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Terrorism Bill

My Lords, in general I welcome the Bill’s measures to contain terrorism. My concern is whether it is too late, and perhaps even too limited. For example, as long ago as August 1999, a film on Channel 4 showed two leading Islamists, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammed and Abu Hamza al-Masri lecturing to a large crowd in Friends’ Meeting House in London. They proclaim that they do not believe in the law of this land but only in the law of Allah, and describe how they will kill us ““kaffirs””. Then, more seriously, they teach terrorist tactics, such as how to put up anti-aircraft nets with balloons and explosives, and how to bring down aircraft coming into London airports. An explosives expert is asked whether this is feasible, and his answer is yes. Those two militant leaders emphasise that that is only one example and urge every man present in the hall to go away and devise a similar terrorist tactic himself because it is jihad in this country—kill or be killed. That was long before 9/11. How many young men and women have since been inspired by those two leaders to develop terrorist tactics to use in this country when the time is ripe? How many have gone abroad to learn the militaristic tactics of jihad in jihads elsewhere? Why did it take so long for Abu Hamza and Sheikh Bakri Muhammed to be contained and why were they allowed to continue teaching terrorism in this country for so many years? I reluctantly return to an issue that I have repeatedly raised, but to which I have had no satisfactory answer from the Government or the relevant authorities. On 12 January 2000 I was speaking in your Lordships’ House about that film and about the teaching of terrorist activities in this country when unprecedented interference to the microphones drowned my voice. The interference ceased 10 seconds before the end of my speech. It is entirely compatible with some kind of jamming. I was advised by the authorities here that it was caused by ““a faulty microphone””, but I have since been advised that a thorough investigation showed no problems with the sound system, leaving as the only plausible explanation that it was intentional interference by someone with inside access. I took independent advice from international experts whose analysis I am willing to make available. They robustly disagreed with the replies that I had been given. They claimed that the only technically feasible and statistically reasonable explanation was that it was an inside job. They pointed out that such jamming is easy to achieve and that it demonstrates the ability to penetrate the security of Parliament, shows contempt for democracy, was a specific threat to me, and a general threat to anyone who dares to speak critically about Islamists. Having failed to elicit any serious response from authorities here, my concern was renewed by a newspaper report in the Sunday Times on 30 July 2000 entitled:"““Commons Security Firm Run By Terror Suspect””." Some excerpts are relevant, such as:"““A Sudanese businessman who has been linked by the American CIA to the world’s most wanted terrorist is the leading shareholder in a company that provides security systems to the House of Parliament . . . Salah Idris, 48, whose pharmaceutical factory in Sudan was flattened by American cruise missiles after it was linked to Osama Bin Laden . . . owns 25 per cent of IES, a company specialising in high-technology surveillance and security management””." The article claims that that firm also provided such equipment to New Scotland Yard, British Airways, Texaco and other blue chip firms. I cannot comment on the allegations that Salah Idris has links with terrorism, but his ownership of the pharmaceutical factory demonstrates his close relationship with the Islamist regime in Khartoum. When Parliament resumed, I tabled a Written Question. The reply on 9 October 2000 confirmed Salah Idris’s involvement in that firm. It admitted that the firm also installed surveillance equipment in the Royal Courts of Justice and provided digital playback systems for New Scotland Yard, but that Salah Idris had no day-to-day involvement in running the firm. I put the matter, if not my mind, to rest until, after the horrors of 9/11, a journalist informed me that Salah Idris had increased his shareholding to 75 per cent. An article in the Observer on 14 October 2001 confirmed that and quotes the marketing manager of IES saying:"““We provide security for some of the most sensitive sites in the UK, right up to government Ministers and the Army””." A subsequent article in the Observer on 4 November 2001 revealed that Salah Idris also held a 20 per cent stake in the security firm Protec. The article states:"““Salah Idris . . . has multi-million pound investments in two British security firms through a secretive offshore company. These firms act as security consultants and supply security systems at 11 nuclear installations in the UK, including Dounreay and Sellafield. They also have security contracts with some of Britain’s top potential terrorist targets, including Canary Wharf, the House of Commons and Army bases. The companies would have highly sensitive details of all the facilities where they install equipment””." I shall repeat the two questions that I have asked before, for which for four years I have received no satisfactory answer. They are germane to the Bill and to its wider implications. First, does either existing or proposed legislation provide protection against financial penetration of and influence in UK institutions of key political military and strategic significance? Secondly, as Oliver Letwin in another place asked when he was shadow Home Secretary:"““In the current climate, people will be rightly concerned about the Observer’sallegations, which raise very serious questions. They require an urgent response. Either the Government cleared Mr Idris of any wrongdoing, or they should launch an immediate investigation””." Before concluding, I point to similar concerns demonstrated by Dr Rachel Ehrenfeld, expert on financial institutions and director of the American Center for Democracy, and her analysis of an American security firm, Ptech. That firm develops enterprise blueprints at the highest level of US Government and corporate infrastructure, which hold every important functional, operational and technical detail of the enterprise. Ptech’s clients in 2001 included the US Department of Justice, the Department of Energy, Customs, Air Force, the White House, IBM, Sysco, Motorola and many others. She claims that examples of information gathered by using Ptech’s capabilities would include: a complete blueprint of a nuclear waste disposal site; the security procedures required to access military bases during transfer of nuclear waste materials; details of security rules and procedures; and specifications for Smartcards as implemented in various defence facilities, which could be used to make templates for unauthorised production of fake Smart IDs for potential use by terrorists. Ptech’s Middle East branch, called Horizons, received projects directly from Ptech and is used to outsource projects for Ptech’s clients. They include the Saudi Bin Laden Company and the Afghan-based BTC—Bin Laden Telecom. Among Ptech’s top investors and management in 2001 was Yassin al-Qadi who was listed as a specially designated global terrorist on 12 October 2001. Rachel Ehrenfeld continues with a long list, and concludes, as do I, with a question. She asks:"““How could a small, Saudi-based company with questionable terrorist connections obtain significant government and business contracts . . . even more importantly, are there other Ptechs around?””." I do not comment on Rachel Ehrenfeld’s disturbing analysis, but I echo her questions. Does the Bill ensure that terrorists are not using their money to buy into our national infrastructure to undermine our economy and security from within? Does it adequately provide measures to prevent such infiltration? I hope that the Minister will answer those questions and provide assurances on those serious issues.