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Weapons of Mass Destruction (EUC Report)

My Lords, I echo the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Astor, about the response of the emergency services in London and the response of the people of London. In the past few days, I have been saying that I suspect that those who attacked London misunderstand the nature and character of the people of London. They have never been bombed into changing their way of life and values by anybody—and they will not be. I am sure that that is how it will stay. Some of the phlegmatic qualities which are attributed to the people of London appear to have been present among our foreign visitors too—some of whom also suffered pretty grievously. So I thank the noble Lord for his comments, which I echo. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, for his introduction to this important subject, and I thank his committee, its staff and the witnesses. Noble Lords will, I am sure, have read the G8 statement on non-proliferation that was agreed at Gleneagles. It stated that,"““the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, together with international terrorism, remain the pre-eminent threats to international peace and security. The threat of the use of WMD by terrorists calls for redoubled efforts””." We are working in all fora to address those threats. The Prime Minister said in his summary that all members of the G8 are fully committed to the fight against proliferation, and that he knew that all other responsible members of the international community share that commitment. If I may make a point to the noble Lord, Lord   Avebury, there will be no diminution of that interest by the Government. That was absolutely explicit at the G8. I hope it is also the beginnings of an   antidote to the radical shaking of what the noble   Baroness, Lady Williams, called the ““fragile framework””. I should add, for purposes of clarity, that the withdrawal of the US from the biological and toxin weapons treaty has not actually happened. The United States withdrew from negotiations on a verification protocol but has remained a member—and, indeed, a depository—of the BTWC. It is not a wonderful picture, but a rather better one. In this context, the Government have been grateful to receive authoritative reports of this kind—and this report in particular produced by the European Union Committee. The five themes that the noble Lord, Lord   Bowness, named are indeed the central ones. The report rightly paid tribute to the work that the EU has done in this area over the past decade, which has not been fully recognised. It is important to ask how the EU can add value. I hope that this evening we can have some of the answers to that. The noble Lords, Lord Astor and Lord Hannay, have pressed me to say more about the EU programme, as have other noble Lords. The EU has set out a programme that shows a potential to do much more, and it is true that it must first have adequate resources. That means more money, as the report rightly says, and we are working with EU partners to achieve that. With partners we are considering plans for the EU’s next financial perspective, 2007 to 2013, and we are arguing strongly for more resources for the global security agenda. But it must be within the constraints of a sensible budget overall, and that means in our view a budget of no more than 1 per cent of EU gross national income. We also strongly support increasing the funding available under the CFSP budget. Through that budget, member states can fund a variety of non-proliferation projects. They spent more than 15 million euros in 2004, which represented 25 per cent of the total CFSP budget and was a 50 per cent increase on the previous year. We hope that the EU can spend at least as much in 2005. I know that there are many demands on that budget and there are also more project proposals than it can cover, but more money is needed; that is plainly so. More money alone will not increase what the EU delivers. We need better organisation of the EU’s counter-proliferation structures. The EU’s central institutions each have much to offer; combining their expertise with that of the member states maximises results. Developing more coherent cross-pillar policies will take time. We need a fresh approach and a new way of working, one that will allow us to tackle security issues across the board. The WMD strategy was a good start, and the appointment of a Personal Representative of the High Representative for WMD, Dr Annalisa Giannella, was a further important step. I am glad that she was of such use to the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Bowness. Her role has helped to keep up the momentum in implementing the strategy. Real progress has been made   in the four pillars of the strategy. As the noble Lord, Lord Bowness, and the noble Baroness, Lady   Williams, said, the review mechanism is very important in ensuring that the progress has real credibility. I should like to report that, as, I think, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, said, the responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the WMD clause lies with the working group on non-proliferation. The working group will consider the advice of the relevant agencies, whether those in the European Union, the member states or other expert organisations such as the IAEA and the OPCW, as well as information from bilateral and multilateral contacts. If there is strong evidence that the clause has been breached in the monitoring process, the working group would make a recommendation to the European Council to take action. The EU remains committed to the multilateral treaty system. It provides the legal and normative basis for non-proliferation, but it needs to be strengthened. Those who break the rules—the review shows where they break the rules—must be dealt with and dealt with firmly. The EU adds value as a diplomatic multiplier in that process. Twenty-five countries now speak with one voice to promote action against proliferation. For example, the EU is campaigning to encourage all countries to adopt additional protocols. That gives the IAEA extra access to countries’ facilities, and it can help them find out whether countries are diverting nuclear material for weapons processes. The EU is not a party to the NPT or to the other non-proliferation treaties for obvious reasons, but it can help strengthen the multilateral non-proliferation regime. I give another example. The EU agreed a common position to guide its contribution to the recent NPT review conference. There have been a number of comments about that conference in your Lordships’ House this evening. I also regret that the conference was not able to produce a substantive final document, although that was due partly to the fact that it was delayed in its start and in its negotiations. However, the conference debated and provided further consensus on a number of important issues, such as withdrawal from the treaty, the universalisation of rigorous safeguard standards through the IAEA additional protocol and the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, all issues that have been passed on to further fora for further developmental work, leaving a leading role for the EU to take full part. It is, however, true—I will not describe it as a failure this evening—that a small group of countries seemed determined from the outset to ensure that no substantive outcome was achieved. That is plainly a matter that we all regret. However, I think that it is now the case that the Gleneagles process has carried matters further forward. The EU is funding a project to help states accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and implement fully its provisions. It has also promoted the challenge inspection mechanism within the convention, and it is now considering how to support the implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Multilateralism is not just about treaties. The