category that can be very destructive indeed. We have already reported on, and debated, the European security strategy. The European Union strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction was endorsed alongside, and as part of, that wider strategy—which notes that the European Union has a wide range of instruments at its disposal. Perhaps the most important is the political and economic power that it can bring to bear on third countries, as well as more formal actions and legal steps that it can take. Within that strategy, the report that we considered particularly noted five themes: the strengthening of the international system of non-proliferation; pursuing universal adoption of international agreements on weapons of mass destruction; reinforcing strict implementation of these agreements; co-operating closely with partners; and providing technical and financial help for dismantling weapons of mass destruction. In our call for evidence, we posed three principal questions. First, did the proposed strategy adequately cover the ground? That is, were there any particular and dangerous loopholes left, and what were the main priorities for action in a large field of activity? Secondly, how well did the strategy—and the United States’ approach to policies and programmes—fit together? Lastly, how far might limited resources, and national procedures and frameworks, limit or hamper the implementation of the strategy? The report itself concentrates on: the scope of the strategy and the European Union’s current activities; how the European Union can best add value to the campaign against proliferation; its place in the wider global context; and whether the European Union is well organised and resourced to achieve a coherent and clear implementation. We believed that we could report upon these four elements in the light of the evidence that we received. I hope that noble Lords will find that the third chapter, dealing with how the European Union can best add value, will also prove a useful aide-memoire to the various treaties and organisations working in the field. In regard to the scope of the strategy, all of our witnesses agreed that it covered all the necessary elements. We ourselves concluded that the strategy was, indeed, generally sound. Perhaps inevitably, we agreed with the high priority which the European Union gives to the strategy. Noble Lords may be pleased to know that there is a six-monthly progress report on the implementation of the strategy. While it does not always show progress, it means that the position is reviewed on a regular basis. The report, as noble Lords will have seen, makes 21 recommendations or conclusions. Time will not allow me to go in detail into every one of those conclusions. But some I would highlight, and particularly those which were the subject of the Government’s response, to which I will refer later. I have already said that we concluded that the Union’s strategy was generally sound, but we believe that there is a good deal more to be done. We are not confident, in the words of the report, that the Union has yet organised and resourced itself—as it needs to do—to ensure full implementation. The Council Secretariat has established a peer review mechanism among members. We take the view that that is useful and that it should be encouraged to ensure that all members of the European Union are doing all that they can to prevent proliferation. There are some areas where we are convinced that WMD work must be co-ordinated with counter-terrorism work. The witnesses whom we saw in Brussels made great play of the non-proliferation clauses being inserted into third-country agreements. Indeed, the agreement with Syria was much quoted although it has not been signed for reasons that are nothing to do with this strategy. But the non-proliferation clause will really not be of any value unless the Union establishes clearly what it will do in the event of these clauses being breached. We also believe that the European Union has a role in strengthening global counter-proliferation regimes and instruments and we urge it to co-ordinate its efforts with the United States, with a view to what was then the forthcoming non-proliferation treaty review conference, to which I shall refer in a moment. We also took the view that the European Union ought to accept the United Nations high-level panel recommendations in advance of that review conference, as that would be very useful. As I say, I shall return to the NPT and the Government’s response in a moment. We believe that the UN high-level panel report contains sections of great importance dealing with weapons of mass destruction and that the European Union should give detailed attention to that. Perhaps it goes almost without saying that co-operation and co-ordination with the United States is important. I come now, if I may, to the Government’s response. I am pleased to say that the response was essentially supportive of most of the conclusions reached by the committee in its report. In some areas, however, the Government’s position was not as clear as we would have liked. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us further today. The first relates to the use of these non-proliferation clauses in third-country agreements to which I have already referred. We have recommended that the European Union should establish arrangements for monitoring these clauses. It is not clear to us from the response who will actually do the monitoring. A role is suggested for the non-proliferation working group, but would that working group be advising on the basis of conclusions reached by external agencies or would it do additional monitoring? I think that the Government should advise us and let us know where they think that should lie. We have also urged that there be a review of priorities. This strategy, like so many strategies, contains many things that are good, but it seems unlikely that it will be possible to do them all. While I know that it is difficult to rank items that are all considered to be good, we nevertheless believe that some effort should be made. The non-proliferation review conference itself was a failure and no conclusions were reached. Although the government response notes that the EU co-ordinated its position—something which had a really disastrous outcome—it would be helpful if the Minister could indicate the European Union’s current position and how in the light of the failure of that conference it proposes to take matters forward. The Government, in their response, provided a detailed reaction to each of the high-level panel’s recommendations. With your Lordships’ permission, I do not propose to go through those in detail. I know   that it is a matter on which the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, will address your Lordships, and as a member of the high-level panel, he can do so from a position of much greater authority than I can. We also expressed concern about resources and lack of communication between the Commission and the Council—the Commission that has the money and the Council that seems to be pursuing the policy. That was a concern expressed to us by Dr Annalisa Giannella. The Government in their response said, in effect, that all would be well in the light of the constitutional treaty, but there may be some fresh thoughts about that in the present state of the constitutional treaty. We are also concerned about the weapons of mass destruction centre, which was the subject of a council decision some years ago, but which has not yet been   established. We would like to know what the Government’s view is about the non-implementation of that decision. Their response says that it is a good thing but that they should not get involved in duplication. We would agree with that, but we believe that additional resources and additional people to take this important matter forward are needed, and the WMD centre is an important part of that. We are concerned about the co-operation between the European Union, the proposed WMD centre and NATO. We had a feeling from evidence from discussions that we had that this was perhaps not all that it might be, and the Government in their response do not address those details or difficulties. On the whole issue of resources, while we know the position regarding the Government’s position on the EU budget and their financial perspectives, the Government do not in their response specifically state the additional resources they would wish to see allocated to this important area. I beg to move. Moved, That this House takes note of the report of the European Union Committee on Preventing Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: The   EU Contribution (13th Report, Session 2004–05, HL Paper 96).—(Lord Bowness.)