export control regimes play a central role in the fight against proliferation. With a single market it is particularly important that the EU should act effectively in this area. One initiative has been the peer review of export controls on dual-use items. Member states have been examining one another’s systems. The lessons that they have learnt have helped them to tighten controls and so peer review is potentially a very powerful tool and we are looking at other areas that could benefit from it. The EU is also stepping up its outreach programmes to help raise standards worldwide. Sometimes third-country controls and institutions are not sufficiently developed to respond effectively to threat. We can offer technical assistance and we should do so. The chain is only as strong as the weakest link. My noble friend Lord Giddens and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, have been absolutely right to talk about the terrorist acquisition of WMD. I say to my noble friend Lord Lea that this is one of the areas where it is impossible other than to agree that this is where a very significant threat exists. The EU is a strong supporter of the efforts to prevent it. All 25   member states have endorsed proliferation security initiatives. The EU has been a strong supporter of the   UN Security Council Resolution 1540. It has produced its own report on what the EU is doing at Community level to strengthen and deal with export and transit controls. These measures help ensure that dangerous materials do not fall into terrorist hands, although the efforts among terrorists to acquire these materials is plain. Although I accept the point of my noble friend Lord   Giddens about the spread of knowledge, as I am sure he would agree, despite that spread of knowledge and the ease with which that can happen, we none the less have to try to act to interdict it as much as we can because what else could we do? We are working in a variety of areas, bilaterally and through the EU, and we are attempting as far as we ever humanly can to ensure that terrorists do not acquire WMD. All this depends on a stable regional and international environment. Noble Lords have also talked about that. The European Commission has pledged €1 billion over 10 years to the global partnership in this endeavour. Some of the money has already been used—as the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, quite rightly said—to destroy the chemical weapons in the former Soviet Union. There are also the issues about its nuclear stockpiles and improving nuclear security. The UK is co-sponsoring with the Commission a project to ensure that future money is spent where the EU can make the most impact. It is not the EU’s responsibility alone; third countries have these responsibilities as well. If they want to benefit from the trade agreements that they seek then plainly they will have to meet their responsibilities. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked me to put it in those terms, and I do so. We are working closely with partners. We are maintaining dialogues with partners including the United States, Russia and many others. In addition, member states’ own bilateral discussions are moving matters forward. There will be occasions when I suspect that there will be disagreements, but there is a far greater convergence than divergence at the moment in these key discussions. As I have said, the structures of the Union are working hard on counter-proliferation efforts and combining the expertise with member states makes a real difference. The six-monthly debates in the European Council are an important way of checking that. The noble Lord, Lord Bowness, asked, as other noble Lords have, about the WMD centre. I will deal with that briefly. It will be a valuable addition to the EU counter-proliferation work and to be truly effective the centre must fully involve the EU institutions and member states. That is candidly not easy as it means adopting a fresh approach and a new way of working that we are advocating. The Council secretariat is currently working on a proposal for such a centre. It is working hard on it. We will work with it to ensure during the presidency that the proposal complements existing efforts and does not duplicate them—in particular, that it does not duplicate the NATO WMD centre. I can differentiate between what the two should do. A strong EU–NATO relationship is very important. The contribution that can plainly be made by the EU is that it is better placed to use its diplomatic and political tools. It has the capacity to undertake projects in third countries, and we agree with the report’s recommendation that the institution should do that. NATO on the other hand is a military body, and it has developed unique expertise in countering chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks. There is no point them duplicating those functions, but noble Lords will agree that the complementarity of those functions is vital. I can say in response to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Giddens, about a centre being a known centre in the same way in which Atlanta was, only that although we have not broadcast it as vigorously, during last week’s attacks I am glad to say that very well rehearsed systems moved into place and worked. People were able to get in touch with the expertise needed, and I hope that the House will allow me to leave that at that point this evening. I am very close to the end of what I can say. I will take up the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, about nuclear weapons and immediate alerts and discuss it with colleagues in the appropriate departments. I thank her for raising the matter. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that we are keen to look for ways to ensure that suitably robust and progressive language on non-proliferation is in the summit outcome document in the autumn. Participation in an appropriately formed working group would be a good way of ensuring that that happens, as he suggests. Any such involvement will be in addition to the work that we perform as the presidency with the Secretary-General and the EU members. My experience of Gleneagles was that everyone there was very keen to take things forward in that way, particularly after the relative lack of success in other discussions. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, asked a number of important questions. The EU is working on pooling expertise. Part of the EU’s counter-terrorism action plan is to agree by the end of the year a common EU strategy on tackling radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism, problems that we all face. He and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, talked about EU policies and actions on non-proliferation being related to those on counter-terrorism, and I agree that they have to be associated with each other. The Government’s international strategic priority No. 1 is intended to cover both threats, and we must ensure that the policy in each area relates to and complements the other. There is a longer answer, but that is the bones of it. The common position on a fissile material cut-off treaty was raised by a couple of noble Lords. We continue to think that the immediate start of negotiations on an FMCT at the conference on disarmament is a priority. We would prefer to see a verifiable FMCT, but we have been encouraging the commencement of negotiations without preconditions to prevent any further delays. That is consistent with the EU common position presented by the review conference on nuclear non-proliferation, which we strongly support. We have a similar level of support for the IAEA proposals for guarantee of fissile material to civil nuclear users. There has to be development in that work as well. There are a number of other proposals from the UN high-level panel that could become part of the EU common position. Negotiations on many of those are proceeding at the moment. I am more than happy to—